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ABSTRACT
This study evaluates recent speech-act theory, par­
ticularly as formulated by J. L. Austin and John Searle, as 
an instrument for the teaching of the reading and writing 
of the formal essay in college freshman English classes.
The study assumes that the formal essay can be regarded as 
the performance of a series of speech acts of the various 
kinds distinguished by Austin and Searle and that the 
reader's and writer's knowledge of these distinctions will 
result in greater effectiveness in the use of language.
The study opens with several chapters in which 
speech-act theory is examined to discover elements that 
might be relevant for the study of the formal essay. The 
following four points are explored thoroughly: (1) virtu­
ally every utterance in a meaningful speech situation is a 
performance of a locutionary or propositional act, an 
illocutionary act, and usually a perlocutionary act; (2) 
propositional acts and illocutionary acts are rule-governed 
and conventional whereas perlocutionary acts (effects on an 
audience) are not; (3) conventional force indicators convey 
the illocutionary intent of the speaker; and (4) the rules, 
conventions, and indicating devices are accessible, at 
least intuitively, to most native speakers of the language.
In the next few sections of the study four essays by 
professional writers are analyzed as the performance of a 
complex series of compound illocutionary acts. The locu­
tionary and perlocutionary acts performed in these essays 
are mentioned only briefly. The lengthiest treatment is 
given to Howard Mumford Jones's "The Iron String." In this 
essay are discovered the illocutionary acts of stating, 
opining, arguing, exemplifying, accounting for, comparing, 
deprecating, commending, evaluating, and urging. Each of 
these acts is defined by the conventional rules which con­
stitute it, and some attempt is made to discover the indi­
cating devices that signal the act. Then three other 
essays found in traditional anthologies used in freshman 
English classes are analyzed: Joseph Wood Krutch's "We
Were Not Skeptical Enough,” Sylvia Angus’s "It's Pretty, 
but Is It Art?", and Irving Kristol's "Censorship and Por­
nography." The analysis of these essays shows that the 
method developed in the study of "The Iron String" works 
in the study of other essays; the analysis also adds to the 
list of illocutionary acts isolated and the rules formu­
lated, and it contributes to the understanding of the force 
indicators which authors use in addressing different audi­
ences. Some attempt is also made to determine the felicity 
of the illocutionary acts isolated in the essays. "Felic­
ity" is Austin's term for success in the performance of an 
illocutionary act. As Austin points out, the felicity of
v
an illocutionary act depends in large part on the extent to 
which the reader can interpret the author's indicators, the 
willingness of the author to use indicators to signal force, 
and the authority of the author who performs a particular 
act.
Finally, five student essays are analyzed as the 
performance of a complex series of compound illocutionary 
acts. Four of these fail to some degree because they do 
not perform the act required by the assignment, perform it 
in a garbled manner, or do not signal their acts in a clear 
way. The students are successful only when they understand 
the extent to which they obligate themselves in performing 
certain acts and therefore perform only acts which they can 
felicitously perform.
This study indicates that this approach to the 
teaching of the formal essay is a promising one which de­
serves to be tested with further classroom experimentation 
in which students are taught to read essays as the perform­
ance of illocutionary acts and to write with the conscious 
intent to perform certain acts.
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
When J. L. Austin delivered the William James Lec­
tures at Harvard in 1955 (published in 1962 as How to Do 
Things with Words), he introduced a new set of concepts and 
terms which have now been adopted by some literary critics, 
rhetoricians, and linguists. In these lectures, Austin 
examined the meaning, the force, and the effect of utter­
ances in the everyday speech of ordinary men. He concluded 
that a speech act, or the utterance of a series of vocables 
by a human speaker who consciously intends to express a 
certain meaning with a certain force in order to produce a 
certain effect, may be analyzed into two and sometimes three 
separate acts. He called one act, which carries the mean­
ing, the locutionary act; another, which conveys force, the 
illocutionary act; and the third, which is the effect of the 
preceding two acts, the perlocutionary act. In other words, 
Austin proposed that when a speaker says, "Please close the 
door," he expresses the idea that a person is to close a 
door and performs a locutionary act, he conveys the force of 
requesting and performs an illocutionary act, and he may 
persuade and perform a perlocutionary act.
1
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Since Austin's death in I960, his speech-act theory
has been modified and expanded by others, particularly John1
Searle. In articles and in his book on the philosophy of 
language, Speech Acts, Searle has built on Austin's defi­
nition of the locutionary, illocutionary, and perlocution­
ary acts. He has modified Austin's ideas in some respects, 
and he has provided concrete examples and detailed explana­
tions of the concepts on which the speech-act theory rests. 
As an explication of Austin's ideas, Searle's work is valu­
able in any study which attempts to explore the use of the 
concepts developed by Austin.
Austin's speech-act theory, originally interesting 
only in philosophers' circles, is now beginning to be ap­
preciated by scholars in other fields. Some literary 
critics have defined various literary genres in terms of 
their illocutionary force, and they have shown that a the­
ory intended originally to explain one-sentence utterances 
can be used in the explication of written discourse many 
paragraphs in length. Students interested in oral and 
written composition have also looked to Austin's speech-act 
theory for new ways to view their disciplines. Though the 
full implications of speech-act theory have not yet been 
explored, significant beginnings have been made in a number 
of fields.
In the study described in this dissertation, I have 
considered the implications of Austin's speech-act theory
3
for the teaching of the formal essay. My thesis is that an 
effective essay hy a professional writer should reflect the 
successful performance of the appropriate speech acts, that 
students can be taught to analyze these acts in the profes­
sional writer's essay, and that they can, in turn, profit 
from viewing their own writing as the performance of speech 
acts. I have, therefore, read essays by professional 
writers as the performance of successful speech acts.
Then, I have evaluated the success of student essays using 
as a criterion the extent to which they perform successful 
speech acts. Finally, I have formulated guidelines for 
teaching the reading and writing of the formal essay using 
speech-act concepts. The results of this investigation 
constitute the main divisions of this dissertation.
In the rest of ray introduction I shall take a gen­
eral preliminary view of the theory and summarize what use 
has already been made of it in the study and teaching of 
literature and composition.
I
To understand Austin's work, one must see it in the 
context of twentieth-century philosophy. According to 
Anthony Quinton, writing for The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 
"The latest phase of British philosophy can be said, with 
more precision than is usual in the history of thought, to 
have begun in the year 1903. It was the year of the first
4
major work of Bertrand Russell (born 1872), his Principles
of Mathematics, and of the two most influential writings of
G. E. Moore (1873-1958), his Principia Ethica and his essay
2
"Refutation of Idealism." The period ushered in by these 
works is characterized by its emphasis on the study of lan­
guage as the chief work of the philosopher. In the first 
decades of this period, philosophers such as Russell and 
Ludwig Wittgenstein in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus 
(1922) attempted to construct a philosophical language as 
precise as the mathematical language of calculus. Then, in 
the next two decades, the logical positivists such as A. J. 
Ayer reduced the statements interesting to philosophers to 
the "verifiable" proposition. According to Ayer, as well as 
the other positivists, verifiable propositions are either 
"analytic" or "synthetic." Ayer defined the two types as 
follows: "A proposition is analytic when its validity de­
pends solely on the definitions of the symbols it contains,
and synthetic when its validity is determined by the facts
3
of experience." Any utterance which does not fall in one 
of these two groups is either nonsense or simply an expres­
sion of an emotion. In either case, the utterance is unim­
portant in serious philosophical discussion. These philos­
ophers believed that the language of the everyday world is 
in many ways deficient and that the business of the philos­
opher is to develop an artificial language that will be a 
more nearly adequate vehicle for his ideas.
5
In the 1950’s Cambridge philosophers under the lead­
ership of Wittgenstein and an Oxford group led by Austin 
and Gilbert Ryle continued the emphasis on language which 
Quinton notes as a characteristic of this period, but they 
repudiated the previous generation's attitude toward ordi­
nary language, Wittgenstein, who, in the Tractatus, had 
advocated a mathematical language for philosophy, decided, 
according to V. C. Chappell, "that ’ordinary language is 
all right,’ and that philosophical difficulties, which are 
indeed linguistic in origin, arise not because our language
is faulty but because philosophers misdescribe and miscon- 
4
strue it." Ryle's landmark essay, "Ordinary Language," 
first published in 1953 in The Philosophical Review, called 
for a consideration of the vernacular as a corrective mea­
sure which the philosopher's jargon requires. As Ryle ex­
pressed it, "'Back to ordinary language' can be (but often 
is not) the slogan of those who have awoken from the for- 
maliser’s dream. This slogan, so used, should be repudiated
only by those who hope to replace philosophising by reckon- 
5
ing." The Oxford and the Cambridge philosophers who agreed 
with Ryle came to be known as the ordinary language philos­
ophers .
Among twentieth-century philosophers, Austin is, 
first of all, an ordinary language philosopher. In his 
early essays and lectures, he turns again and again to the 
way an expression is used in ordinary English for his basic
6
information on the expression. For example, in ’’Truth,"
an essay published in 1950, he begins with the question,
"What is it that we say is true or is false? Or, how does
6
the phrase 'is true' occur in English sentences?" In
Sense and Sensibilia, lecture notes published in 1962,
Austin's chief attack on Ayer's "two languages" grows from
Ayer's failure to regard ordinary language with respect.
In the first chapter he affirms, "The fact is, as I shall
try to make clear, that our ordinary words are much subtler
in their uses, and mark many more distinctions, than phi-
7
losophers have realized." In the essay, "A Plea for Ex­
cuses," Austin sums up his attitude toward ordinary lan­
guage: "Certainly, then, ordinary language is not the last
word: in principle it can everywhere be supplemented and
improved upon and superseded. Only remember, it is the 
8
first word."
Austin's other characteristic which is important in 
this study because it led to the theory of the illocution­
ary act is his concern for the dimensions of language which 
the language philosophers of the first half of the century 
considered irrelevant in the study of philosophy. In a 1956
B. B. C. broadcast, a transcript of which was later printed 
in Philosophical Papers as "Performative Utterances," Austin 
describes the philosophical milieu in which he developed 
his theory. He says,
We have not got to go very far back in the history of 
philosophy to find philosophers assuming more or less
7
as a matter of course that the sole business, the sole 
interesting business, of any utterance— that is, of any­
thing we say— is to be true or at least false. Of 
course they had always known that there are other kinds 
of things which we say— things like imperatives, the ex­
pressions of wishes, and exclamations— some of which had 
even been classified by grammarians, though it wasn't 
perhaps too easy to tell always which was which. But 
still philosophers have assumed that the only things 
that they are interested in are utterances which report 
facts or which describe situations truly or falsely.9
Austin cites two periods in the development of this ap­
proach. In the first period, "people began to say: 'Well,
if these things are true or false it ought to be possible
to decide which they are, and if we can't decide which they
10
are they aren't any good but are, in short, nonsense."’
In the second period, philosophers began to question whether 
or not the statements classified as nonsense had been in­
tended as statements at all. For example, as a philosopher 
beginning his work in this period, Austin asks, "Mightn't 
they [the statements classified as nonsense] perhaps be in­
tended not to report facts but to influence people in this 
way or that, or to let off steam in this way or that? Or 
perhaps at any rate some elements in these utterances per­
formed such functions, or, for example, drew attention in 
some way (without actually reporting it) to some important
feature of the circumstances in which the utterance was be­
ll
ing made." Austin is interested in the second type of 
utterance— that which is not intended to report facts or, 
if it does report facts, also has an additional dimension.
Working with ordinary language, Austin set out to
8
explore this dimension of utterances which cannot be ac­
counted for by their factual content. Significantly, he 
worked with the utterance of the sentence or proposition, 
not with the sentence or proposition itself, and then with 
the "total speech act," as he calls it. Summing up his 
conclusions in Lecture XII in How to Do Things with ffords, 
Austin makes the following point first: "The total speech
act in the total speech situation is the only actual phe­
nomenon which, in the last resort, we are engaged in elu- 
12
cidating." In considering the "total speech act," not 
the sentence or proposition, Austin moved from a distinc­
tion between two kinds of utterances— the performative and 
the constative— to the notion that every utterance will be 
a locutionary and an illocutionary act and may also be a 
perlocutionary act. Then he established the nucleus of a 
theory of rules and conventions which govern the illocu­
tionary act.
Austin's discussion of the performative in the first 
seven chapters or lectures in How to Do Things with Words 
begins with a consideration of certain utterances which 
seem to have meaning but which do not seem to be true or 
false. The most obvious of these is a ceremonial utterance 
such as "I do" in the wedding ceremony or "I name this ship 
the Queen Elizabeth" in christening a ship. The grammat­
ical form of these utterances is the simplest form of the 
logical positivist's verifiable proposition, but the
9
utterance is not intended to make a statement and is not 
subject to the need for verification. Instead, such an 
utterance as "I do" "performs” an action. The actual utter­
ing of the words is a vital part of the marriage ceremony or 
the christening of the ship. Hence, Austin calls this type 
of utterance a "performative." The "constative," on the 
other hand, is the utterance which makes a statement and is 
subject to the need for verification. Its chief function 
is not to perform an action but to report or describe. A 
constative with the same form as the performatives which 
Austin uses for examples is the following: "I see the dog."
In this utterance, the speaker describes his own action, 
but, by his utterance, Austin concludes at this point, he 
does not perform an action since he does not perform the 
act of "seeing" by stating that he is seeing.
In these first lectures Austin explores the idea that 
the performative is capable of being happy or unhappy and 
the constative of being true or false. The "doctrine of the 
Infelicities" defines the conditions under which an utter­
ance is happy. These conditions, which will be discussed 
fully in Chapter III, are the circumstances surrounding the 
utterance, the intention of the speaker, and the commitment 
of the speaker to carry out or stand behind the commitment 
which he makes in the performative utterance. The consta­
tive, on the other hand, Austin tries to show, can only be 
judged by the extent to which it can be verified.
10
By Lecture VIII, however, Austin has abandoned the 
distinction between performative and constative as a help­
ful way of dividing utterances into two completely separate 
classes. After experimenting with various grammatical 
tests, he concludes that none of them will be consistently 
useful in his attempt to distinguish constatives from per­
formatives. More important, he realizes that every utter­
ance is an action. The simplest verifiable proposition—  
for example, ’’The rose is red"— becomes an act of stating 
when it is uttered by a speaker. As such, it is subject to 
the conditions which must be satisfied if a performative is 
to be happy. On the other hand, Austin discovers that per­
formative utterances not only have a happiness-unhappiness 
dimension but also are capable of being true or false. In 
fact, the happiness of a performative depends in part on its 
being true. For example, a performative such as "I apolo­
gize" is only happy when it is true that the speaker is 
apologizing. Austin concedes that "considerations of the 
happiness and unhappiness type may infect statements (or
some statements) and considerations of the type of truth and
13
falsity may infect performatives (or some performatives)."
In other words, when Austin considers the "total speech 
act," he cannot divide utterances into two discrete classes, 
one consisting of performatives and the other of constatives.
Austin, therefore, replaces the attempt to separate 
utterances into two groups with the attempt to distinguish
11
different acts within the ’’total speech act.” Most signi­
ficant utterances, he decides, involve two acts: a locu­
tionary act and an illocutionary act. Some utterances also 
perform a third act— the perlocutionary act. The locution­
ary act is the direct descendant of the constative. It is
simply "uttering a certain sentence with a certain sense
14
and reference.” Austin's favorite example of a sentence 
which can be used in performing a locutionary act is "The 
cat is on the mat." Uttering it, the speaker refers to 
"the cat" and tells something about the particular cat.
The illocutionary and the perlocutionary acts go back to 
the performative. The illocutionary act is the component 
of the utterance which determines its force, or the type of 
action which the speaker is performing in uttering the sen­
tence. The speaker may be ordering, warning, or advocating, 
or he may be stating. Austin can find no clear examples of 
utterances in which he is not doing some action such as 
these when he is uttering a meaningful sentence and intend­
ing to communicate with an audience. If a speaker says to 
his listener, "The cat is on the mat," unless the circum­
stances are completely outside the limits which define human 
communication, he is performing an illocutionary act of 
stating or asking or even warning. The perlocutionary act 
is "what we bring about or achieve b£ saying something such
as convincing, persuading, deterring, and even, say, sur-
15
prising or misleading." Every speech act will have its
12
locutionary and illocutionary components, but, since the 
perlocutionary act is the effect on the listener, some 
speech acts may not include a perlocutionary component.
One may warn of a danger, for example, without convincing 
or deterring. To sum up the character of the three acts, 
Austin says, "Thus we distinguished the locutionary act 
. . .which has a meaning; the illocutionary act which has 
a certain force in saying something; the perlocutionary act
which is the achieving of certain effects by saying some-16
thing."
Virtually all utterances are locutionary and illocu­
tionary acts: in the act of performing the locutionary
act, the speaker must employ a certain force and therefore 
perform an illocutionary act. Any act may also have a per­
locutionary effect: it may cause the hearer to change an
attitude, escape a danger, or rob a bank. Whether this ef­
fect is achieved is outside the full control of the speaker. 
In fact, the effect which he achieves may not even be an 
effect which the speaker has intended to bring about by his 
speech act. To Austin, the most interesting of the three 
acts is, then, the illocutionary. The locutionary aspect 
of utterances he feels has been overemphasized by the logi­
cal positivists. The perlocutionary act is too subjective, 
too dependent on the hearer's emotional response, to provide 
material for the kind of objective study in which he is in­
terested. Ignored by the previous generation of philos-
13
ophers, yet possessing the built-in characteristics neces­
sary for an objective study, the illocutionary act is 
Austin's chief concern.
Austin's work with the theory of the illocutionary 
act was not, however, complete at the time of his death in 
1960. Of his three major works, only Philosophical Papers 
contains essays published during his lifetime and therefore 
prepared for publication by Austin himself. After Austin's 
death, C. J. Warnock edited some of his notes for publica­
tion as Sense and Sensibilia. J. 0. Urmson, assisted by 
Warnock, prepared the manuscript of How to Do Things with 
Words from Austin's William James Lectures notes. Because 
his work was not considered finished, his fellow scholars 
have found it possible to amend and supplement it without 
assuming an adversary role in relation to Austin. The most 
important, John Searle, in Speech Acts and in articles based 
on his dissertation, has expanded the Austinian framework 
into the beginnings of a full philosophy of language. Aus­
tin's three books supplemented by the relevant portions of 
Searle's works will provide the understanding of the illo­
cutionary act which is the basis of this study.
IX
In the last ten years, encouraged, it appears, by the 
publication of How to Do Things with Words in 1962 and 
Speech Acts in 1969, some literary critics and rhetoricians
14
have attempted to show that Austin's theory has signifi­
cant implications for the formulation of literary theories 
and new methods of teaching oral and written composition.
In a recent article in New Literary History, "Cumulation, 
Revolution, and Progress," Martin Steinmann describes Aus­
tin's speech-act theory as revolutionary and predicts the 
emergence of a new school of criticism based on "the Lit-
erature-as-Imitation-Speech-Act Theory" which may overthrow
17
the New Critics' "Literature-as-Special-Language Theory." 
The effect of the use of the theory on the teaching of oral 
and written composition as well as linguistic studies seems 
likely to be equally revolutionary.
Richard Ohmann, editor of College English and a 
leading proponent of the usefulness of speech-act theory in 
literary criticism, called for a study of its usefulness as 
early as 1971. In that year he begins the final section of 
his essay, "Speech, Action, and Style," with the following 
statement: "A discourse is a set of grammatical structures
with meanings. It is also an attempt to influence the 
reader. I am suggesting that these facts about the ontol­
ogy of discourse have been well recognized in theories of
style, but that a third— that a discourse is a series of
18
illocutionary acts— has not, and ought to be." In the 
same year in another essay, "Speech Acts and the Definition 
of Literature," Ohmann proposes this definition: "A liter­
ary work is a discourse whose sentences lack the illocution
15
ary forces which would normally attach to them. Its illo­
cutionary force is mimetic." Considering this defini­
tion, Ohmann observes:
If the work of literature is mimetic of speech acts, 
then it is in a sense exhibiting both quasi-speech-acts 
and the sentences that purportedly help bring about 
those acts. To exhibit them is to direct attention to 
them, and, among other things, to their intricacy of 
meaning and their formal regularity. Similarly, since 
the quasi-speech-acts of literature are not carrying on 
the world’s business— describing, urging, contracting, 
etc.— the reader may well attend to them in a non­
pragmatic way, and thus allow them to realize their 
emotive potential. In other words, the suspension of 
normal illocutionary forces tends to shift a reader's 
attention to the locutionary acts themselves and to 
their perlocutionary effects.2®
Ohmann studies the connection between style and the illocu­
tionary act in "Speech, Action, and Style"— a connection 
based on his view of literature as "a series of hypotheti­
cal acts, grounded in the conventions for verbal action
21
that we have all thoroughly learned." In "Speech, Liter­
ature, and the Space Between," written in 1972, Ohmann ap­
plies his understanding of the illocutionary force of ut­
terances to an exploration of discourses ranging from news-22
paper articles to television commercials.
In the essay, "Literature as Act," printed in Seymour 
Chatman’s Approaches to Poetics, 1973, Ohmann expands ideas 
for which he has laid the foundations in the earlier arti­
cles. For one thing, he defines irony in speech-act termi­
nology as the result of an illocutionary act's infelicity. 
The desperate irony of a play like Beckett’s Endgame he
16
shows to be a result of the author's manipulation of 
"quasi-speech-acts" in a milieu in which felicitous speech 
acts are impossible since the understandings necessary for 
their successful performance are no longer shared by speak­
er and hearer. Ohmann demonstrates that the irony of Un­
dershaft’s speeches in Act II of Major Barbara results 
from their infelicity and that Barbara's understanding of 
the truths which they convey results from her knowledge of 
their infelicity. In addition, Ohmann makes an important 
point concerning the speech act in fiction which applies 
to the act in any written discourse: "A written literary
work preserves in its words a record of purported speech
acts. They are frozen in its text, to be brought alive
23
whenever a reader reenacts them as a participant." Both 
of these ideas are important as speech-act theory is ex­
panded to explain other forms of literature.
Monroe C. Beardsley, co-author with W. K. Wimsatt of 
"The Intentional Fallacy" and "The Affective Fallacy," de­
fines the lyric poem in The Possibility of Criticism, pub­
lished in 1970, as "the complex imitation of a compound
24
illocutionary act." Beardsley calls the imitation "com­
plex" for the following reason: "What makes a discourse a
literary work (roughly speaking) is its exploitation to a 
high degree of the illocutionary-act potential of its verbal 
ingredients— or, in more usual terminology, its richness and 
complexity of meaning. And what makes a literary work a
17
poem is the degree to which it condenses that complexity
25
of meaning into compact, intense utterance,'' Defining it 
as "compound," he considers that the poem relies heavily 
for its complexity on primary and secondary illocutionary 
acts. To explain these Beardsley compares "Bring me my 
slippers" to "Bring me my favorite slippers, which are such 
a comfort to me." He calls both of these examples of or­
dering, but the second he holds to be also an example of 
praising. Beardsley sums up the difference between the two 
utterances: "The second case is a compound illocutionary
act, though the syntax makes the ordering primary, the
26
praising secondary." In a later essay, "The Concept of 
Literature," Beardsley is less confident of his definition 
of the lyric poem as "the complex imitation of a compound 
illocutionary act,"but he is not willing to abandon it com­
pletely. He concludes, "What I wish to suggest, by way of 
conclusion, although without anything like an adequate de­
fense, is that there is indeed an underlying relationship 
between (1) being an imitation illocutionary act and (2)
being distinctly above the norm in ratio of implicit to ex-
27
plicit meaning." Since the relationship of implicit to 
explicit meaning is basic to Beardsley's other theories, he 
is expressing a crucial idea when he connects implicit and 
explicit meanings to the illocutionary act.
In recent years at least four other critics have used 
Austin's terminology, and Searle himself has smoothed the
18
way for a consideration of the illocutionary act in fiction,
Marcia Eaton, in articles based on her 1968 dissertation,
Stanford University, adds the term "translocutionary act"
28
to Austin's three terms for speech acts. Richard Gale in
the essay, "The Fictive Use of Language," which he describes
as "a paper on the ontology of fiction," considers fiction
from a philosophical viewpoint using the locutionary, illo-
29
cutlonary, and perlocutionary distinction. In the essay,
"Three Kinds of Intention," printed in Modern Language Notes 
in 1972, Michael Hancher distinguishes three kinds of inten­
tion which may be discovered in a literary work: "(1) the
author’s intention to make something or other; (2) the au­
thor’s intention to be (understood as) acting in some way or
other; (3) the author's intention to cause something or
30
other to happen." Hancher shows the problem discussed by 
Wimsatt and Beardsley as the "intentional fallacy" to result 
from confusing these three kinds of intention, which he 
feels correspond roughly to the locutionary, the illocution­
ary, and the perlocutionary acts. Using speech-act theory, 
Robert L. Brown, Jr., in "Intention and the Contexts of 
Poetry," published in 1974 in Centrum, attacks the idea that 
interest in the author's intention is a "fallacy" and dis­
cusses two kinds of intention— the intention of the speaker
in the poem or work of fiction and the intention of the au-
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thor of the work. In a recent article, "The Logical sta­
tus of Fictional Discourse,” Searle shows the way in which
19
he believes the author of a work of fiction uses illocu-
tionary acts and the status of these acts in the work of 
32
fiction.
In the field of speech several works have explored 
ordinary language philosophy as a possible source of in­
sight. Karl R. Wallace, author of Understanding Discourse: 
The Speech Act and Rhetorical Action, uses Austin's ideas 
to support his "notion of purpose" as well as the "notion
of material foundations of utterance and the form and sub-
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stance of utterance." John Stewart's dissertation, Uni­
versity of Southern California, 1970, is entitled "Rhetor­
icians on Language and Meaning: An Ordinary Language Phi­
losophy Critique." Stewart, in a recent article based on 
this study, summarizes a number of treatments of language 
and meaning in recent speech communication literature and 
the approach to these subjects of the ordinary language 
philosophers, Wittgenstein, Ryle, Austin, P. F. Strawson, 
and William P. Alston. In this article, printed in The 
Quarterly Journal of Speech, he proposes a study of ordi­
nary language philosophy by both the rhetorician and the
34
speech communication specialist. Paul Newell Campbell,
on the other hand, tries to show in "A Rhetorical View of
Locutionary, Illocutionary, and Perlocutionary Acts" that
ordinary language philosophy can have little importance in
35
the field of speech.
A few attempts have been made to incorporate the
20
conclusions of speech-act theory into programs for teaching 
writing. For example, Ohmann has collaborated with Harold
C. Martin and James Wheatley in a textbook for a composi­
tion course, The Logic and Rhetoric Of Exposition (third 
edition), in which the authors consider exposition as the 
illocutionary act of stating or asserting and attempt to 
list the rules and obligations of the writer of statements 
or assertions. In addition, they explain persuasion as a 
perlocutionary act and strategies of persuasion as the 
means of bringing about a change in an audience. This book 
makes a valuable contribution to the study of speech acts 
and composition, but it does not fully exploit the possi­
bilities of the Austinian theory. It limits serious exposi­
tory writing to the illocutionary act of asserting, it does 
not explore the relationship between style and illocutionary- 
force potential, and it does not attempt the analysis of 
whole works.
In addition to the Martin-Ohmann-Wheatley textbook, 
three dissertations have contributed to the attempt to re­
late ordinary language philosophy to the study of language 
and composition. One of these, "Illocutionary Acts and 
Transformational Grammar," by Steven Davis, University of 
Illinois., 196S, is concerned with the teaching of composi­
tion only to the extent that generative grammar is consider­
ed to be a tool for improving composition. In it, Stevens 
explores the relationship between generative grammar and
21
speech-act theory and concludes that a "universal grammar"
will have an "illocutionary act component" which will ac-
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count for questions and assertions. In other words, he 
concludes that the question and the assertion are present 
in every language because the human mind works in a certain 
way. Jack Reitzes in "J. L. Austin's Theory of Speech Acts: 
Its Theoretical and Heuristic Potential for the Study of 
Language," Harvard, 1968, finds that "Austin's theory can 
be construed as a valuable heuristic device both for theo­
rists involved in the study of language, linguistic perform­
ance and perception and for those who are in the process of
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learning their language as well." Reitzes' study is di­
rected not to the teaching of composition but to the teach­
ing of language, and it remains on the level of a theoreti­
cal philosophical study. Alan Lemke's "Philosophy of Lan­
guage and the Teaching of Writing," University of Illinois, 
1972, is the only dissertation at this time which offers 
practical suggestions for teaching composition. Lemke looks 
for an approach to the teaching of writing in the works of 
Wittgenstein, Austin, Alston, Kenneth Burke, and Brand 
Blanchard. Drawing upon the work of these men, Lemke advo­
cates teaching writing as "a way of knowing," utilizing "a
process in which the student moves from a state of relative
38
incoherence toward the end of his knowing impulse."
Lemke's chief contribution to techniques for teaching writ­
ing is his suggestion concerning pre-writing activities. He
22
feels that the student should be led through a dialectic 
process to accept as his own the question or problem which 
he is to consider. Good writing will result from the stu­
dent's serious consideration of the problem. Lemke deals 
with problems of style or arrangement only as they arise 
and are solved as the student searches for a coherent an­
swer.
One point emerges from a consideration of these uses 
of the illocutionary-act theory. A growing number of schol­
ars feel that this theory, developed in terms of the simple 
one-sentence utterance, can be applied to discourse of more 
than one sentence in length and even to written discourse.
In addition, two definitions which apply the idea of the 
illocutionary act to written discourse of some length have 
appeared: Beardsley’s definition of the lyric poem as "the
complex imitation of a compound illocutionary act" and Oh- 
mann's definition of any discourse as "a series of illocu­
tionary acts." In prose nonfiction the discourse is not an 
imitation of an illocutionary act: the author performs the
act in his own right when he speaks in his own person. Usu­
ally in nonfiction the author is speaking for himself. A 
long discourse will be "a series of illocutionary acts," and 
it will be a complex performance of illocutionary acts. Its 
separate sentences will usually perform a compound illocu­
tionary act. In fact, the discourse as a whole may be ana­
lyzed as a compound illocutionary act. For example, an
23
article for a periodical may be, first of all, an act of 
asserting and, second, an act of advocating. Then it may 
have within it a series of acts, most of them compound, all 
of them contributing to the complexity of the performance 
of illocutionary acts in the essay. In this study, the 
formal essay will be considered as a performance of a com­
plex series of usually compound illocutionary acts all of 
which contribute to the total illocutionary force, which 
in turn may be compound.
Ill
When one applies to the formal essay the idea that 
any discourse is the performance of a series of illocution­
ary acts, he is broadening a theory based originally on 
single utterances in speech situations to fit a discourse 
that may run to thousands of words. This application is 
possible if one accepts the extended application of the 
term supplied by Beardsley and Ohmann. It becomes even 
more plausible applied to the formal essay as I define it 
in this study.
I define the formal essay by pulling from the histor­
ical definition of the essay those elements which seem to 
make it in its more formal instances a suitable label for 
the type of writing which a student should master before he 
enters a particular field with its particular writing de­
mands. In other words, this definition of the formal essay
24
should apply to the ''theme11 which is the goal of freshman 
English instruction. James Kinneavy in A Theory of Dis­
course comments on the ambiguous uses of the term essay
which, he feels, "make it presently unacceptable in any
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precise context." Certainly the term has been a catch­
all term, used in fact to apply to any short prose non­
fiction. In its evolution, however, the term has kept 
some elements which make it meaningful in spite of its 
broadness. The English word essay is derived from the 
French essai used by Montaigne in the sixteenth century to 
refer to his "attempts" to explore subjects of interest to 
him in short prose works. Samuel Johnson turned the defi­
nition in a pejorative direction in his eighteenth-century 
definition: "A loose sally of the mind; an irregular in­
digested piece; not a regular and orderly composition."
OED lists its definition of the literary essay under the 
second division of its definition of the word essay. All 
the definitions in this division are "a trying to do some­
thing." When this definition is limited to written dis­
course, OED picks up parts of Johnson's definition: "A
composition of moderate length on any particular subject, 
or branch of a subject; originally implying want of finish, 
’an irregular undigested piece' (J), but now said of a com­
position more or less elaborate in style, though limited in 
range." The thread tying all these together is knotted at 
Montaigne's first use of "attempts" to describe his short
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meditative sketches. It is the key, in fact, to modern de­
finitions such as the one in the 1971 unabridged edition of 
The Random House Dictionary of the English Language and in 
Barnet, Berman, and Burto's A Dictionary of Literary, Dra­
matic, and Cinematic Terms. The first defines the essay as 
"a short literary composition on a particular theme or sub­
ject, usually in prose and generally analytic, speculative, 
or interpretative.” The second defines it as "a composi­
tion having no pretensions to completeness or thoroughness 
of treatment." This last definition keeps most clearly the 
idea of the essay as an "attempt” or a "loose sally of the 
mind," but even the Random House definition continues to 
suggest that the work is not one in which the writer merely 
reports but one in which he analyzes, speculates, and in­
terprets in an "attempt" to produce a viable analysis, 
speculation, or interpretation. The OED adds the idea of a 
"more or less elaborate style," rejecting Johnson's idea 
that the essay must be "an irregular indigested piece."
In this study, the essay is defined first of all as 
an attempt to explore a subject. As such it will make no 
claim to exhaustive treatment of the subject. In the second 
place, it will be speculative, interpretative, and analytic. 
Finally, its style will be as elaborate as the subject and 
the audience demand. Since the type of essay studied here 
is to be limited to the formal essay, its style will never 
be "loose" or "irregular."
26
The type of essay to be considered is then the for­
mal essay. According to Steinmann and Willen in the intro­
duction to Literature for Writing, the goal in writing in 
freshman English and most college courses is a paper which
is "rather formal, impersonal, and objective; essentially 
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serious." They give the name formal essay to this type 
of writing to distinguish it from the familiar or informal 
essay. No one can claim that the dividing line between the 
formal and the familiar essay is so clear that essays can 
be separated into two groups which will satisfy everyone. 
Essays can only be arranged on a continuum from the most 
formal to the completely personal and subjective. In this 
study, the essays to be considered will group themselves 
far enough in the direction of the formal as to arouse no 
real argument. They will appear to be impersonal, objec­
tive, and serious because they will be written in formal 
English, will usually employ the third person, and will be 
essentially serious. Like any essay, they will be, in re­
ality, somewhat personal, since each will be an "attempt" 
by its author to develop a point which he has chosen to 
make. The style will often be appropriate for what Kin- 
neavy calls "reference discourse," especially the "reference 
discourse" which he classes as "exploratory," but the empha­
sis on the author's opinion rather than the world which he 
is describing will keep the work an essay.
Since the essay is closely tied to its author's
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attempt to convey an idea to an audience, even when it is 
its most formal, it is especially amenable to analysis as 
the performance of speech acts which result in a "complex" 
series of illocutionary acts made up of "compound" acts.
The essay has, however, one characteristic which distin­
guishes it from the spoken act. The illocutionary acts in 
written discourse are usually prepared with an audience in 
mind, but the audience is not present during the writing or 
speaking process. The acts therefore become merely sen­
tences when they leave the writer, and the sentences must 
be re-incorporated into speech acts by the reader. Thus, 
each act cannot be considered successful or unsuccessful un­
til the sentence is read. Since the writer will not get the 
kind of help with each utterance that the speaker gets from 
his audience, he must work harder than the speaker to indi­
cate the force of his utterances in his sentences which the 
reader will transform into speech acts as he reads. In 
other words, the illocutionary acts in an essay should be 
indicated in more obvious ways than the same acts in spoken 
discourse, or, at least, in ways more closely tied to the 
sentence.
The next chapter of this dissertation will be devoted 
to a discussion of the theory of the locutionary, illocu­
tionary, and perlocutionary acts. Chapter III will explore 
the conditions and rules which "constitute" illocutionary 
acts and make them successful. Then Chapter IV will record
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my first attempt to analyze an essay as the performance of 
a complex series of usually compound illocutionary acts.
The essay chosen for this analysis is Howard Mumford Jones's 
"The Iron String," which was originally prepared to be pre­
sented as a speech to a group of Harvard students. Any 
editing which the original speech would need in order to be 
intelligible to an audience of readers, one can assume has 
been done, so the speech printed here should have the ex­
plicitness in its use of terms and force indicators which 
written discourse requires. At the same time, as an essay, 
it retains the value of having originally been a complicated 
speech act of the kind which Austin and Searle specifically 
discuss. In this chapter, Jones's essay will be analyzed 
as the performance of a complex series of compound illocu­
tionary acts which are indicated in conventional ways and 
constituted by certain rules and conditions. The total 
illocutionary force of the essay should become apparent as 
well as its locutionary or propositional (Searle's term) 
content and the complex of illocutionary forces within the 
essay. In addition, the function of force indicators will 
be elucidated, and the list drawn from the work of Austin 
and Searle will be amended. Finally, the rules and condi­
tions for the acts performed will be formulated. Through a 
consideration of this essay, close to Austin's original 
theory since it was prepared to be delivered as a speech and 
to the personal essay because of its occasional use of first
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person, the usefulness of the theory for the analysis of 
essays further removed from the speech situation and placed 
closer to the formal end of the essay continuum should be­
come apparent.
In the fifth chapter, therefore, the points in the 
theory which still appear to be pertinent will be applied 
to the analysis of the following essays: MWe Were Not
Skeptical Enough" by Joseph Wood Krutch, "It’s Pretty, but 
Is It Art?" by Sylvia Angus, and "Pornography and Censor­
ship" by Irving Kristol.
In the sixth chapter, the practice in analyzing suc­
cessful professional essays will supply the method for ana­
lyzing student essays, some of which "misfired," to use 
Austin's term. Such an analysis will be shown to result in 
a clearer insight into the student writer's problems. More 
important, it will provide a way to explain the student's 
difficulties and suggest the way to correct them.
The study will end with the suggestions for using 
the speech act theory in the composition class which seem 
valid after it has been applied in these different ways.
CHAPTER II
LOCUTIONARY, ILLOCUTIONARY, AND PERLOCUTIONARY ACTS
J. L. Austin formulated his speech-act theory in 
order to call attention to the dimensions of the total 
speech act which philosophers in the decades before him 
had not considered relevant in the study of philosophy.
In the William James Lectures presented at Harvard in 1955 
and printed in 1962 as How to Do Things with Words, he 
maintains that most utterances by a speaker who is ad­
dressing an audience convey a meaning together with a 
certain force and sometimes a certain effect or, in other 
words, may be analyzed into a locutionary, an illocution­
ary, and sometimes a perlocutionary act. He devotes most 
of his attention in How to Do Things with Words to the 
illocutionary act and its relationship to the locutionary 
act. Because the illocutionary act is, unlike the perlo­
cutionary act, dependent for its successful performance 
on language conventions which the speaker and the hearer 
must know, Austin maintains that he or any other third 
person can listen to a conversation and determine what 
illocutionary as well as what locutionary acts the speak­
ers are performing and what language conventions they are 
using to perform these acts.
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John Searle, in Speech Acts and a number of articles 
published before Speech Acts, amends Austin's ideas and 
applies the theory to specific acts. He shares, moreover, 
without reservation Austin's view of the conventional na­
ture of illocutionary acts. He agrees with the view 
stated by Austin: "A judge should be able to decide, by
hearing what was said, what locutionary and illocutionary
acts were performed, but not what perlocutionary acts were 
1
achieved."
From the works of these two men, then, comes the 
theory of the locutionary, illocutionary, and perlocution­
ary acts which I shall use as the basis for my analysis of 
the formal essay. According to this theory, a speaker in 
a certain situation signals by conventional indicators that 
he is performing a total speech act which has a certain 
content and force. Because of their conventional nature 
these indicators can be interpreted by a third person or 
Austin's "judge."
I
After J. L. Austin in the William James Lectures had 
abandoned his earlier constative-perforraative distinction 
between utterances in favor of the distinction between 
meaning and force in a single utterance, he turned to the 
analysis of two acts which he believed could be found in 
any meaningful utterance, the locutionary and the illocu-
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tionary acts, and a third act, the perlocutionary act, 
which he believed to occur in many speech acts. He devoted 
most of his interest to the illocutionary act. Because of 
their conventional nature, he believed that it is possible 
to study speech acts and ascertain their illocutionary 
force with more precision than is possible in the study of 
most human activities and to discover conventional force 
indicators which signal force changes. The most reliable 
of these indicators Austin concluded is the "explicit per­
formative formula" which he used to make a tentative list­
ing of illocutionary acts into five categories, "verdic- 
tives," "exercitives," "commissives," "behabitives," and 
"expositives." These categories are not mutually exclu­
sive, but interrelated, Austin discovered, but with the 
explicit formula and other force indicators they are help­
ful in studying the illocutionary force of utterances.
The locutionary act is, to Austin, the carrier of
meaning defined as "correspondence with the facts" of a
linguistic form. The locutionary act, in other words, is
the direct descendant of the constative. In Lecture XI
Austin explains,
With the constative utterance, we abstract from the il­
locutionary (let alone the perlocutionary) aspects of 
the speech act, and we concentrate on the locutionary: 
moreover, we use an oversimplified notion of corres­
pondence with the facts— oversimplified because essen­
tially it brings in the illocutionary aspect. We aim 
at the ideal of what would be right to say in all cir­
cumstances, for any purpose, to any audience, &c. 2
When Austin considers the locutionary act, he says that he
33
is abstracting from the total speech act "what would be 
right to say in all circumstances, for any purpose, to any 
audience." For example, the sentence "The cat is on the 
mat" should convey to any audience of English speaking 
people the "fact" that the cat is on the mat. Of course, 
uttered by a speaker to a certain audience, it will never 
convey only this fact, but Austin is willing to consider 
the product of this abstracting, though it is "over­
simplified," because of the need he feels for isolating a 
facet of the speech act which conveys a "correspondence 
with the facts." Austin, in effect, recommends here a def­
inition of meaning in which the performance of a locutionary 
act is "roughly equivalent to uttering a certain sentence
with a certain sense and reference, which again is roughly
3
equivalent to 'meaning' in the traditional sense." This
act will convey the same meaning in every speaking situation
as long as the "sense" and "reference" are the same. These
in turn equal "correspondence with the facts."
To explain his use of "sense" and "reference," in
Lecture VIII Austin breaks the locutionary act into three
other acts: the phonetic, the phatic, and the rhetic.
Austin is not interested in the phonetic act, which is
"merely the act of uttering certain noises," though it is,
4
of course, a basic condition of all speech acts. The 
phatic act is "the uttering of certain vocables or words, 
i.e. noises of certain types, belonging to and as belonging
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to, a certain vocabulary, conforming to and as conforming
5
to a certain grammar." In other words, the vocables ut­
tered in the phonetic act are organized into words and 
grammatical phrases in the phatic act. The phatic act has 
no meaning, however; it may even result in nonsense. For 
example, "The green grass is growing" used to perform a 
phatic act and a phonetic act is a successful performance 
of both acts because it uses the vocabulary, the grammar, 
and the sound system of English. "The boing boing is bo- 
ing" :‘s a phonetic act but not a phatic act since it does 
not use the vocabulary of English. "The green grass is 
growing" has no meaning until the speaker refers to certain 
grass and describes it as growing. The utterance can even 
be nonsense if the only grass to which reference is made 
is artificial. It is in the rhetic act that sounds orga­
nized by a particular vocabulary and grammar in the pho­
netic and phatic acts become meaningful utterances or, in
Austin's words, acquire "a certain more-or-less definite
6
sense and reference." Austin illustrates the difference 
between the phatic and the rhetic acts with the same series 
of vocables. The utterance, "He said, 'The cat is on the 
mat,’" reports a phatic act. On the other hand, this ut­
terance also reports a rhetic act: "He said that the cat
is on the mat." Employing essentially the same "vocables" 
and the same vocabulary and grammar, the second construc­
tion has "a certain more-or-less definite sense and
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reference": a native speaker understands the second utter­
ance as an attempt by a speaker to refer to the world of 
facts or to secure a "correspondence with the facts." The 
first sentence, on the other hand, merely reports a sen­
tence using the grammar and vocabulary of English. It may 
be a sentence uttered by a parrot or a robot in imitation 
of human speech.
A more precise understanding of "sense" and "refer­
ence" eludes even the reader who studies Austin's discus­
sion in the essay, "How to Talk." There Austin explores 
what he calls "Speech-situation S »" in which there is only
7one utterance pattern,"I is a T." "I" is the symbol for
the "I-word," which refers or corresponds to a single en­
tity, a sample of an "item-type." Austin uses the example 
"1227 is a rhombus." "1227" refers to one figure or item, 
identified as "1227." Reference is made when "1227" is 
linked with this figure or item. The "T-word," on the 
other hand, is linked to the "sense" or "pattern."
"Rhombus" gives the "sense" of the item-type "1227." Thus 
it seems to identify it, describe it, or limit it. The way 
this distinction would work even in a simple utterance such 
as "The cat is on the mat" is not completely clear. One 
assumes that "the cat" refers and that "on the mat" carries 
the sense of "the cat" in this context. However, an at­
tempt to extend this analysis further quickly becomes orig­
inal work tied to Austin's thinking by conjecture only. On
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the basis of Austin's work, one can conclude only that some 
element in each speech act refers to the nonlinguistic world 
and that another element gives the sense of that reference—  
added information about it.
The phonetic, the phatic, and the rhetic acts, the 
last characterized by "a more-or-less definite sense and 
reference," make up the locutionary act. This act is the 
uttering of sounds using a particular vocabulary and gram­
mar to convey a certain sense and reference. When one ques­
tions the purpose of the utterance produced in this way, he 
is moving from a consideration of the utterance as a locu­
tionary act to a study of it as an illocutionary act, the 
carrier of "force" in the utterance.
Acknowledging that the distinction is arbitrary, Aus­
tin continues to separate meaning and force in discussing 
the locutionary and illocutionary acts. He says in Lecture 
VIII, "Admittedly we can use 'meaning' also with reference 
to illocutionary force— 'He meant it as an order', &c. But 
I want to distinguish force and meaning in the sense in 
which meaning is equivalent to sense and reference, just as
it has become essential to distinguish sense and reference
8
within meaning." Considering an utterance as a locutionary 
act, Austin focuses on it as a phonetic act, a phatic act, 
and a rhetic act or the sum of these— an utterance with 
sense and reference. Considering the same act as an illo­
cutionary act, he examines it for its force in the context
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where it occurs. Its force depends on the intention of the 
speaker performing the speech act. For example, the utter­
ance of the series of vocables, "He ran ten miles," is a 
locutionary act if it has sense and reference. In every 
case which Austin can discover, it is also an illocutionary 
act with the force of a statement, an exclamation, or a 
question. In other words, the speaker who utters the 
series of vocables with sense and reference in the locu­
tionary act will utter them in order to perform an addi­
tional act, the illocutionary act. This additional act is 
the force of the utterance.
To succeed in performing this act, the speaker must
secure from his audience only an intellectual response
9
called "uptake." His utterance may be one which "takes 
effect" as in the christening of a ship, or it may require 
a response as in asking, but Austin is most interested in 
the response he calls "uptake." For this response to be 
complete, the hearer must understand the meaning of the 
locution and the illocutionary intent of the speaker. Dis­
cussing the appropriate responses to the illocutionary act 
in Lecture IX, Austin uses the example of the "uptake" fol­
lowing a warning. For a warning to be a successful locu­
tionary and illocutionary act, the hearer must understand 
what he is being warned about and that the speaker intends 
to warn him. He does not need to act on the warning.
Though Austin is not interested in the perlocutionary
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act, which is too closely tied to audience attitude to be
studied objectively, he realizes that any speech act with
its locutionary and illocutionary aspects may have, if not
"a perlocutionary object,” at least "a perlocutionary 
10
sequel.” The perlocutionary act differs from the illo­
cutionary act in the effect which it produces. For a per­
locutionary act to be successful, the hearer must respond 
in an appropriate way. When the act of persuading is suc­
cessful, for example, the hearer is persuaded. However, as 
Austin expresses it, ”any, or almost any, perlocutionary 
act is liable to be brought off, in sufficiently special 
circumstances, by the issuing, with or without calculation, 
of any utterance whatsoever, and in particular by a
straightforward constative utterance (if there is such an 
11
animal).” Then the perlocutionary act may occur as a re­
sult of a speech act which appears to be intended to per­
form only the locutionary and the illocutionary acts. The 
"perlocutionary sequel” may, therefore, be a sequel which 
the speaker did not expect or even desire. A simple warn­
ing may result in the speaker’s offending his hearer. The 
hearer may experience the appropriate "uptake,” but because 
of his personal emotional and mental state also experience 
the same effect that he would experience if the speaker 
desired to offend him. For example, a warning that his car 
is in the path of another vehicle may arouse anger if the 
hearer is a driver who is accustomed to being laughed at
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for his driving errors. An observer has no way, however, 
to predict this anger, and nothing in the utterance demands 
it.
Austin maintains that "a judge should be able to 
decide, by hearing what was said, what locutionary and 
illocutionary acts were performed, but not what perlocu­
tionary acts were achieved.” The judge should have this 
ability to distinguish locutionary and illocutionary acts 
because he is a proficient speaker of the language which is 
being used and therefore understands its conventions. Since 
the illocutionary act is basically conventional, it depends 
on signals which the speaker and his audience as well as the 
judge can understand. Austin never reaches the point at 
which he can define these conventions precisely and fully, 
and his very use of the term conventional is not always 
clear. What is clear is his total commitment to the con­
ventional nature of language in general and the illocution­
ary act in particular.
Any speech act is to Austin largely dependent on 
conventions for its usefulness as a conveyor of meaning. 
Austin expresses his commitment to this idea in the essay 
’’Truth” :
If there is to be communication of the sort that we 
achieve by language at all, there must be a stock of 
symbols of some kind which a communicator ('the speaker') 
can produce 'at will' and which a communicatee ('the 
audience') can observe: these may be called the 'words',
though, of course, they need not be anything very like 
what we should normally call words— they might be signal 
flags, &c. There must also be something other than the
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words, which the words are to be used to communicate 
about: this may be called the ’world'.12
Austin believes that many of the problems of the philosopher 
arise when he fails to understand the arbitrary nature of 
words. Language symbols have no natural connection or 
correspondence with the world about which they are used to 
describe. Philosophers tend to forget this character­
istic of language symbols, especially as they examine the 
meaning of words such as fact. In this essay Austin avoids 
the use of the phrase "the fact that" because, he says, in 
philosophy it is often used loosely "with advantage in or­
dinary life, though seldom in philosophy— above all in dis­
cussing truth, where it is precisely our business to prise
13
the words off the world and keep them off it." To "prise 
the words off the world," Austin emphasizes the conventional 
nature of words. He says, concerning the use of "corre­
sponds," "The only essential point is this: that the corre­
lation between the words (“sentences) and the type of situa­
tion, event, &c., which is to be such that when a statement 
in those words is made with reference to an historic situa­
tion of that type the statement is then true, is absolutely
14
and purely conventional." One can say, then, that the 
locutionary act, the act which embodies "correspondence 
with the facts," employs the first level of language conven­
tions, since this discussion in "Truth" involves the conven­
tions of locution.
In "How to Talk," Austin shows how the conventions
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used in the locutionary act function in "Speech-situation
So ." Two sets of "semantic conventions" operate in the
sentence of form S, "I is a T." These are "I-conventions,
or conventions of reference," and "T-conventions, or con-
15
ventions of sense." These conventions make possible the 
relationship between the "I-word" and the "T-word" in the 
sentence "I is a T," and they make it possible for such a 
sentence to convey meaning to a hearer. As a result of an 
arbitrary decision, any "I-word" refers to an item. In the 
example which Austin uses, "1227 is a rhombus," as in all 
sentences in "Speech-situation SQ ," the "I-word" is a num­
ber so that no two items can be identified by the same 
word. The "T-word" Is more difficult to explain. Austin 
says, "Every word in our language SQ (except for 'is* and 
'a') has either a reference fixed by I-conventions or a
sense fixed by T-conventions, but not both, and is accord-
16
ingly either an I-word or a T-word." "T-conventions" in­
volve two linguistic procedures: "name-giving" and "sense-
giving." "Name-giving," "allotting a certain vocable to a 
certain item-type as its 'name'," and "sense-giving," 
"allotting a certain item-type to a certain vocable as its 
'sense'," produce this result: "when either has been gone
through, the item-type, attached by nature to certain items, 
is attached by convention to a certain vocable, now a T-word
and (as we shall call it) its 'name', as the 'sense' of that 
17
word." As one sees in Chapter II, "Speech-situation SQ ,"
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limited to only one sentence pattern, provides little help 
in the analysis of more complicated utterances. The point 
here is that to Austin, even on the locutionary level, the 
meaning of the utterance depends on conventions which speak­
er and hearer know how to use and recognize.
In this essay, Austin also describes one convention
related to illocutionary force. He calls "is a" the
18
"assertive link." Since asserting is an illocutionary act, 
the use of "is a" to link the "I-word" and the "T-word" as 
the "assertive link" must show the force of the utterance.
In English, as in "Speech-situation S0 ," the presence of a 
part of the verb be used as the predicate will sometimes 
signal assertions, since the pattern of the one sentence in 
"Speech-situation SQ" is a common pattern in English.
By the end of these essays, Austin has made two 
points which indicate the way in which he understands the 
word conventional and the conventions of a language. First, 
language is conventional and language conventions operate 
because of arbitrary agreements that certain words will 
convey certain meanings. There is no natural connection 
between words and the "real" world. Second, the locutionary 
act, when he discusses it, will be as dependent on conven­
tions as the illocutionary act. As a judge, Austin or any 
other person who knows these conventions can distinguish 
locutionary and illocutionary acts.
The suggestions which Austin gives concerning illo-
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cutionary act conventional indicators in How to Do Things
with Words are helpful only if one realizes the limitations
of these suggestions. At the end of his listing of types
of indicators in Lecture VI, Austin stresses that usually
one indicator is not adequate to show force and that several
will be needed together if the force is to be clear. Austin
says, "No doubt a combination of some or all the devices
mentioned above (and very likely there are others) will
19
usually, if not in the end, suffice." Only the explicit
performative, either already supplied in the utterance or
added to test the force, is a sure indicator to Austin, who
stresses the "vagueness of meaning and uncertainty of sure
20
reception" of the others.
The most important of the conventional devices which 
Austin uses, the "explicit performative formula," he first 
discovers when he is working with the performative and 
finally fastens on after testing and discarding two other 
formulas for distinguishing illocutionary from perlocution- 
ary acts. The formulas which he tests and discards are the 
following:
•In saying x I was doing or 'I did £',
'By saying x I did or 'I was doing £'.21
When meaningful lexical items are substituted for x and £,
these formulas result in the following sentences:
'In saying I would shoot him I was threatening him'.
♦By saying I would shoot him I alarmed him'.22
In Lecture X Austin concludes that "these formulas are at
best very slippery tests for deciding whether an expression
is an illocution as distinct from a perlocution or nei- 
22
ther." In some cases, for example, the formulas can be 
used to identify locutionary acts; and, in some cases, the 
formulas, when words are substituted, result in the identi­
fication of the opposite act. In other words, the "by" 
formula produces the illocutionary act. More important, 
Austin finds the formulas to be no help in his study of 
distinctions among illocutionary acts. The significant 
aspect of the formulas is their emphasis on the verb as the 
key word in the perlocutionary and the illocutionary acts. 
From the start of Austin's work with the performative, the 
verb had this importance. It is, of course, the key to the 
explicit performative formula, which consists of the addi­
tion of "I" and a first person singular present indicative 
active verb to the beginning of an utterance in order to 
make it "explicit" as a performative. The illocutionary 
force, Austin discovers, can be made "explicit" in the same 
way. Thus, in studying an utterance such as "He has told 
the truth," Austin adds "I hold that,” "I promise that," 
or "I believe that" to the utterance. If one of these works 
in the context of the original utterance, then it makes 
"explicit" the illocutionary act performed in the speech 
act. The verb, then, names the illocutionary act, and, in 
turn, a list of verbs which will work in the explicit for­
mula becomes a list of illocutionary acts.
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In Lecture XII Austin applies the first person singu­
lar present indicative active test in order to set up five 
categories of verbs naming illocutionary acts. He begins 
the procedure by listing all the verbs in a concise dictio­
nary which seem to work in the explicit formula. His list,
he jokingly says, is "of the order of the third power of 10"
24
or consists of more than one thousand verbs. These he
classifies as "verdictives," "exercitives," "commissives,"
"behabitives," and "expositives." Acts in the first group
give verdicts or a finding "which is for different reasons
25
hard to be certain about." Examples of verbs which name 
these acts are "characterize," "reckon," and "estimate."
(See Appendix I for Austin's examples in all five cate­
gories.) The exercitive involves "the exercising of powers, 
rights, or influences" or "the giving of a decision in fa­
vour of or against a certain course of action, or advocacy
26
of it," as in appointing, dismissing, or pardoning. Com­
missives "commit you to doing something, but include also 
declarations or announcements of intention, which are not
promises, and also rather vague things which we may call
27
espousals, as for example, siding with." Examples are 
"vowing," "undertaking," and "engaging." Behabitives "have
to do with attitudes and social behaviour" as apologizing,
28
thanking, and complimenting. Expositives, the fifth
group, "make plain how our utterances fit into the course
29
of an argument or conversation." Examples are "affirm­
ing," "remarking," and "informing."
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These lists of verbs which name illocutionary forces 
and the headings themselves are not as helpful in identify­
ing the various illocutionary acts as they appear to be when 
one first studies them. In the first place, Austin's verbs 
will not all work in the explicit formula. Then, the lists 
are not exhaustive. One cannot even be sure that Austin 
would have retained these five categories if he had been 
able to continue his study. In Lecture XII, in discussing 
expositives, Austin admits that one can often dispute his 
placing of various verbs in the categories. Then he men­
tions the way an act tends to differ in particular cases 
from another as a matter of degree, not kind. Discussing 
intention, for example, he says, "At the one extreme I may
just state that I have an intention, but I may also declare
30
or express or announce my intention or determination."
In other words, Austin acknowledges the difficulty in decid­
ing even in cases where the explicit form is used which act 
is being performed. The formula, found in the utterance or 
added to test the utterance in context, is, however, the 
most useful indicator.
In his discussion of the performative, Austin lists 
other indicators which, though vague and uncertain, will 
work as illocutionary force indicators, especially if they 
are used in combinations to support each other. These are 
the mood of the verb, adverbs and adverbial phrases, con­
necting particles, the circumstances of the utterance, tone
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of voice, cadence, and gestures. The imperative mood clear­
ly points to such acts as ordering, requesting, and begging, 
if it is used in its customary sense. The subjunctive mood 
also expresses a kind or degree of force which distinguishes 
it from the indicative, which is used in too many dissimilar 
situations to be a clear signal. About adverbs and adver­
bial phrases, Austin says, "Thus we can qualify the force of 
'I shall' by adding 'probably' or— in an opposite sense— by 
adding 'without fail'; we can give emphasis (to a reminder
or whatever it may be) by writing 'You would do well never
31
to forget that. . . Austin cautions that these words 
often signal intentions which he considers to be question­
able as to force such as intimating and insinuating, so care 
must be taken not to interpret all adverbial qualifiers as 
simple force indicators. When they do signal force, they 
change the force to some degree from that expressed in the 
verb or they simply make the force expressed in the verb 
clearer by making it more emphatic.
By connecting particles, Austin means transition 
words such as "still," "therefore," "hereby," and "moreover" 
as well as subordinate conjunctions such as "although" and 
"whereas" and presumably coordinate conjunctions like "and" 
and "but." He gives as examples of the way the connecting 
particles convey force the use of "'still' with the force of 
'I insist that,'" "'therefore* with the force of 'I conclude 
that,'" and "'although' with the force of 'I concede
48
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that.'" Austin does not mention the coordinate conjunc­
tions, but they operate to indicate force very much as ei­
ther the subordinate conjunctions or the transition words. 
For example, "and,” used to connect independent clauses, 
usually indicates that the force of the first part of the 
utterance continues in the second part. "But," on the other 
hand, indicates a change in propositional act and sometimes 
in force. When one of these occurs as the first word in a 
sentence, it ties the utterance which it introduces to the 
one before it in a way that usually indicates whether or not 
the force of the previous utterance is repeated. The ways 
in which all the connecting particles indicate force will 
become clearer as I discuss their use in "The Iron String" 
in Chapter IV.
When Austin speaks of the circumstances of the utter­
ance, he discusses one of the most important indicators in 
conversation and also in the essay. One must see its use in 
conversation in order to see its relevance to the interpre­
tation of written discourse. In a conversation, the first 
speaker often needs no explicit word indicators to interpret 
correctly the illocutionary act of the person who responds 
to his utterance. For example, the first speaker asks,
"When did you last see John?" The person addressed answers, 
"I saw him last week." The second speaker is stating and 
also answering. Out of context, the utterance could be the 
performance of a number of acts. In this context, the
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speaker will seldom fail to secure the "uptake" which he 
intends, even though the words in the sentence are neutral 
as to force.
Austin mentions titles several times in his discus­
sion of performatives and illocutionary acts, thus indicat­
ing that the title of any discourse may play a part in in­
dicating its illocutionary force. In Lecture VI he mentions 
that performative verbs may occur in titles and seems to in­
dicate that they keep their performative characteristics in 
titles. Then, after pointing to the significance of words 
like "whereas," "hereby," and "moreover," Austin says, "A 
very similar purpose is served by the use of titles such as
Manifesto, Act, Proclamation, or the subheading 'A 
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Novel. . . One can see that these announce something
about the nature of the act. On occasion, the title may 
even connect the chapter to follow with the one before it in 
a way which indicates illocutionary force. In this study, 
the title will usually be considered as part of the context 
of the discourse or the circumstances of the utterance, 
since it usually prepares the reader for what is to come.
In his discussion of speech acts and conventional in­
dicators, Austin leaves many problems unsolved. One such 
problem which will be important in this study is the status 
of utterances by an actor on a stage or a persona in a poem. 
Austin says in Lecture II, concerning such utterances: 
a performative utterance will, for example, be in a
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peculiar way hollow or void if said by an actor on the 
stage, or if introduced in a poem, or spoken in solil­
oquy. This applies in a similar manner to any and every 
utterance— a sea-change in special circumstances. Lan­
guage in such circumstances is in special ways—  
intelligibly— used not seriously, but in ways parasitic 
upon its normal use— ways which fall under the doctrine 
of the etiolations of language.34
Then, in Lecture VIII, Austin discusses certain nonillocu- 
tionary and nonperlocutionary uses of language, for ex­
ample, "'the use of language' for something, e. g. for jok- 
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ing." Here he means the utterance of a sentence which 
seems, on the surface, to perform a legitimate illocutionary 
act but actually is used "for something" else. For example, 
the sentence "She is a beanpole," when uttered by a speaker, 
may appear to be a statement. Its locutionary meaning is, 
however, in question, and, if the person in question weighs 
three hundred pounds, its force as a statement is question­
able. It seems to be a sentence used for joking, rather 
than for the sake of its illocutionary force.
Austin cites the use of language in poetry as the 
same use "for something," and he explains the problem in the 
following way:
These references to 'use of language' have nothing to do 
with the illocutionary act. For example, if I say 'Go 
and catch a falling star', it may be quite clear what 
both the meaning and the force of my utterance is, but 
still wholly unresolved which of these other kinds of 
things I may be doing. There are parasitic uses of lan­
guage, which are 'not serious', not the 'full normal use'. 
The normal conditions of reference may be suspended, or 
no attempt made at a standard perlocutionary act, no 
attempt to make you do anything, as Walt Whitman does not 
seriously incite the eagle of liberty to soar.36
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In addition to the examples of the use of language Mfor
something," Austin cannot fit into his categories those
utterances "which do not seem to fall, intuitively at least,
exactly into any of these roughly defined classes, or else
37
seem to fall vaguely into more than one." For example, 
the act of insinuating, "seems" to involve the use of con­
ventions of the kind typical of the illocutionary act, but 
Austin is troubled by the fact that a native speaker of 
English would never use the explicit performative formula,
"I insinuate that. . .," and the feeling that insinuating
"seems like implying to be a clever effect rather than a 
38
mere act." Using language to evince emotion is another
speech act which does not seem to fit Austin's application
of the performative formula: "We may evince emotion in or
by issuing an utterance, as when we swear; but once again we
have no use here for performative formulas and the other de-
39
vices of illocutionary acts." Since Austin's work is un­
finished and he admits that these problems are unsolved, one 
can suggest tentative solutions which do not seriously con­
tradict the rest of the theory. Therefore, these do not 
interfere with the usefulness of the theory as a tool for 
analyzing the formal essay.
As one begins a study of the essay as a compound 
illocutionary act based on a series of locutionary acts, one 
has, then, several reasonably clear formulations from the 
work of Austin to use as guidelines. In the first place,
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though sense and reference are never completely explained, 
one feels able to separate the elements which merely repre­
sent "correspondence with the facts," or the locutionary 
acts, if only by reducing each utterance to a constative.
In the second place, it is possible to classify some illo­
cutionary acts in the essays to be considered by choosing 
the appropriate verb from Austin's list or using the per­
formative formula. In the third place, one knows to look 
for subjects and verbs in the first person singular present 
indicative active in the essays as an explicit indication 
of the act which is being performed. Finally, one has a 
list of indicators of or clues to illocutionary force. On 
the other hand, the essays exemplify some of Austin's acts 
which seem "like implying to be a clever effect rather than 
a mere act." For example, in "The Iron String," Howard 
Mumford Jones "understates." Does this fact vitiate the 
force of the essay as an illocutionary act. Before answering 
this question, however, one needs to see what light the work 
of John Searle can throw on the whole problem of distin­
guishing locutionary and illocutionary acts.
II
By the end of How to Do Things with Words, Austin has 
described a theory which he hopes will account for most se­
rious utterances. While attempting to base a "philosophy 
of language" on Austin's work, John Searle in Speech Acts
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suggests another way to distinguish among illocutionary 
acts. In the process of expounding his philosophy, he ab­
sorbs Austin's distinction between meaning and force in his 
understanding of the relationship between the sentence and 
the speech act, and he redefines the locutionary act as the 
propositional acts of reference and predication, only a 
slightly more useful formulation than Austin's.
Like Austin, Searle is committed to the study of 
language as a speech act, the most interesting component of 
which is the illocutionary act. Searle defines the term 
speech act in the essay, "What Is a Speech Act?": "It is
not, as has generally been supposed, the symbol or word or 
sentence, or even the token of the symbol or word or sen­
tence, which is the unit of linguistic communication, but 
rather it is the product ion of the token in the performance
of the speech act that constitutes the basic unit of lin-
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guistic communication." In Speech Acts Searle amends this
definition in a significant way. He says, "More precisely,
the production or issuance of a sentence token under certain
conditions is a speech act, and speech acts (of certain
kinds to be explained later) are the basic or minimal units
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of linguistic communication." The "certain kinds" which 
are "minimal units of linguistic communication" are illocu­
tionary acts. The performance of these is the result of the 
"issuance of a sentence token under certain conditions."
The existence of the "certain conditions" give the speech
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act its significance. In fact, they determine its illocu­
tionary force.
Like Austin again, Searle uses the method and the 
material of the ordinary language philosophers. He says in 
Speech Acts, "My knowledge of how to speak the language in­
volves a mastery of a system of rules which renders my use 
of the elements of that language regular and systematic.
By reflecting on my use of the elements of the language I
can come to know the facts recorded in linguistic character- 
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izations." When Searle wants to state rules or list
illocutionary acts, he relies on his intuitive grasp of a
language which he has mastered without the necessity for
consciously learning rules or ways to perform illocutionary
acts. This language is his native language. Using it,
Searle does not need to gather information from a sampling
of informants. Nor does he need to trouble himself because
he cannot give satisfactory definitions of terms as long as
he can use these terms. His problem is merely "converting
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knowing how into knowing that." Searle sums up his 
method: "I am a native speaker of a language. I wish to
offer certain characterizations and explanations of my use 
of elements of that language. The hypothesis on which I am 
proceeding is that my use of linguistic elements is underlain 
by certain rules. I shall therefore offer linguistic charac­
terizations and then explain the data in those characteriza-
44
tions by formulating the underlying rules." This method
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Searle follows in his entire study of the illocutionary act.
Finally, like Austin, Searle is chiefly interested in 
illocutionary acts. Katherine Hammer in "Searle*s Condi­
tions and the Determination of Illocutionary Force" points 
out that basic to the conditions for the illocutionary act 
is the intent of the speaker to perform a perlocutionary 
act. She adds, however, "This is not to collapse the dis­
tinction between illocutionary act and perlocutionary act, 
for the successful performance of some illocutionary act 
does not necessarily result in the successful performance of 
the intended perlocutionary act; e. g. , one can successfully
warn someone without persuading him to behave appropriate- 
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ly." At the end of his discussion of promising, Searle
himself acknowledges the close tie between the illocution
and the perlocution, but he insists that the distinction is
vital to his theory. Reducing the illocution to the perlo-
cution results, he feels, in a "stimulus-response account of 
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meaning." His rules are tied, instead, to "institutional
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theories of communication." It is this characteristic 
which makes his theories seem valuable in a study of lan­
guage where any degree of certainty will depend on the ac­
ceptance of the idea that there is a body of language data 
which is the common property of the student and his society 
and is not dependent on individual reactions, ffhatever its 
perlocutionary intent, therefore, the utterance is interest­
ing in this study as a speech act which secures "uptake,"
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and this result is not dependent on the hearer's subjective 
response.
Searle devotes no space to a formal definition of
the illocutionary act. In the first place, Austin's work
provides the basic definition, since Searle uses the term
essentially as Austin uses it. In the second place, as with
the terms which Searle discusses in Chapter I of Speech Acts
as those which give philosophers unnecessary difficulty when
they try to define them, the illocutionary act, to Searle,
is understood when one knows how to use it. In Speech Acts,
Searle equates "performing illocutionary acts" with "stat-
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ing, questioning, commanding, promising, etc." If a 
speaker understands the nature of stating, questioning, or 
promising to the extent that he can use these terms, he 
understands the terms whether he can give a formal defini­
tion or not. If he knows when to use the term illocution­
ary act to mean stating, questioning, or promising, then he 
understands what an illocutionary act is.
Austin's recommendation to speak of illocutionary 
force rather than illocutionary meaning is absorbed without 
a real attack on the idea in Speech Acts. Searle's state­
ment of the "principle of expressibility" is the first step 
in this process. The principle is that "for every possible 
speech act there is a possible sentence or set of sentences
the literal utterance of which in a particular context would
49
constitute a performance of that speech act." Or, to
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state it another way, "whatever can be meant can be said."
Searle never deviates from the idea that every meaningful
utterance is primarily an illocutionary act. The literal
utterance of the sentence must supply the ingredients for
the illocutionary act as part of the total speech act. Then
in the second chapter of Speech Acts Searle asks, "But what
is it for one to mean something by what one says, and what
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is it for something to have a meaning?" The first ques­
tion is tied to the speaker's intention; the second refers 
to the sentence used in the utterance. Searle insists that 
intention and literal sentence meaning go together. He fi­
nally states the relationship between the two in the follow­
ing way:
In our analysis of illocutionary acts, we must capture 
both the intentional and the conventional aspects and 
especially the relationship between them. In the per­
formance of an illocutionary act in the literal utter­
ance of a sentence, the speaker intends to produce a 
certain effect by means of getting the hearer to recog­
nize his intention to produce that effect; and further­
more, if he is using words literally, he intends this 
recognition to be achieved in virtue of the fact that 
the rules for using the expressions he utters associate 
the expression with the production of that effect.
Since it is possible for the speaker to convey that which
he intends to convey by "using words literally," it becomes
inconsequential to separate what he intends to convey into
force and meaning. Austin's concept of force is nebulous
and difficult to discuss, and when it disappears in the
total meaning of the utterance, its disappearance is not
even deserving of a comment from Searle. One needs to
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remember, however, that when Searle examines the locutionary 
act, he is not looking at it as the carrier of meaning.
This fact is the basis for the frontal attack on 
Austin's locutionary act which Searle launches in the arti­
cle, "Austin on Locutionary and Illocutionary Acts." Dis­
cussing Austin's distinction between the locutionary act 
and the illocutionary act, Searle observes that Austin uses 
the same form for demonstrating rhetic and illocutionary 
acts. In Lecture VIII Austin shows the phatic and the
rhetic acts with these sentences:
'He said "I shall be there'", 'He said he would be there';
'He said "Get out'", 'He told me to get out';
'He said "Is it in Oxford or Cambridge?'": 'He asked 
whether it was in Oxford or Cambridge'.
In the same chapter Austin uses sentences such as these to
illustrate the illocutionary act: "He urged (or advised,
ordered, &c.) me to shoot her" and "He protested against my 54
doing it." Changing from phatic to rhetic act, Austin 
changes from a direct to an indirect quotation. When he 
changes a sentence from a locution to an illocution in form, 
he changes from a direct to an indirect quotation. In addi­
tion, the verbs which he uses in demonstrating the rhetic 
act— said, told, and asked— are verbs which he uses in his 
formula for testing illocutionary force, and they also ap­
pear in his lists of verbs naming illocutionary acts. If 
one cannot report a rhetic act without employing a verb with 
illocutionary force and if the rhetic act is the necessary 
ingredient of the locutionary act, then an attempt to
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separate meaning and force in the locutionary act and the 
illocutionary act is doomed to failure. The need for the 
concept of the locutionary act seems to have disappeared.
Searle is not actually making such a dramatic depar­
ture from Austin's divisions of the speech act. He still 
feels that he must distinguish two elements which he finds 
in the total speech act, and he bases his method of making 
this distinction on Austin's correlation of the constative 
and the locutionary act and the performative and the illo­
cutionary act. Searle quotes from Austin's How to Do Things 
with Words, "With the constative utterance, we abstract from 
the illocutionary (let alone the perlocutionary) aspects of 
the speech act, and we concentrate on the locutionary. . . . 
With the performative utterance, we attend as much as possi­
ble to the illocutionary force of the utterance, and ab-
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stract from the dimension of correspondence with facts." 
Since the constative represents the verifiable proposition 
so dear to the hearts of earlier twentieth-century philos­
ophers and the locution with its sense and reference is the 
pure constative, Searle concludes that Austin is separating 
content from force rather than meaning from force when he 
defines the locution and the illocution. Relying on the 
constative's relationship to the proposition, Searle calls 
the speech acts with which he replaces the locutionary act 
"propositional acts." He represents the utterances which 
he examines as "F(p>" with "F" standing for force and "(p)"
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for content or proposition. By the end of the article, 
"Austin on Locutionary and Illocutionary Acts," Searle has, 
then, replaced Austin's five acts with four acts— phonetic, 
phatic, propositional, and illocutionary.
In Chapter 2 of Speech Acts Searle describes the 
relationship of the three acts which he finally substitutes 
for Austin's five. He lists these and explains each:
(a) Uttering words (morphemes, sentences)=performing
utterance acts.
(b) Referring and predicating=performing propositional
acts.
(c) Stating, questioning, commanding, promising, etc.=
performing illocutionary acts.° *
In this list, phonetic and phatic acts are combined as 
"utterance acts." Searle then explains the way utterance 
acts operate in a full speech act. Utterance acts are not 
means to propositional and illocutionary acts; "rather, ut­
terance acts stand to propositional and illocutionary acts
in the way in which, e. g., making an 'x' on a ballot paper
5.8
stands to voting." Utterance acts do not cause proposi­
tional acts and illocutionary acts, nor do propositional 
acts cause illocutionary acts. Instead, each is a part of 
a process in the way that the "x" and the ballot are part 
of voting. The voter, using the "x" and the ballot and in­
tending to vote, votes. The speaker, uttering words, re­
ferring and predicating, and intending to ask a question or 
give a command, actually does ask a question or give a 
command.
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Only the propositional acts of referring and predi­
cating receive any detailed explanation from Searle, who is 
satisfied that the reader will understand the other two if 
he understands the normal use of the explanatory terms. In 
order to illustrate propositional acts, Searle lists four 
sentences, each of which is used to perform a different 
illocutionary act:
1. Sam smokes habitually.
2. Does Sam smoke habitually?
3. Sam, smoke habitually! 59
4. Would that Sam smoked habitually.
From each of these the same propositional acts can be ab­
stracted: "Sam" and "smokes habitually." The utterance of
"Sam" is the reference act, and the utterance of "smokes 
habitually" is predication. Obviously, Searle's use of the 
term reference corresponds closely to Austin's use of the 
same term, but his use of the term predication is nearer the 
use of the noun predicate and the verb predicate by an 
earlier generacion of grammarians and philosophers.
To explicate his notion of reference, Searle deals 
only with one kind, "single definite reference." Tokens 
used in performing this act may be proper names, -noun 
phrases beginning with the definite article or a possessive 
pronoun or noun followed by a singular noun, and pronouns. 
Other types of referring expressions or tokens are indefi­
nite referring expressions, expressions referring to uni- 
versals, and plural definite referring expressions. Obvi­
ously, these last expressions are used to perform acts which
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are far more complicated than single definite reference, 
but, at the same time, all reference acts share essential 
features which enable Searle to group them as reference 
acts. The first of these features is Austin's "correspon­
dence with the facts" or correspondence with a nonlinguis- 
tic element, something outside the speech act itself. The 
second is the result of this first characteristic: the
reference act, Searle insists, is a speech act in itself. 
Though Searle indicates that the only reference which he is 
interested in occurs in the total speech act, still, in re­
ferring the speaker performs an act which has a degree of 
autonomy. This autonomy is best understood in a comparison 
of the reference act to the act of predication. Dropping 
into the terms of an older grammar, Searle says, "The sub­
ject serves to identify an object, the predicate, if the 
total illocutionary act is one of describing or character­
izing, serves to describe or characterize the object which
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has been identified." Reference then is tied to ele­
ments outside the utterance; predication turns inward as it 
acts on the referring expression. In addition, the refer­
ring expression may occur within the predicate, or so it 
seems though Searle never discusses this occurrence. These 
expressions, in other words, seem "to identify an object" 
and become part of a reference act wherever they occur.
The third feature which reference acts share is that they 
are always neutral as to illocutionary force.
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Predication, on the other hand, is never a speech act
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and is always "a slice from the total illocutionary act." 
Rather than referring to an entity outside the context of 
the speech act, the expressions which make up the predicate 
act on the referring expressions in a way which is very sim­
ilar to the way the predicate relates to the subject in 
traditional grammar. In addition, predication acts are 
never neutral as to illocutionary force. Like Austin,
Searle sees in the verb, the key word in predication acts, 
the carrier of illocutionary force. The following examples
illustrate this characteristic: "'You are going to leave',
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’Leave!’, 'Will you leave?', 'I suggest that you leave.'" 
Each has the same subject for "leave"— the single definite 
referring expression "you." The predication in each changes, 
however, and with it, the illocutionary force changes from 
stating to commanding, requesting, and suggesting.
When Searle tries to list verbs which stand for illo­
cutionary acts, he drops Austin's five classes for the no­
tion that there are "several different continua of 'illocu-
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tionary force'." He lists six types of illocutionary acts 
or six "different continua" in Chapter 3, "The Structure of 
Illocutionary Acts." The description of these six types is 
not so helpful in the process of identifying illocutionary 
acts as the "principles of distinction" which. Searle uses in 
order to arrive at the types. These principles follow a 
discussion of the rules for promising, and they are related
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to these rules. For this reason, most of them only become 
meaningful after the discussion of rules in Chapter III.
Two of them are, however, useful as tests of the illocu­
tionary force of an utterance even without the rules. The 
first is "the point or purpose of the act (the difference, 
for example, between a statement and a question)," and the 
seventh is "the different ways in which an utterance relates 
to the rest of the conversation (the difference between
simply replying to what someone has said and objecting to
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what he has said)." The purpose of an utterance is usu­
ally clear whether one can list the rules for the utterance 
or not. The seventh condition reenforces Austin's view that 
the circumstances of the utterance are very important as an 
indicator of the force of the act.
Since, to Searle, speech rules are universal and 
conventions are found only in particular languages, he de­
votes only an occasional sentence in his "philosophy of 
language" to listing conventional force indicators in Eng­
lish. Searle is, however, dedicated to the idea that "for 
every possible speech act there is a possible sentence or 
set of sentences the literal utterance of which in a partic­
ular context would constitute a performance of that speech 
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act." Here he is emphasizing two points in his under­
standing of indicators. In the first place, the "particular 
context" is all-important. In the second place, in the 
sentence itself, it is possible to indicate every meaning
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which the speaker intends to convey. These two points would 
alone be an adequate guide to the person working within the 
framework of Searle's theory and wishing to discover force 
indicators in the sentences of English or any other lan­
guage.
When Searle lists specific indicators, he lists them 
primarily for spoken English, but he, like Austin, includes 
some which can be found in written discourse. Searle's list 
includes the mood of the verb, the performative verbs, ca­
dence, intonation contour, stress, word order, and punctua­
tion. It is interesting that Searle mentions two times the 
use of the verb as a force indicator. The verb in any sen­
tence is so closely tied to the act of predication that one 
can practically pick out the words which are used in this 
act by the old subject-verb distinction. Now, Searle says
that the act of referring "always comes neutrally as to its
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illocutionary force." Predication, on the other hand, "is 
a slice from the total illocutionary act." In the words 
which are used to perform the act of predication, one can 
expect to discover important clues to illocutionary force.
One can say, then, that Searle's work has clarified 
and added to Austin's theory in several areas which are im­
portant to this study of the formal essay. First, Searle 
has removed the need to consider force as separate from 
meaning. Second, by his understanding of the relationship 
of the propositional acts and content and his explanation
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of the propositional acts of reference and predication in 
terms which fit traditional ideas of these, he has provided 
a way of examining the sentence for the speech act which 
conveys content. Third, he has formulated two distinctions 
between illocutionary acts which are helpful in determining 
which acts have been performed. Finally, he has added to 
Austin's view of indicators. Like Austin, Searle has left 
groups of utterances such as joking outside his classes of 
serious speech acts.
Ill
At the end of a study of the locutionary, illocu­
tionary, and perlocutionary acts as they are defined by 
Austin and Searle, one has an understanding of these acts 
as part of the total speech act. Conventional in nature, 
locutionary and illocutionary acts should be clear to a 
third party to a conversation or to the reader of an essay. 
They should be clear because the speaker or writer has sig­
nalled his meaning with convenient force indicators.
At the end of a study of the work of Austin and 
Searle, one has the following possibilities for considera­
tion as force indicators:
1. Verbs— mood, performatives.
2. Vocabulary— connecting particles, adverbs.




7. Tone of voice.
8. The circumstances of the utterance or context.
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The importance of several of these will obviously change as 
one turns from the spoken utterance to the essay. Intona­
tion and stress, gestures, and tone of voice will play no 
part in one's reading of the essay. On the other hand, 
punctuation can be a subtle tool in the hands of the essay­
ist, a tool by which he conveys some of the meanings which 
he would convey orally or visibly if he were speaking. The 
circumstances of the utterance change to the total context 
of the essay— the purpose for which it was written, its orig­
inal place of publication, whether in a book or a periodical, 
its title, each paragraph and each sentence as each creates a 
context for the next. Each sentence in an essay should set 
up expectations in the minds of a reader to be satisfied in 
the next sentence just as one utterance in a dialogue pro­
vokes the utterance which follows it. The list amended to 
exclude intonation, stress, gestures, and tone of voice and 
to include a new understanding of the circumstances of the 
utterance provides the necessary framework for beginning the 
search for indicators in essays studied here. Before study­
ing the essays, however, one must understand the cornerstone 
of the theory of Austin and Searle— the notion of the condi­
tions and rules for the successful performance of the illo­
cutionary act. These conditions and rules actually set up 
the framework for illocutionary acts. Their existence makes 




As J. L. Austin and John Searle studied the illocu- 
tionary act and classified various acts, they both concluded 
that the successful illocutionary act depends on its satis­
fying certain conditions. To Austin, the conditions equaled 
the rules for performing an illocutionary act. After a 
study of the act of promising, Searle first formulated nine
conditions which must be satisfied if the speaker "sincerely
1
and non-defectively promises." Then he extracted from
these conditions five rules for the use of "the illocution-
2
ary force indicator for promising." Austin's conditions 
will provide the basic guide in the formulation of condi­
tions and rules for the illocutionary acts discovered in the 
formal essays analyzed in this study, but the work of Searle 
will be used for its three important additions to Austin's 
theory. His first contribution is his application of Aus­
tin's idea of rules and conditions to a specific illocution­
ary act— the act of promising. His second contribution is a 
list of suggested rules for a number of speech acts which he 
does not analyze completely. Probably his most important 
contribution is his discussion of what speech rules do—  
that they "constitute" a speech act.
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Before one attempts to formulate rules for the illo­
cutionary acts performed in the essays analyzed in this 
study, it is necessary, therefore, to understand the nature 
of the rules and conditions of Austin and Searle— how they 
are discovered, how they are instituted, and how they 
function to constitute speech acts,
I
Austin's most detailed discussion of the conditions 
or rules governing speech acts occurs in his early attempt 
to distinguish performative from constative utterances, but 
all the points which he makes apply to his discussion of 
illocutionary acts. The constative, Austin postulates, may 
be examined for its "truth” and "falsity." The performative, 
on the other hand, is capable of being "happy" or "unhappy," 
"felicitous" or "infelicitous." When Austin abandons the 
constative/performative distinction for the notion that 
every utterance in a meaningful speech act has both a con­
stative and a performative dimension, he carries over to the 
locutionary act the idea of truth and falsity and to the 
illocutionary act the idea of felicity and infelicity. The 
locutionary act is defined by its "more-or-less definite 
sense and reference" or its rhetic component. Truth, for 
Austin as for language philosophers such as Ayer, is a pro­
duct of successful reference; so the locutionary act like 
the constative is judged for its truth. The illocutionary
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act rests in most cases on a successful locutionary act, 
but the added dimension of illocutionary force is subject 
to the test of happiness or felicity. This test is the ex­
tent to which any act satisfies the conditions, and the con­
ditions for the successful performative are the conditions 
for the successful illocutionary act.
In Lecture II, Austin considers the performative as 
an utterance which can be happy or felicitous or can go 
wrong in various ways. He uses the performative "I bet” as 
an example, and he points out, "To bet is not. . .merely to 
utter the words 'I bet, &c.': someone might do that all
right, and yet we might still not agree that he had in fact,
3
or at least entirely, succeeded in betting." He might say 
"I bet” when the only appropriate linguistic procedure for 
betting is to say "I wager." He might be without money or 
any other goods to bet, and he might say "I bet" to someone 
not prepared to take bets. He might even say "I bet" when 
he had no intention of betting. Any act such as christen­
ing, marrying, or apologizing can go wrong, Austin concludes, 
for the same kinds of reasons, and he calls this notion of
the things that can make a performative unhappy, the "doc-
4
trine of the Infelicities." On the other side of the coin 
is the idea of the things which must go right if the act is 
to be happy. Austin lists these as the conditions or rules 
to be satisfied if the performative is to function happily. 
The rules which Austin formulates for the happiness
71
of the performative are general rules for all performatives. 
Applied to the study of the illocutionary act, they become 
general rules for all illocutionary acts. The rules or 
conditions as Austin states them follow:
(A.1) There must exist an accepted conventional proce­
dure having a certain conventional effect, that 
procedure to include the uttering of certain words 
by certain persons in certain circumstances, and 
further,
(A.2) the particular persons and circumstances in a
given case must be appropriate for the invocation 
of the particular procedure invoked.
(B.l) The procedure must be executed by all participants 
both correctly and
(B.2) completely.
(v.l) Where, as often, the procedure is designed for use 
by persons having certain thoughts or feelings, or 
for the inauguration of certain consequential con­
duct on the part of any participant, then a person 
participating in and so invoking the procedure 
must in fact have those thoughts or feelings, and 
the participants must intend so to conduct them­
selves, and further
(^.2) must actually so conduct themselves subsequently.
The first two rules specify the setting in which the speech 
act occurs. They also define the conventional nature of 
the act. The conventional procedure must "exist" before 
the speaker can use it. It must be "accepted" in the reper­
toire of the speaker and the audience. In addition, the 
first two rules define the proper relationship between 
speaker and hearer: "the particular persons" invoking a
"particular procedure" must be persons who are capable of 
invoking that procedure whether the procedure is designed 
for use in christening a ship, performing a marriage cere­
mony, or apologizing. The next two rules describe the 
correct observance of the conventions in the act itself.
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Finally, the last two connect meaning with intention in 
terms of the speaker's sincerity.
Applied to any one of Austin's performatives, the 
rules work in a simple way which makes it possible to gen­
erate rules for any speech act. For example, a man utters,
"I apologize." His utterance is happy or felicitous if the 
utterance of "I apologize" is the correct procedure for the 
person uttering it to use and he is uttering it to a person 
whom he has wronged in some way, if the speaker utters the 
words with the correct intonation and is not interrupted in 
the process, and if the person actually intends to apologize 
because he is sorry for his actions. The apology may be un­
happy or a "misfire" if the speaker intends to act but does 
not proceed correctly. The act may be an "abuse" if the 
speaker is not sincere when he performs the act. "I apolo­
gize" uttered with the wrong intonation may become a "mis­
fire." Uttered when the speaker is not sorry, it becomes an 
"abuse."
In Lecture XI, Austin, discussing statements, con­
cludes that the illocutionary act is also subject to infe­
licities and is therefore covered by the conditions and 
rules for performatives. The statement is, of course, tested 
for truth, but, in addition, the judge hearing the statement 
uttered in a conversation may ask whether the speaker is the 
appropriate person to make such a statement: to apologize,
one must have done something wrong, and to state one must be
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in a position to know what he states. He must not, for ex­
ample, give population figures for China unless he can show 
or his hearer knows that he has the information on popula­
tion in China. He can state successfully, in other words, 
only if he satisfies the same type of general rules that he 
must satisfy in apologizing or betting. If stating, the 
nearest to the pure constative of any speech act, is gov­
erned by the performative rules and conditions, then cer­
tainly acts such as ordering, begging, urging, and warning, 
where the illocutionary force is more important, have rules 
which can be derived from the general rules for the perform­
ative. An illocutionary act, like a performative, is infe­
licitous or unhappy if any one of the six rules or condi­
tions is not satisfied.
Austin uses the terms conditions and rules inter­
changeably. From allusions to games in How to Do Things 
with Words, the reader concludes that Austin's rules are 
game-type rules, but when Austin discusses them, his pur­
pose is, first, to discover the ways in which a performative 
utterance is different from a constative, not to discuss the 
nature of the rules or even to discriminate between condi­
tions and rules, and finally to show that even statements 
must satisfy the rules. Searle attempts to make such a dis­
tinction, but his attempt is not his most important contri­
bution to Austin's theory. More important is his explana­
tion of the nature of the rules which "constitute" a speech
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act. More helpful as a guide to formulating rules for the 
acts in the essays is his analysis of the act of promising.
II
John Searle proceeds from Austin's list of the condi­
tions for the success of a performative utterance to an ex­
planation of the type of rule which "constitutes" a speech 
act and a detailed explanation of the conditions and rules 
for promising. In addition, he shows that predicating and 
referring, propositional acts, are rule-governed. His work 
offers, then, the most specific guide to formulating the 
conditions and rules for the illocutionary acts in the for­
mal essay. In some respects this attempt at a precise anal­
ysis of the act of promising is very helpful in the prepara­
tion of such an analysis of other illocutionary acts. In 
other respects, it is not helpful. The distinction between 
conditions and rules, for example, seems an unnecessary one 
in this study; and since the rules as he states them have 
aroused a number of attacks on Searle and his work, here the 
conditions and rules for promising will be used to show how 
Austin's conditions can be applied to a particular act with­
out any attempt being made to extract rules from conditions. 
Indeed, such an attempt seems more and more a mere exercise 
in the manipulation of words as one considers the nature of 
the rules and Searle's purpose in formulating them.
In the 1965 essay, '"What Is a Speech Act?", Searle
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introduces the distinction between regulative and constitu­
tive rules on which his definition of speech rules rests. 
About rules, he says, "Some regulate antecedently existing 
forms of behaviour; for example, the rules of etiquette reg­
ulate interpersonal relationships, but these relationships 
exist independently of the rules of etiquette. Some rules
on the other hand do not merely regulate but create or define
6
new forms of behaviour." The second type of rule is the 
type which constitutes games, as, for example, football or 
chess. These games and even the individual plays and moves 
in them do not exist before a set of rules defines them.
For example, it takes the understanding that a player cross­
ing the goal line without committing any of the infractions 
of the rules possible at that point in the game and without 
being tackled by a player on the other team who is also per­
forming the actions permitted him by the rules of the game 
constitutes a touchdown to set up the scoring procedure for 
football. In chess, even the pieces are defined by the rules 
of the game: a pawn is a pawn because it is constituted a
pawn by the rules which define its movements. Translated 
into another language, the term pawn will be different, but 
it will still name the pieces that perform certain moves as 
constituted by the rules of chess.
This understanding of rules is found in John Rawls'
"Two Concepts of Rules," which Joseph Ransdell considers to
7
be the ancestor of Searle's conception. Rawls distin­
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guishes between what he calls the "summary" approach and 
the "practice" approach to understanding law. In the sum­
mary approach, "rules are pictured as summaries of past
decisions arrived at by the direct application of the util-
8
itarian principle to particular cases." The "particular
cases" must exist before the rules can be formulated. In
the practice approach, the rules define the action. They
9
are "logically prior to particular cases." Of these rules, 
Rawls says, "To engage in a practice, to perform those ac­
tions specified by a practice, means to follow the appropri- 
10
ate rules." In other words, "if a person is engaged in a
practice, and if he is asked why he does what he does, or if
he is asked to defend what he does, then his explanation, or
11
defense, lies in referring the questioner to the practice." 
This type of rule and this type of practice, Searle believes, 
define the speech act.
Speech Acts, Searle substitutes for the distinc­
tion between "summary" rules and "practice" rules the dis­
tinction between regulative and constitutive rules. He ex­
presses the difference: "Regulative rules regulate a pre­
existing activity, an activity whose existence is logically 
independent of the rules. Constitutive rules constitute
(and also regulate) an activity the existence of which is
12
logically dependent on the rules." Regulative rules, for 
example, do not make it possible for a human being to con­
sume food, but they may exist as commands to eat a certain
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way. Such commands may become constitutive rules for the 
consumption of a formal dinner, the procedure for the formal 
dinner only existing after it is defined by the constitutive 
rules. Constitutive rules will often be definitions rather 
than commands. For example, in football or chess, each 
playing position and each chess piece exists because it has 
been defined in a certain way. Rules which constitute an 
activity, unlike regulative rules, can change without chang­
ing the nature of the activity only if the rules are not
basic to the nature of the activity. Searle cites "degrees
13
of centrality in any system of constitutive rules." 
"Peripheral" rules can be changed without a change in the 
nature of the game. In football, the substitution rules are 
changed periodically without the game becoming another type 
of ball. On the other hand, the introduction of a rule that 
six points are scored only if a player can hold the ball for 
sixty seconds on the fifty-yard line would result in a dif­
ferent game altogether. Searle sums up the difference be­
tween the two types of rules: "Regulative rules character­
istically have the form or can be comfortably paraphrased in 
the form 'Do X' or 'If Y do X'. Within systems of constitu­
tive rules, some will have this form, but some will have the
14
form 'X counts as', or 'X counts as Y in context C'." 
Actually, all constitutive rules, it can be shown, have this 
"counts as" quality, and Searle involves himself in unneces­
sary controversy by insisting on separating some rules from
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others on the basis of this difference. The very nature of 
a constitutive rule is that it causes a particular "X" to 
"count as" something. In his discussion of the difference 
between constitutive and regulative rules, however, Searle 
has explained the nature of the rules to be formulated in 
this study.
Searle gives some insight into the way these rules
operate in his discussion of "brute" and "institutional"
facts in Chapter 2 of Speech Acts. "Brute" facts are mental
or physical entities. "Institutional" facts depend on the
existence of human institutions. According to Searle,"These
15
'institutions' are systems of constitutive rules." Each 
"fact" in such a system is undergirded by one or more rules 
of the form "X counts as Y," Searle says. For example, the 
fifth rule which he gives for the proper use of any illocu­
tionary force indicating device for promising (Pr) is of this
kind: "The utterance of Pr counts as the undertaking of an
16
obligation to do A [some future act of the speaker]." If 
one considers the act of promising as a human "institution," 
then all the "facts" that make up the promising act are de­
pendent on this rule. Whether one accepts the "counts as" 
form as essential or not, the idea which Searle is explaining 
is basic to an understanding of rule-governed speech acts. 
Communication in the language "game" is possible because of 
the existence of a network of constitutive rules, and the
"facts" in the repertoire of the players are "institutional"
facts.
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Since speech seems logically prior to other human 
institutions, the process by which its constitutive rules 
were established is puzzling. Certainly, Searle is not 
suggesting that a prehistoric committee on language set up 
certain rules and thus constituted speech acts. He may be 
suggesting, as Steven Davis tries to prove in his disserta­
tion, "Illocutionary Acts and Transformational Grammar," 
University of Illinois, 1968, that the rules for such acts 
can be traced to a source deep within the mind of all human 
beings. Davis considers promising and questioning, for ex­
ample, to be accounted for in an "illocutionary act compo-
17
nent" of a "universal grammar." The fact that Searle 
considers his study to deal with a "philosophy of language" 
rather than the working of a certain language seems to sup­
port this view. Without adopting such a comprehensive ex­
planation or even attempting to explain how speech rules 
were set up, the reader can find two significant ways in 
which speech-act rules meet the requirements for constitu­
tive rules. In the first place, they possess the arbitrary 
force that one associates with the rules set up by the 
maker of a new game: one does not question these rules if 
he wants to play the game constituted by them, and one does 
not question the necessity of the speech-act rules when he 
wants to perform a certain act. The second way in which 
speech-act rules meet the requirements for constitutive 
rules is merely the other half of the first way. It is not
80
only the speaker who follows the rules but also the hearer 
who follows them In interpreting the speech. The rules, 
whatever their source, make the meaning of an utterance 
accessible to the hearer, just as the rules which constitute 
a game make it possible for the second player to understand 
what his next move should be after he sees the move of the 
player ahead of him.
For the rules basically deal with the manipulation of 
words and terms in the way that the player of games manipu­
lates men or chess pieces, in other words, with the forma­
tion of the sentence. Searle calls them rules for "the use 
of the illocutionary force indicating device," and he uses 
an analogy to the game of chess in describing them. In his 
analogy the speaker's and the hearer's repertoire of illocu­
tionary force indicating devices corresponds to the chess­
men. The rules describe the way the devices may be manipu­
lated.
Though the rules deal with the manipulation of de­
vices in sentences, Searle stresses the fact that they are 
"semantic” and not "syntactic." His use of the term semantic 
is intended to remind the reader that, if he wishes to con­
sider the rules in the framework of transformational grammar 
— a method of study which Searle does not himself pursue but 
believes to be productive, these rules belong to the seman­
tic component, not the syntactic component, of the deep
18
structure of the sentence. It is also intended to
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emphasize the Idea that the rules and meaning are two sides 
of the same coin. Searle ties the sentence, the rules, and 
meaning together in the following summary:
1. Understanding a sentence is knowing its meaning.
2. The meaning of a sentence is determined by rules, and 
those rules specify both conditions of utterance of 
the sentence and also what the utterance counts as.
3. Uttering a sentence and meaning it is a matter of 
(a) intending (3.-1) to get the hearer to know (re­
cognize, be aware of) that certain states of affairs 
specified by certain of the rules obtain, (b) in­
tending to get the hearer to know (recognize, be 
aware of) these things by means of getting him to 
recognize ji-1 and (c) intending to get him to recog­
nize ^-1 in virtue of his knowledge of the rules for 
the sentence uttered.
4. The sentence then provides a conventional means of 
achieving the intention to produce a certain illocu­
tionary effect in the hearer.
To understand an utterance and the commitments which the 
speaker is making in the utterance, the hearer must have 
internalized the rules which apply and must be able to as­
sume that the speaker is using the rules properly. If he 
can assume that the utterance which he is hearing follows 
the rules, the sentence used in the utterance will convey 
the act with its full effect.
When Searle studies the rules for the use of the 
illocutionary force indicating device in performing specific 
acts, he has, then, two sources of information. The first 
of these is the sentence used in the utterance. Since it 
"provides a conventional means of achieving the intention to 
produce a certain illocutionary effect in the hearer,"
Searle can study it without the fear of delving into the 
mind of the speaker or the hearer. According to the
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"principle of expressibility," whatever the speaker intended 
to express, he should have been able to express in the gram­
mar and vocabulary of his language. Anyone studying his 
utterance should be able to discover his intentions as well 
as the contents of the utterance by studying the sentence. 
The second source of information is his own intuition as a 
native speaker of the language. For information on the 
rules governing speech acts, as a good ordinary language 
philosopher, Searle relies on his intuitive grasp of the way 
these acts work. Relying on the sentence and his under­
standing of the language which he speaks, Searle can formu­
late semantic rules for predicating and referring as well as 
the rules for illocutionary acts.
Before he attempts to formulate rules, however, 
Searle, like the observer of the chess game who tries to 
understand the game without having it explained to him, at­
tempts to describe the conditions under which the illocu­
tionary act which he is studying is performed. In Chapter 
3 °- Speech Acts as in the earlier article, "What Is a 
Speech Act?", Searle lists nine conditions which must be 
satisfied in a successful act of promising. These nine 
conditions, which should be compared with Austin's rules 
discussed on pp. 70-72 above, must be satisfied if the act 
of promising is happy or felicitous, or, in other words, if 
the act is a promise at all. The following list summarizes 
these conditions:
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1. Normal Input and output conditions obtain. . . .
2. S [speaker] expresses the proposition that £ jUa the 
utterance of T(sentence). . . .
3. 2° expressing that £, S predicates a future act A 
of S. . . .
4. H [hearer] would prefer S' s doing A to his not doing 
A, and S believes H would prefer his doing A to his 
not doing A. ! ! .~ “
it A®, not obvious to both S and H that S will do A
in the normal course of events. . . .
S intends to do A. . . .
7. S intends that the utterance of T will place him under 
an obligation to do A. , . .
8* S intends (i-1) to produce in H the knowledge (K) that 
the utterance of T is to count as placing S under an
obligation to do A. S intends to produce K b£ means
of the recognition of i-1, and he intends i - 1 to be 
recognized in virtue of (by means of) H's knowledge of 
the meaning of T. . . .
9. The semantical rules of the dialect spoken by S and H 
are such that T is correctly and sincerely uttered if 
and only if conditions 1-8 obtain^^
"Normal input and output conditions" are present when, for
example, the speaker and hearer know the language being used,
the speaker does not have an impediment which makes his
speech unclear, and the hearer is not deaf. In Searle's
words, "'Output' covers the conditions for intelligible
speaking and 'input' covers the conditions of understand- 
21
ing." Searle calls conditions 2 and 3 the "propositional 
content conditions." Four and five are termed "preparatory 
conditions"; six, the "sincerity condition"; and seven, the 
"essential condition." Though the hearer is necessary in 
the satisfying of these conditions, they do not rely on his 
response. Rather the burden is on the speaker, who must as­
sess the situation which includes the expectations of the 
hearer and must perform the act of promising using a sen­
tence which contains the signs necessary for determining the
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hearer's response.
These conditions for promising are closely related 
to Austin's general conditions for the performance of a 
successful performative or illocution. Condition 1 is not 
included in Austin's list, though everything which Austin 
says about language implies that the successful performance 
of speech acts depends on the existence of "normal input and 
output conditions." Condition 8 specifies the appropriate 
"uptake" for the act. Condition 9 corresponds in some 
respects to Austin's condition A.I. Searle says, in explain­
ing it, "This condition is intended to make clear that the
sentence uttered is one which, by the semantical rules of
22
the language, is used to make a promise." Here one finds 
the meaning of the sentence and the meaning of the utterance 
tied together again. Searle points out that the conditions 
1, 8, and 9 apply to all illocutionary acts. Searle's con­
ditions 2-5 correspond to Austin's A.2, B.l, and B.2, though 
Searle does not make explicit the importance of the appro­
priate person's performing the act. Condition 6, the "sin­
cerity condition," corresponds to 7.1 and ^.2. Together, 
Austin and Searle indicate four basic components for the 
conditions of promising:
1. Speaker and hearer must share a common language, and 
no speaking or hearing problem must interfere with 
their use of it.
2. The speaker, the appropriate person to perform such 
an act, must intend to perform an act which he knows 
the hearer wishes him to perform but does not know 
that he intends to perform.
3. By the speech act, the speaker intends to place himself
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under obligation to perform the act described in the 
sentence.
4. The existing linguistic formula is followed.
Conditions of the same type may be formulated for any illo­
cutionary act. These conditions are complete if they spec­
ify (1) the speaker's intentions, (2) his assessment of the 
hearer's knowledge and desires, (3) the position of the 
speaker as the proper person to perform the act, and (4) 
the extent to which the speaker obligates himself.
From his nine conditions, Searle "extracts" five 
rules for "the use of the illocutionary force indicating 
device" to be used in promising. These rules correspond to 
conditions 2-7. Since conditions 1, 8, and 9 are applicable 
to illocutionary acts generally, rules for the use of spec­
ific act indicators need not include these. By his use of 
the term extract, Searle shows how closely he thinks the 
rules follow the conditions. By his calling them rules for 
"the use of the illocutionary force indicating device," he 
means that these rules are intended as a precise shorthand 
statement of the constitutive rules that a native speaker 
of any language will employ, automatically for the most 
part, in choosing from his repertoire of conventional de­
vices the appropriate ones to convey the force which he 
intends his utterance to have. Searle calls number one the 
"propositional content rule": "Pr [any illocutionary force
indicating device for promising] is to be uttered only in 
the context of a sentence (or larger stretch of discourse)
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T, the utterance of which predicates some future act A of
23
the speaker S." Rules two and three are "preparatory
rules": "Pr is to be uttered only if the hearer H would
prefer S's doing A to his not doing A, and S believes H
would prefer S ’s doing A to his not doing A," and "Pr is to
be uttered only if it is not obvious to both S and H that S
24
will do A in the normal course of events." Four is the
"sincerity rule": "Pr is to be uttered only if S intends
25
to do A." Five is the "essential rule": "The utterance
26
of Pr counts as the undertaking of an obligation to do A." 
Whereas rules 1-4 are quasi-imperatives, rule five has the 
form, Searle says, of a constitutive rule. For that reason, 
to Searle, this rule is "essential" in "constituting" the 
speech act an act of promising.
The relationship between conditions and rules in 
Searle's discussion is so close that one can profitably con­
tinue with Austin to equate rules and conditions. Certainly, 
the two categories are never more than two views of the 
same set of phenomena— the constitutive rules which estab­
lish each speech act as a human "institution." Conditions 
are formulated when one views the speech act as it occurs 
and describes what is happening as the speaker utters a 
meaningful sentence with a certain force. Rules are a 
statement of the restrictions which the speaker must observe 
as he chooses force indicators in order to perform the act 
which he intends. Or, at least, this seems a fair
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assessment of Searle's distinction between the two. Condi­
tions are discovered in the observable act by Austin's im­
partial judge. Rules are a level away from conditions: 
theoretically, they explain why the conditions can be ob­
served. When the two are essentially the same, then, one 
finds it difficult to justify considering rules and condi­
tions separately. Indeed, when Searle turns to other illo­
cutionary acts after his analysis of promising, he erases 
the distinction between rules and conditions. The chart on 
pp. 66-67 of Speech Acts, reproduced in my Appendix II, re­
flects the simplified set of distinctions which, he feels, 
are all that are necessary for most purposes.
Searle has retained in this summary the key terms
that he used in formulating his conditions and rules for
promising. The "propositional content" is given, not in a
sentence, but in a noun phrase, which makes it clear that
the important element is "something"— the content of the
propositional act. The "counts as" terminology of the
"essential" rule points to Searle's original discussion of
constitutive rules in Chapter 2. It should be pointed out
that this rule is controversial. For example, Barry
Richards, in "Searle on Meaning and Speech Acts," objects
to the fact that only one of the five rules for promising
is a "counts as" rule, the others following the pattern
27
"________ is to be uttered only if. . . ." However, with­
out one rule of this form, even though the rule applies
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only if rules two and three also apply, Searle would not 
recognize the act of promising as instituted by a set of 
constitutive rules; thus the "essential" rule expresses the 
basic arbitrariness of the rules and the conditions. This 
summary, because it contains the key ingredients of the 
conditions and rules for all illocutionary acts, will form 
the basis for formulating the rules and conditions of the 
illocutionary acts to be studied in my next chapter.
Having explicated the rules and conditions for prom­
ising and summarized the conditions for other acts in 
Chapter 3, in Chapters 4 and 5 Searle sets up the semantic 
rules for the two parts of the propositional act— referring 
and predicating. Since it will not be necessary to discuss 
fully the propositional acts in the formal essay analyzed 
here, it seems unnecessary to describe these rules fully. 
However, one point which Searle makes in his analysis of 
the conditions for successful predicating will, however, be 
useful in studying illocutionary force indicating devices. 
The conditions and rules for predicating support the idea 
that predication "is a slice from the total illocutionary 
act." For example, condition 7 reads: "S intends to pro­
duce in H the knowledge that the utterance of P raises the 
question of the truth or falsity of P o£ X (in a certain 
illocutionary mode), b£ means of H* s recognition of this
intention; and he intends this recognition to be achieved by~28
means of H's knowledge of the meaning of P." Since the
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"meaning of P" is conveyed by the sentence and the part of 
the sentence concerned with predicating is the grammatical 
predicate, this condition supports the suspicion that illo­
cutionary force indicating devices will be found in the 
predicate or will in some way relate to the grammatical 
predicate. One recalls, too, Austin's explicit formula and 
classification of illocutionary acts by a listing of verbs.
In his study of speech acts, Searle has, then, made 
Austin's study of rules and conditions concrete. Following 
his lead, any other sophisticated introspective user of the 
language should be able to arrive at the rules for any illo­
cutionary act. He needs only to ask himself concerning any 
act what relationship exists between the speaker and his 
audience, what commitments the speaker must make in perform­
ing the act, and what the correct procedure is for perform­
ing the act. Assisted by Searle's analysis of promising 
and his chart of other acts but not bound to follow slav­
ishly his terminology, the reader of the essays can act as 
Austin's judge to decide which acts have been performed and 
then delve into his own experience in order to codify the 
rules for the illocutionary acts found in them.
CHAPTER IV
"THE IRON STRING" AND SPEECH-ACT THEORY
If a reader attempts to use the theories of Austin 
and Searle in the analysis of a complete formal essay as 
the performance of a series of illocutionary acts, he will 
get little help from critics and rhetoricians. They have 
taken only a few steps from the analysis of single-sentence 
utterances to the analysis of longer discourse. A few 
critics have studied lyric poems as the performance of illo­
cutionary acts, they have theorized on the place of fic­
tional sentences in speech-act theory, and they have sug­
gested that the theory can apply to discursive prose of 
more than one sentence. No one, however, has reported an 
attempt to analyze a formal essay as the performance of il­
locutionary acts. In this chapter I shall present the re­
sults of such an attempt. It is an attempt which reveals a 
number of problems, some of which can be solved only tenta­
tively at this time.
One of these problems is that the analyst, as a 
reader, stands in a relationship to the essay different 
from the relationship of the impartial judge overhearing a 
conversation and deciding what locutionary and illocutionary 
acts are being performed. The difference is the result of
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the fact that he must transform the written word into speech
acts. Ohmann, in the passage quoted in Chapter I, comments
on the position of the reader as the audience which brings
alive the speech acts "frozen" in the text of the printed
work. Now, the speech acts in the formal essay are closer
to ordinary speech acts than the utterances in many other
types of works. Barbara Herrnstein Smith in her essay
"Poetry as Fiction" insists that "to the extent that the
writer's act of composing and inscribing is an historically
specific and unique verbal event, it is analagous [sic] to
the speaker's act of emitting the sounds that comprise1
spoken discourse." She maintains further that "a printed
work may. . .be a natural utterance itself in written form,
2
exactly like a personal letter." The utterances in an es­
say in which the author speaks primarily in his own voice 
are very similar to the utterances in a personal letter.
One difference is that the audience is not usually known to 
the writer, and, therefore, he does not know the extent to 
which he and his audience may share speech conventions. As 
with the letter, however, the writer must rely only on the 
conventions which he can incorporate in print.
Another problem that the analyst of the formal essay 
encounters immediately is the problem of handling the 
single-sentence utterance which is not simple in terms of 
propositional acts or illocutionary forces or both. Few 
sentences in an essay by a mature writer record simple
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propositional and illocutionary acts like the sentences 
analyzed by Austin and Searle; most of these sentences con­
sist of complicated arrangements of words, phrases, and 
clauses. In other words, they are the product of trans­
formations and embedding, to use the terminology of trans­
formational grammar, which I will employ in other sections 
of this chapter. As I showed in Chapter I, Monroe Beardsley 
is one philosopher who has discussed sentences that incor­
porate within their structures two or more illocutionary 
acts, one of which may be primary and the others secondary. 
Such sentences Beardsley concludes are used in the utterance 
of "compound" illocutionary acts. In this study, I shall 
develop this suggestion of Beardsley. I shall analyze some 
sentences by reducing them to kernel form to show that these 
kernels correspond to the tokens of propositional acts, and 
I shall examine many sentences as reflecting compound illo­
cutionary force.
The biggest problem for the analyst of the essay is, 
however, the act which does not appear to be completed with 
the utterance of a single sentence. Austin and Searle work 
with simple single-sentence utterances, though they do not 
rule out the possibility of longer utterances in which a 
number of acts are part of the same act. In an essay, one 
sentence is often so closely tied to the ones which follow 
it that it seems impossible to speak of its performing an 
illocutionary act alone, and sometimes the act does not seem
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complete at the end of the sentence. For these reasons, I 
found the analysis of single sentences did not always pro­
duce meaningful results.
Fortunately, N. G. Fotion in two essays— "Master 
Speech Acts" and "Indicating Devices?"— makes some sugges­
tions on how this problem might be handled. In the first 
article Fotion contends that utterances should be analyzed 
in units longer than the sentence and the individual speech 
act. A follower of Austin and Searle, he contends, is al­
most forced to regard utterances as separate entities, 
which, when they are put together, are characterized "much
like the way a child characterizes the marble collection
3
which he keeps in a bag." The child may group his marbles 
according to type, but they remain separate marbles. Fotion 
contends that, in most utterances, the relationship among 
the sentences is more organized than is the relationship of 
marbles in a bag and that this organic connection is fre­
quently signaled by an author's use of a sentence like the 
following: "First of all, let us be clear about (i.e.,
state what) the facts (are)" or "Let us pray." Such sen­
tences, Fotion claims, control the linguistic behavior of 
the sentences which immediately follow them. The first 
makes it necessary that the speaker state facts, and the 
second guides him to pray. Fotion calls such sentences
"master speech acts" or "speech acts which control other 
4
speech acts." He says that these sentences may control at
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least the following four aspects of the use of language:
1. Mode of expression (e.g., talking rather than writing; 
this code rather than that one).
2. Manner of speaking or writing (e.g., loudly rather
than softly; slowly rather than rapidly; prosaically 
rather than poetically).
3. Topic (e.g., topic A rather than B; this aspect of A 
rather than that one).
4. Nature of speech act (e.g., commanding rather than
promising; describing rather than evaluating).5
Each master speech act may control more than one of these 
four aspects of the acts which follow, its function being 
mainly to aid the hearer in identification of the act and 
assessment of the acts which follow. Fotion cites as an 
example of a master speech act which controls more than one 
aspect, "When you write, please tell me (i.e., describe) 
what happened to June.” Here the act controls mode—  
writing; topic— what happened to June; the illocutionary 
force of the act— describing. In this way the master speech 
act guides the reader’s expectations as to what is to fol­
low. The aspects of language use which Fotion is concerned 
with in this paper and certainly the ones which I am partic­
ularly interested in are the third and the fourth. The 
third is the aspect expressed in the locutionary or proposi- 
tional act, and the fourth is the aspect expressed in the 
illocutionary act.
Fotion analyzes master speech acts into two basic 
parts. These parts he refers to as the ’’formula” and the 
"content" parts. By the "formula” he means either the ex­
plicit performative verb already supplied in the sentence
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or the part of the sentence which shows what explicit verb 
could be added to the content portion to determine force.
For example, in the sentence, "First of all, let us be 
clear about the facts," "let us" is a formula for request­
ing. It indicates that the utterance of this one sentence 
is a request. The rest of the sentence indicates the force 
of the sentences to follow. The speaker is going to state 
facts. The utterance has two forces then— requesting and 
stating. Because the content part controls the utterances 
which follow, the entire utterance is called a "master 
speech act," and it is actually part of the utterances which 
it controls.
In "Indicating Devices?" Fotion focuses on speech 
activities rather than individual speech acts. He finds 
that speech activities like a conversation or an essay or a 
book frequently use "detached" indicating devices which are 
similar in form and purpose to master speech acts. Philo­
sophers, Fotion believes, have "focused too much attention 
upon locating these devices within the framework of the in­
dividual speech act, rather than in the relationships be- 
6
tween acts." He first examines the "detached" indicating 
device as it is added to an utterance to prevent ambiguity 
or failure to secure "uptake." For example, he cites the 
following dialogue:
Speaker 1: "You had better get a move-on."
Speaker 2: "Are you threatening me?"
Speaker 1: "Yes."?
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The first speaker’s response, "Yes," is a detached device 
signaling or confirming that his first utterance was in­
tended as a threat. But Fotion feels that the more inter­
esting indicating devices are those which occur "prior to
the 'original' speech act" and whose purpose is not remedial
8
but "preventive or lubricative." His examples are "Let us 
pray," "Here are your orders for the week," and "Here is a 
list of things I want for Christmas." These usually indi­
cate the force or content or both of the sentences which 
follow. Others are what Fotion calls "referring-indicating" 
devices, an example being "This is a true story." Even the 
title of a book or a chapter in a book may be used to indi­
cate force and content. This last indicates that the lin­
guistic activity discussed may be as long as a chapter or 
even a book. A "detached" indicator, functioning in the 
above manner, is part of the speech acts which it serves 
since the acts are not complete without the indicator.
If this function of the master speech act or the 
"detached" speech indicator is allowed, then necessarily 
some speech acts must consist of more than one-sentence 
utterances. A clear example of such utterances is the argu­
ment. On a very general level, most illocutionary acts per­
formed in exposition can be classified into two groups:
(1) those that are claims, conclusions, assertions, etc., 
and (2) those that provide the justification for group 1 
acts, such as proving, making good, justifying, inferring,
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backing up, defending, supporting, etc. Usually the pattern 
is that a claim or assertion is made and then justification 
for that claim or assertion is provided. Together they 
constitute an argument which frequently may be introduced 
and organized by a master speech act. For example, a mas­
ter speech act such as the following might begin a paragraph 
of arguing: "I claim that the following reasons will demon­
strate that under no circumstances should the United States 
intervene in Angola." Here the force of claiming is carried 
by the formula. The content shows that an argument support­
ing this claim is to follow. The act of arguing seems to 
consist of the master speech act, the stated conclusion, and 
the sentences which supply the reasons and the evidence. As 
we shall see, the illocutionary acts of exemplifying and ac­
counting for work somewhat the same way.
I
I chose to analyze "The Iron String" as the first 
test of the usefulness of speech-act theory in teaching the 
reading and writing of the formal essay because, though my 
position as Austin’s "judge" is still shaky in this situa­
tion, the essay itself surely is what Smith calls a "natural 
9
utterance." It was originally a speech made to a group of 
students at Harvard, where Jones was a professor of American 
literature. It was printed in the Harvard Alumni Bulletin, 
April 8, 1950. I read it as it appears in Steinmann and
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Villen's Literature for Writing, an anthology for freshman 
English classes. (It is reproduced in Appendix III as it 
appears in Literature for Writing.) Beading it, I must, as 
Ohmann says, bring alive the speech acts "frozen" in the 
text. Though I find my role as the judge hampered by my 
participation in the speech act which I must bring alive, I 
will at least be analyzing a "natural utterance."
The title of the essay comes from the following quo­
tation from Emerson's essay "Self-Reliance": "Trust thyself
— every heart vibrates to that iron string." Emerson's 
ideas of self-reliance are the basis of a view of education, 
the advocacy of which is Jones's main intention in the es­
say. Jones begins the essay with a list of the things for 
which Emerson has been criticized: his transcendentalism,
his optimism, his liberalism, and his failure to understand 
human weakness. To Jones, it is contradictory for an Ameri­
can to criticize Emerson for these positions: instead
Emerson should be considered as a leading proponent of "the 
custom of dissent," and "the custom of dissent" is necessary 
for the maintenance of this country's institutions. The 
"drive for conformity" is strong in this country in politics 
and in education, according to Jones. The present need in 
education is to reverse this drive, to educate men, not 
train them, and finally to produce "man thinking" (Emerson's 
term again). Jones says, "The educational problem is not 
conformity to any pattern, however lofty in intent; it is
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how to remove obstacles from the lonely path by which edu­
cation sometimes results in man thinking." In this process, 
according to Jones, Emerson is "the most excellent catalyst 
we have in a democracy."
It is obvious that Jones's intention was to convince
or persuade his audience to accept this view of education,
but the securing of conviction or persuasion is a perlocu-
tionary act and will not be studied in detail here, though
the direction such an analysis would take seems clear. As
Austin and Searle both point out, illocutionary acts may be
and usually are performed with a perlocutionary intent.
Certainly the essay can be analyzed (and probably usually
is in the classroom) as persuasive discourse with ethical,
pathetic, and logical appeals, in the full Aristotelian
sense, which, as Kinneavy reminds us, are the same set of
appeals used by rhetoricians and propagandists of all 
10
times. Thus, the reader (the analyst of "The Iron 
String") can see ethical proof in the way the author por­
trays himself as a person who possesses a tremendous amount 
of knowledge of his subject, who is willing, on the surface, 
to see both sides of the subject, and who has only the in­
terests of his country at heart. Examples of his pathetic 
or emotive appeals appear in the irony of his pose: "All
these fine scholars see it as a weakness that Emerson lacks 
'a vision of evil,’ but I, a plain man who cannot under­
stand their devious and subtly intricate explanations, am
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so naive that I see only that he has a ’vision of good.1" 
Finally, an analysis of Jones's logical argument would show 
how he "stacks the cards" and throws in "glittering general­
ities" such as honor and love of country in order to achieve 
his persuasive effects. It is possible then to analyze the 
speech as persuasive discourse, but Austin's judge does not 
want to examine or evaluate this aspect of it. His main job 
is with the illocutionary forces incorporated in the speech 
acts that constitute this essay. The reaction of the audi­
ence is involved only to the extent that "uptake" must occur 
if these acts are to be felicitous.
When I began to study "The Iron String" as a series 
of speech acts, I did not have a clear view of the steps 
that I should take in such an analysis. Following the sug­
gestion of Searle, I decided to begin with the attempt to 
isolate propositional acts, since this part of the analysis 
seemed simple compared to the discovery of illocutionary 
acts and since it appeared that this might be a necessary 
first step in the discovery of illocutionary acts. When 
this process was explored and found to be unnecessary to the 
discovery of illocutionary acts, I decided to begin identi­
fying illocutionary acts by using the two most obvious in­
dicators which Austin discusses— the circumstances or con­
text of the utterance and the explicit formula. I felt that 
I could use the circumstances or the context of each utter­
ance at least as effectively as all of us use them to
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interpret the utterances of another speaker and that Aus­
tin's faith in the explicit formula justified working with 
it. It should be pointed out at once, however, that neither 
of these indicators, as yet, can be used with complete as­
surance; the theory of each is incomplete and unsettled.
For example, no complete list of explicit formulas is avail­
able; there is disagreement as to whether certain verbs can 
be used in the formula or not; no sharp differentiation has 
been made between the meaning of verbs that name closely re­
lated illocutionary acts; and, except for the very tentative 
treatment by Austin, no classification of illocutionary acts 
is available. There are also problems in the use of the 
context or circumstances of an utterance as an indicating 
device. The problems of defining and particularizing the 
context remain unsolved. Perhaps a rough distinction can be 
made between the "internal" and "external" context of an ut­
terance, but the specific aspects of the kinds of contexts 
which are relevant for determining illocutionary force, 
particularly in written discourse, remain to be fully worked 
out. Fotion's notion of the master speech act and the de­
tached indicating device I assumed would be helpful in my 
use of context or the circumstances of the utterance.
The indicators other than context and formula verbs 
which Austin and Searle mention I found to be as vague and 
uncertain as Austin says they are. Thus my procedure was to 
use the explicit formula and the circumstances of the
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utterance with some consideration of master speech acts to 
determine roughly what acts are being performed. It soon 
became apparent that an analysis which is aimed at isolat­
ing every secondary component of every compound speech act 
is impractical: such an analysis would extend for too many
pages and be far too complicated to have any practical ap­
plication. At the same time that I was determining which 
acts are being performed, I was formulating the constitutive 
rules for each of the major acts performed in the essay. 
Neither Austin nor Searle has worked out rules for most of 
these acts. My formulation of these rules is summarized in 
Appendix II, but the chief characteristics of each are dis­
cussed as I discover the act in the essay. Finally, I ex­
amined the essay for the other indicators which Austin and 
Searle mention with the idea that the function of these will 
become more meaningful when they appear in context and that, 
since I had a hypothesis about what acts are being per­
formed, I could tell how each indicator works to signal 
these acts. The following is a list of indicators mentioned 
by Austin and Searle which apply to written discourse:
1. Circumstances of the utterance
2. Verbs— performative, mood
3. Vocabulary— connecting particles, adverbs
4. Word order
5. Punctuation
By the end of the analysis, I was aware that indicators 
which neither author discussed had signalled some acts to 
me. Thus, in addition to studying the five indicators above
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lor their potential to convey force, I had added certain 
others.
So, from a start with context and the performative 
formula to a listing of acts to a study of the rules for 
the acts and the indicators in context, the study proceeded, 
as this chapter will show. By the end of the chapter, I 
hope to show that it is not unreasonable to say that "The 
Iron String" represents the successful performance of a com­
plex series of usually compound illocutionary acts. Almost 
all the individual acts in the essay can be classified as 
stating, one kind of explaining, arguing, deprecating, com­
mending, evaluating, and advocating. However, analysis will 
support Beardsley's contention that many sentences are com­
pound illocutionary acts. For example, many sentences are 
used to state and deprecate, or to state and commend, or to 
state, commend, evaluate, and advocate. Further, my anal­
ysis will show complex interrelationships among individual 
speech acts. For example, a series of statements may come 
together to constitute a speech act of a higher order, such 
as an argument or an explanation. Indeed, the stated master 
illocutionary act for the entire essay may be considered as 
the advocacy of a certain view which Jones has evaluated and 
concluded to be good. Jones's advocacy of this view seems 
to control a complex intertwining of various kinds of Aus­
tin's verdictives, exercitives, behabitives, and expositives.
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II
If speech-act theory is relevant in the analysis of 
the formal essay, in "The Iron String," Howard Mumford Jones 
is first of all uttering words and performing the proposi- 
tional acts of referring and predicating. It will become 
immediately apparent that it would be tedious and unneces­
sary to follow propositional acts through the entire essay, 
but it seems important to see the way in which this part of 
the theory works. I have, therefore, analyzed the first 
paragraph for propositional content as an example of a pos­
sible procedure to follow in determining propositional acts. 
The paragraph follows:
I have lately been reading a Harvard author who is 
just now out of favor here. He has been unpopular be­
fore. He once made a speech^ at this college, a speech 
so disliked that he was persona non grata in Cambridge 
for thirty years. However, the alumni and the Faculty 
finally decided he was a solid citizen— this was after 
the Civil War— and so they made him an Overseer, they 
gave him an honorary degree, and they asked him to de­
liver a course of lectures. In view of this history I 
take some pleasure in remembering that the title of 
these lectures was: "The Natural History of the Intel­
lect." Another thirty years or so drifted by, and they 
erected a building in his honor. On any class day in 
winter you can enter it and see Frank Duveneck's statue 
of him buried under the coats and hats. Somehow, this 
symbolizes what has happened to Emerson.
speech: Ralph Waldo Emerson (1803-1882; American
poet, essayist, and philosopher), "The Divinity School 
Address," July 15, 1838.
^persona non grata: unacceptable person.
This paragraph is printed here as it appears in Literature
for Writing complete with footnotes provided by the editors.
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These notes are a reminder that here one is considering the 
speech as an essay and that full reference may not be com­
pleted successfully by the wider audience of recent college 
undergraduates which the book will reach without these ex­
planations of allusions which the original audience of Har­
vard students was expected to understand. The only semantic 
problem is the need to understand these allusions.
To provide an analysis of the sequence of proposi­
tional acts that appear in a discourse consisting of a 
series of sentences, almost all of which are, grammatically, 
compound or complex, is an extremely difficult matter. 
Neither Austin nor Searle, in their concentration on single­
sentence utterances, is of much help. Discussing proposi­
tional acts in Searle's work, one concludes that the tokens 
of the reference act will correspond to the grammatical sub­
ject and the tokens of the predication act will correspond 
to the grammatical predicate, but when one attempts to sep­
arate these tokens in a complex sentence, the result is far 
removed from Searle’s division of acts in his typical four- 
or five-word sentences. The sentences which Searle works 
with are the simplest possible forms. In fact, they contain 
simply the ingredients of the kernel sentences of transform­
ational grammar.
When one realizes that the sentences which can be 
divided into reference and predication act tokens with ease 
and certainty are the same as the kernel sentences of
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transformational grammar, he sees almost immediately a di­
rection to take in analyzing complex-sentence utterances
for propositional acts. Now, this direction is not new
11
and unheard of among speech act theorists. Indeed, in 
the introduction to The Philosophy of Language, Searle him­
self affirms his belief that a theory which combines the 
insights of ordinary language theory and generative grammar 
is the most promising approach in modern philosophy. Re­
peatedly, in Speech Acts, Searle describes aspects of his 
theory in the terms of generative or transformational gram­
mar. In Chapter 4, for example, discussing reference, he
says that "generative syntax" can be used to explain expres-
12
sions such as "his sake" and "the lurch." Searle is 
chiefly interested in deep structure and the semantic com­
ponent, but he obviously makes a connection on the syntactic 
surface level. Steven Davis, whose dissertation "Illocu­
tionary Acts and Transformational Grammar" is also directed 
primarily at deep structure relationships, suggests in Chap­
ter VII four hypotheses which he feels account for illocu­
tionary act potential. They are the study of the forms 
underlying the surface structure of an utterance, the study 
of these forms using Austin’s explicit formula, a semantic 
study, and finally a study of illocutionary act features 
which do not seem to be included in the other three. The 
first hypothesis, which he feels works in some instances, 
would call for the discovery of the structure embedded in
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the completed utterance or an analysis of the kernel sen­
tences. In the second hypothesis, there lies the possibil­
ity that this analysis should take place in some utterances 
before one uses the explicit formula.
Just as speech-act theorists have incorporated
transformational grammar in their studies, so linguists have
begun to use speech act theory and transformational grammar
together in interesting ways. For example, Chungmin Lee
describes ’’suggest" in "May I suggest that you run for the
13
presidency this time" as an "embedded performative."
Julian Boyd and J. P. Thorne in "The Semantics of Modal 
Verbs" propose an explanation of modal verbs which begins 
with a discussion of their differences with Katz and Postal, 
leaders in the generative grammar movement, and they use 
generative grammar terminology as tools in their speech-act 
explanation of modal verbs. Certainly, the use that has 
been made of transformational grammar by speech-act theo­
rists and speech-act theory by grammarians prepares one to 
recognize kernel sentences in Searle's propositional act 
tokens.
Paul Roberts' definition of kernel sentences in 
Modern Grammar seems to support the relationship between 
propositional act tokens and kernel sentences. Roberts de­
fines a kernel sentence as one "to which no optional trans­
formation rules have been applied" and adds, "It is made up 
of two main parts— a noun phrase that functions as the
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subject, and a verb phrase that functions as the predi- 
14
cate." The propositional act, consisting of a reference
act and a predication act, certainly seems to be represented
in its simplest form by a kernel sentence. In most of the
sentences in a formal essay, then, one may expect to find
the tokens of more than one propositional act, and each act
may be analyzed as a kernel sentence. In addition, if Davis
is correct in his first hypothesis, then illocutionary force
may be made clearer by this analysis.
Using Roberts' definition of the kernel sentence but
simplifying it to allow such "kernels" as "Thirty years or
so drifted by," I have broken the sentences in the first
paragraph into these basic structures. Sentence 1 yields:
I have been reading books lately.
The author is from Harvard.
He is out of favor just now.
Sentence 2 is the only kernel sentence in the paragraph:
"He has been unpopular before." Sentence 3 yields:
He made a speech at Harvard once.
The audience disliked the speech.
He was persona non grata in Cambridge for thirty 
years.
Sentence 4 becomes:
The alumni decided [it].
The faculty decided [it].
He was a solid citizen.
It was after the Civil War.
They made him an Overseer.
They gave him a degree.
The degree was honorary.
They asked him to deliver a course of lectures. 
Sentence 5 breaks into:
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I remember the title of the lectures.
I take some pleasure in the title.
The title was "The Natural History of the Intellect." 
Sentence 6 can be analyzed thus:
Thirty years or so drifted by.
They erected a building.
The building honors Emerson.
Sentence 7 becomes:
You can enter the building any class day in winter.
You can see Frank Duveneck's statue of Emerson.
It is buried under coats and hats.
In sentence 8, "this" is substituted for the statement in 
sentence 7 that the statue is buried under coats and hats. 
Analyzed into kernel sentences, sentence 8 becomes:
This symbolizes it somehow.
It has happened to Emerson.
This analysis clears up several problems in applying 
Searle's definitions of successful reference and predication 
acts. Searle does not give an example of reference which
occurs within the predication act, yet the reader feels that
reference according to his definition takes place in the ut­
terances in this essay in other positions than in the sub­
ject position cited by Searle. Many of these become the 
tokens of reference in the subject positions in the kernel 
sentences. In addition, the complexity of the act of predi­
cation in the surface structure of the final utterances is a
result of the embedding of kernel sentences.
Such an analysis is the necessary first step in de­
termining the compound illocutionary force of most of the
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sentences in a typical essay. The sophisticated reader 
makes such an analysis intuitively. It must become a con­
scious process only when a question of content arises or 
when he wants to pare away indicators. In addition, in 
some cases, a separation of a transformation into its con­
stituents will make the illocutionary force of each of the 
constituents more readily apparent and, as Davis suggests, 
provide the structure for the use of the explicit formula. 
Thus, the usefulness of a combination of speech-act theory 
with transformational grammar is increasingly recognized in 
philosophical and linguistic circles.
Ill
In this section of Chapter IV, I shall show my tenta­
tive attempts to identify illocutionary acts in "The Iron 
String." My method will be chiefly a reliance on the in­
stinctive "uptake" provided by a careful reading of the 
essay supplemented by a study of the context of the essay 
and a search for the guidelines which Jones provides by his 
selection of a title for the essay and his use of Austin's 
explicit performative formula at strategic points within 
the essay. The results of this method will be tested by the 
Austinian procedure of introducing each sentence with an 
explicit formula in order to make the implicit force of an 
utterance explicit. I shall end the section with an outline 
of the illocutionary acts which, one must remember, will
I l l
suffer from all the weaknesses inherent in the process in 
which the judge is also the audience. How successful a 
summary it is will be clearer when the other indicators are 
examined later in the chapter.
In "The Iron String" the internal context of each 
separate sentence as well as the context of the whole dis­
course plays a part in indicating illocutionary force. In 
fact, as with many single-sentence utterances, the context 
is the most important single indicator. The context of this 
utterance must include its original setting— the Harvard 
lecture room in which Howard Mumford Jones addressed stu­
dents. Studied here, the essay appears in Literature for 
Writing, already identified as an anthology for undergrad­
uate students. In both cases, the author stands in a rela­
tion to his audience which enables him to state and recom­
mend felicitously. Fotion says that the title of a 
selection may be a detached indicator and therefore an im­
portant part of the context of the remainder of the work. 
Actually, the title of this essay has minimal indicative 
use. It does not indicate the illocutionary act or acts 
that will appear in the essay. To a reader who does not 
know where the expression "the iron string" comes from, the 
title will not indicate even the content of the essay. How­
ever, a reader who does recognize the title as a quotation 
from Emerson will expect that the essay will be dealing in 
some manner or other with Emerson’s advice, "Trust thyself."
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All readers, moreover, will recognize the metaphoric nature 
of the phrase, "the iron string." The idea of an "iron 
string" provokes a number of questions: What is one used
for? Does the use of the word iron suggest rigidity or 
merely strength? The reader wants an explanation of the 
title’s significance, and he expects the writer to supply 
it.
In paragraph 7, Jones uses a master speech act to 
indicate that he intends to advocate a certain position 
which he has evaluated and found to be good. He begins the 
paragraph, "By now you have rightly inferred that I find 
something important in Emerson. I am speaking of Emerson 
A propos of our time in order to revalidate an old Harvard 
custom— the custom of dissent." The reader who recognizes 
the phrase used as the title knows at this point, if he has 
not suspected it before, that Emerson’s "iron string" and 
advice, "Trust thyself," will not be disparaged in the essay. 
In these two sentences, Jones clearly indicates that he 
evaluates Emerson's position as good, that his position 
favors dissent, and that Jones is prepared to advocate—  
"revalidate"— that position. The future of American insti­
tutions, he is prepared to argue, depends upon the fostering 
of the inclination to dissent. One is not surprised then 
when Jones advocates education which will produce "man think­
ing," since, to him, "man thinking" will be man dissenting 
when dissent is needed. Other master speech acts occur in
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the essay, but they are more profitably discussed in a dis­
cussion of the acts which they control than in a discussion 
of the indicators which signal Jones's overall intent. Ad­
vocating and evaluating will be discussed at the very end 
of the discussion of the acts as the two acts which to­
gether control or organize the others.
Proceeding from this very general consideration of 
these matters of external and internal context to the deter­
mination of the illocutionary force of smaller units of 
utterance within the essay, I turn to an examination of the 
essay for verbs that can be used in Austin’s explicit per­
formative formula. Some which have the form, first person 
singular present indicative active, on examination do not 
function as part of the explicit formula. These are "I 
take," paragraph 10, and "I come," paragraph 19. They are 
mentioned because the reader, seeing the forms which do not 
work, will better understand the ones which do work. These 
name and report acts, but they do not name speech acts. Nor 
do they indicate that the speaker is performing a speech act. 
One group which Austin does not mention is included here 
because it seems to fit. The groups includes verb-adjective 
and verb-noun combinations which are synonymous with certain 
formula verbs. The examples are "I take pleasure," "I am 
afraid," and "I am ashamed." The first seems synonymous with 
"I rejoice.” The second translates "I fear." "Fear" seems 
like the doubtful cases which Austin lists under exposi­
tives, such as "doubt," "know," and "believe." The third
114
seems a synonym for the behabitive "deprecate."
A certain pattern appears even on a cursory examina­
tion of the explicit formula verbs. In addition to the ones 
mentioned in the previous paragraph, there are at least ten 
true expositives and six such as "I think" that seem to be 
covered by Austin's doubtful cases such as "believe" and 
"doubt." "I find" in paragraph 7 is one of these. They are 
expositives in the sense in which Austin explains the term: 
"Expositives are used in acts of exposition involving the
expounding of views, the conducting of arguments, and the
14
clarifying of usages and references." Expositives are "I 
suggest," "I wonder" (conjecture), "I mean," "I cite," "I 
suppose," "I submit," "I detect," "I repeat," and "I quote." 
Each of these indicates the "expounding of views" or the 
"conducting of arguments." They show that various acts such 
as stating, arguing, and opining will take place. Some that 
contain more than two words can have expositives from Aus­
tin's list substituted for them as "I can only point" and 
"I take my third example"— "I illustrate." Most of the ex­
positives signal acts which are statements or show relation­
ships between statements. Two formula verbs, "honor" and 
"am ashamed," are behabitives and indicate that Jones is 
expressing his feelings for the ideas which he discusses.
Identifying the explicit formula verbs in the essay 
does not exhaust the possibilities for the use of the form­
ula. The formula was used by Austin to make "explicit" or
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clear and unequivocal the force which he believed an utter­
ance to have "implicit" in it. From the context and from 
conventional indicators which he grasps only half con­
sciously, the reader or the listener may suspect that a 
certain illocutionary act is being performed. To test the 
utterance, he adds the appropriate explicit formula verb to 
the utterance. If the utterance still works in the context, 
he has made explicit what he knew implicitly from the con­
text and other indicators. He will have demonstrated what 
he knew intuitively without demonstration. This is the 
process to be applied in summarizing the illocutionary acts 
in "The Iron String." After using context consciously and 
other indicators only half consciously at this point, the 
reader will then test utterances with the explicit formula. 
It will not be necessary to record every test here, since 
the process becomes too monotonous, but enough tests will be 
given to demonstrate the method.
Applying the formula-indicating device in this double 
fashion, I found that a large number of the propositional 
acts in the essay are asserted or stated. A full clarifica­
tion of stating and the other illocutionary acts that occur 
in the essay appears in Appendix II, where I present a form­
ulation of the rules, either taken from Searle or developed 
by myself, that govern the happy performance of each of the 
acts. However, a general notion of these acts is indispens­
able as I trace their appearance in the essay. Thus, a
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statement, as defined by Austin and Searle, asserts the 
truth of the propositional act which is its content. This 
is similar to what I. A. Richards and others call the ref­
erential use of language in which a sentence is to be taken 
as referring to some state of affairs in the real world 
with the implication that the speaker of the sentence be­
lieves that what he says is true and that he can support the
15
truth of the statement with hard evidence. Now, in Lec­
ture XI of How to Do Things with Words, after attempting to 
set stating apart as an act distinct from such acts as warn­
ing, arguing, judging, and blaming, Austin concludes that 
this "hard evidence" is not always so firm a means of dis­
tinguishing statements as he would like it to be. He exam­
ines such statements as "France is hexagonal" and "Lord 
Raglan won the battle of Alma." He calls the first "rough"
and the second "exaggerated and suitable to some contexts
16
and not to others." The first would satisfy the require­
ments for a statement if uttered by virtually anyone except 
a geographer; the second works in an elementary textbook 
where the point is that Raglan was the commander of the win­
ning forces, not an analysis of the factors involved in his 
army's victory. Austin concludes that, "in the case of 
stating truly or falsely, just as much as in the case of 
advising well or badly, the intents and purposes of the 
utterance and its context are important; what is judged true 
in a school book may not be so judged in a work of
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historical research." In other words, Austin seems to be 
saying that there is a range of degrees of fidelity to the 
truth into which an utterance may fall and still remain a 
statement. In "The Iron String," one finds sentences such 
as this one: "His life was threatened by tuberculosis, he
abandoned his pulpit, his first wife died young, his broth­
ers were sick men, and his son perished. . ." Each clause 
seems to represent a statement, but not a statement with the 
kind of verifiability that it would have if it specified 
time, place, and degree. Again, Jones concludes the first 
paragraph, "Somehow, this symbolizes what has happened to 
Emerson." Austin might describe this utterance as "exagger­
ated and suitable to some contexts and not to others," but 
it seems to fall within the statement range. Most state­
ments in an essay of this type, one begins to feel, will 
not be precise, though they may refer, as these do, to his­
torical events. To be felicitous, they must only satisfy 
an audience which respects the ability of the speaker to 
supply precise information and can assume some responsibil­
ity on its own for assessing the statements.
Now, there are similar utterances which seem even 
less susceptible to verification. In paragraph 2, one finds 
this sentence, "He was a transcendentalist, and any beginner 
in philosophy can tell you what is wrong with transcendenta­
lism." The first clause is a verifiable statement, though 
again it does not specify when Emerson was a transcendenta-
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list and therefore seems vague. The second, however, gives 
an opinion. It is an opinion tainted with irony, as I shall 
show later, but one would find it difficult to prove that 
"any beginner in philosophy can tell you what is wrong with 
transcendentalism." Or one finds a statement such as this 
one made concerning Harvard: "I sometimes think dissent may
have no other place to go if the drives for conformity con­
tinue." The use of "I think," a doubtful performative in 
Austin's list, indicates that Jones is expressing an idea 
which is personal to him. He is performing an act similar 
to stating but distinguished by the speaker's understanding 
that he cannot demonstrate the point conclusively by supply­
ing additional information and by his hope that the audience 
will be willing to accept the point tentatively as his per­
sonal opinion. This act I shall distinguish in this study 
from stating and call "opining." Webster's New Dictionary 
of Synonyms groups "opinion" with "view, belief, conviction, 
persuasion, sentiment" and sees them as "comparable when 
they mean a more or less clearly formulated idea or judgment 
which one holds as true or valid." The term opinion it 
distinguishes by "a personal element in the judgment, the 
possibility of its being in error, and the strong probabil­
ity that it will be disputed." Now, opinions like state­
ments cover a wide range of utterances, some of them hardly 
distinguishable from statements. For example, Jones's view 
of Harvard as the home of dissent remains an opinion in this
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study even though it is not completely personal, being 
shared by many people. Stating and opining, distinguished 
in this way, become valuable labels for the acts in this 
essay. They are distinguished by the degree of certainty 
of the speaker in his utterance, the type of evidence which 
he can supply, and the nature of the "uptake" which the 
audience gives to the intention of the speaker.
Going back to the use of the explicit formula, one 
finds in the introductory paragraph of this essay the per­
vasiveness of stating or asserting. In the first paragraph, 
only one explicit performative verb is used, "I take some 
pleasure." Thus it is necessary to preface the other utter­
ances with the appropriate explicit formula. Now, I have 
already extracted kernel sentences from the sentences in 
this paragraph; so in an attempt to discover all the illocu- 
tionary acts conveyed in the utterance of these sentences, I 
shall use the explicit formula on these. When this process 
is completed, one has the following:
I state that I have been reading books lately.
I state that the author is from Harvard.
I state that he is out of favor just now.
I state that he made a speech at Harvard once.
I state that the audience disliked the speech.
I state that he was persona non grata in Cambridge 
for thirty years.
I state that the alumni decided it.
I state that the faculty decided it.
I state that he was a solid citizen.
I state that it was after the Civil War.
I state that they made him an Overseer.
I state that they gave him a degree.
I state that the degree was honorary.
I state that they asked him to deliver a course of 
lectures.
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I state that I remember the title of the lectures.
I rejoice that the title was what it was.
I state that the title was "The Natural History of 
the Intellect."
I state that thirty years or so drifted by.
I state that they erected a building.
I state that the building honors Emerson.
I state that you can enter the building any class 
day in winter.
I state that you can see Frank Duveneck's statue of 
Emerson.
I state that it is buried under coats and hats.
I state that this symbolizes it somehow.
I state that it has happened to Emerson.
This consideration of the first paragraph indicates that the 
illocutionary act of stating will appear frequently in the 
kind of discourse usually called "expository." The act will 
appear either as an end in itself as in the first sentences 
in paragraph 1 or as a part of a higher order act, such as 
explaining, arguing, or evaluating.
A more refined analysis of the first paragraph will 
show that other illocutionary acts are also being performed. 
There are touches of explanation, deprecation, and commend­
ation. For example, in sentence 5, the formula-like expres­
sion, "I take some pleasure," is an explicit indication that 
the speaker is approving, applauding, or favoring. These 
acts will be discussed more fully as more clear-cut examples 
are discovered later in the essay.
After the introductory paragraph, the next major 
block of the essay consists of paragraphs 2-6. This section 
is introduced by a master speech act: "The reasons for
Emerson's current lack of favor are understandable." Jones, 
following this utterance, proceeds to discuss four reasons
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for Emerson's "current lack of favor": his being a trans-
cendentalist, his having no vision of evil, his being a 
liberal, and his having no understanding of human nature.
The master speech act indicates that, by discussing these, 
Jones intends to explain. Now, "explanation" is not a sim­
ple term. Austin lists the verb explain under expositives, 
but the act performed in explaining is far more complicated 
than the act performed by most of the other expositives. 
Abraham Kaplan in The Conduct of Inquiry speaks of the end 
of explaining being to secure understanding, and he says of 
scientific explanation, "It does its work, not by invoking
something beyond what might be described, but by putting
18
one fact or law into relation with others." When one ex­
plains, as when he describes, Kaplan is saying, he is not 
merely reporting facts which can be grasped and used. In 
explanation, however, the relationship between the parts is 
of even more importance than it is in a description. Though 
there are, of course, one-sentence explanations, the act of 
explaining which is intended to secure understanding will 
usually consist of more than one sentence, and each sentence 
will be carefully related to the others in the explanation. 
For this reason, the explicit formula, "I explain that," 
does not work in the neat way that "I state that" or "I warn 
that" will work.
The word explain, probably because of the vagueness 
of the word understanding, has several different meanings
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which apply to radically different uses of the word. Web­
ster1 s New Dictionary of Synonyms divides the definitions 
of "explain" into two groups. In one group, it places 
"explain, expound, explicate, elucidate, interpret, con­
strue," and in another, "explain, account, justify, ration­
alize." Kaplan says of explanations, "We use the verb 'to 
explain' in connection with very many different things. We 
may be said to explain ourselves, a dream, or a text; ex­
plain how to do something or other; explain why a particular
event occurred or a certain law obtains; or explain for what
19
reason a person or group acted as they did." Though he 
acknowledges that all explanations seem to be intended to 
secure understanding, Kaplan finds that the type of under­
standing and the appropriate response by the hearer differ 
to such an extent that he must separate explanations into 
several types, two of the most prominent being what he calls 
semantic and scientific explanations. Semantic explanations 
make clear a meaning. Scientific explanations supply other 
kinds of understanding, mostly "reasons why." The explana­
tions which Jones is undertaking in this essay probably have 
characteristics of both kinds of explanations. Kaplan would 
then call them "interpretations," but in this study it is 
important to distinguish the two types.
The reason why the distinction must be made is that, 
according to Kaplan's discussion of the two types of explan­
ation, semantic explanation is a perlocutionary act, and
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scientific explanation is an illocutionary act. Since a 
study of the explaining acts in the essay support the idea 
that illocutionary and perlocutionary explaining take place 
and since this study is devoted to illocutionary acts, then 
the two must be kept separate. Kaplan shows the difference 
when he says that semantic explanation must be clear, but 
scientific explanation must only be true. In other words, 
semantic explanation must produce the perlocutionary effect 
of clarification, but scientific explanation can be success­
ful whether or not it succeeds in clarifying an idea for an
audience. As Kaplan says, "There is a difference between
20
having an explanation and seeing it." One need only 
"have" a scientific explanation. Converted into speech-act 
terminology, this distinction means that the semantic ex­
planation is a perlocutionary act, and the scientific ex­
planation is an illocutionary act. In Jones's essay, then, 
most of the explanations seem intended to "clarify" or per­
form a perlocutionary act. Both Austin and Searle point 
out that many illocutionary acts are characterized by the 
perlocutionary intent. An illocutionary act with the in­
tent to clarify is illustrating or exemplifying. For the 
acts seemingly intended to clarify, I shall use the terms 
exemplify and define. Other acts of explanation where Jones 
seems to be engaged in a kind of scientific explanation I 
shall call "accounting for."
Now, the act of exemplifying seems to be felicitous
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when the audience understands that the speaker is supplying 
information intended to clarify a generalization. Webster*s 
New Dictionary of Synonyms says that "exemplify" and "illus­
trate" are "comparable when they mean to use in speaking or 
writing concrete instances or cases to make clear something 
which is difficult, abstract, general, or remote from ex­
perience or to serve as an instance, case, or demonstration 
of a point or matter under examination." "Exemplify," it 
adds, "implies the use of examples for clarification of a 
general or abstract statement or as an aid in revealing the 
truth of a proposition or assertion." The audience may not 
find that the act produces clarification, but it must under­
stand the speaker's intent. In accounting for, on the other 
hand, the audience recognized the speaker's intent to supply 
reasons and his belief that he can supply valid reasons.
Both of these acts are usually performed in more than one 
sentence, the act consisting of the generalization or the 
statement of the phenomenon and then the concrete detail or 
specific reasons. In other words, exemplifying commits the 
speaker to supplying examples intended to secure the perlo­
cutionary effect of clarification, whereas accounting for 
commits him to supplying reasons or causes for the existence 
of something.
In paragraph 2, then, the first sentence, a master 
speech act, commits Jones to accounting for Emerson's lack 
of popularity, but far more is going on than the simplest
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understanding of the master speech act would indicate. In 
the first place, Jones is stating and opining, acts which 
seem to underlie most explaining. In the second place, he 
is commending and deprecating. Now, the acts of commending 
and deprecating have certain characteristics common to all 
members of Austin's class of behabitives. Austin says, 
"Behabitives include the notion of reaction to other peo­
ple's behaviour and fortunes and of attitudes and expres­
sions of attitudes to someone else's past conduct or immi- 21
nent conduct." He adds, "There are obvious connexions
with both stating or describing what our feelings are and
expressing, in the sense of venting our feelings, though
22
behabitives are distinct from both of these." Austin 
seems to mean that behabitives will not be mere exclamations, 
but he also seems to imply that the propositional content 
will be limited in a way which will distinguish the behabi- 
tive from other speech acts. He gives as examples words 
like "thank," "apologize," and "welcome." In the essay, 
however, the behabitive act will seldom be as simple as the 
acts which Austin describes. Instead, it will usually be 
the secondary act in a compound act.
Taking commending for an example, one has the sen­
tence in the first paragraph: "I take some pleasure in re­
membering that the title of these lectures was: 'The Natu­
ral History of the Intellect.'" Here, as I demonstrated 
already using the explicit formula, one has a statement plus
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the force of praising or commending. Vebster's New Diction­
ary of Synonyms defines "commend" as a synonym of "recom­
mend," "applaud," and "compliment," saying that they "are 
comparable when they mean to voice or otherwise manifest to 
others one's warm approval." This source adds that commend 
"usually implies judicious or restrained praise, but it sug­
gests as its motive a desire to call attention to the merits 
of a person or a thing." Obviously, as Austin points out 
about all behabitives, the sincerity condition is especially 
important. The audience must believe that the speaker is 
sincere if it accepts his intent to call attention to the 
merits of the thing commended.
On the other hand, "deprecate" means, like its syn­
onym "disapprove," "to feel or to express an objection to 
or condemnation of a person or thing." It "stresses the 
implication of regret, frequently profound, occasionally 
diffident or apologetic." In paragraph 8, one finds this 
sentence: "There is with us a set of persons called Demo­
crats, some of them in office, and another set of persons 
calling themselves Republicans, not so many of whom are in 
office, but neither you nor I nor more competent observers 
can define the philosophic difference between these sets of 
persons in terms that will really make sense." In the con­
text of the paragraph, this sentence is used to express 
Jones's objection to a two-party system where no differences 
separate the parties and to express his regret at this state
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of affairs. The sentence is used in a compound act, con­
sisting actually of three acts— stating, comparing (to be 
discussed later), and deprecating. In performing this last 
act, the speaker is obviously committing himself to a sin­
cere objection to the absence of a real difference of 
political principles separating Republicans from Democrats.
In paragraph 2 and then in paragraph 3, the thrust 
of commending and deprecating is conveyed in interesting 
ways. The last sentence in paragraph 2 follows: "All it
[transcendentalism] has is imagination and insight." This 
is the sentence which turns the force of the paragraph to 
commendation of Emerson's views and deprecation of those who 
criticize him. His views possess the merits of imagination 
and insight; his critics do not understand that possessing 
imagination and insight will atone for other weaknesses. 
One's understanding of this sentence depends on one's under­
standing of understatement as well as on one's understanding 
that enough imagination and insight will compensate for any 
other weakness. In paragraph 3, one finds understatement 
and an apparent paradox. The paradox is that in a society 
with a certain vision of good as its ideal the only person 
with that vision of good is condemned. The discussion of 
understatement and paradox is deferred to the fourth section 
of this chapter, where devices such as these will be dis­
cussed as conventional force indicators. Here it is suffi­
cient to see that Jones regrets that a view as close to the
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American ideal as Emerson's should be criticized in America 
and by reverse implication commends this view.
Paragraph 4, in addition to being a part of the unit 
of speech acts controlled by the master act in paragraph 2, 
is a fine example of the complexity which makes exhaustive 
analysis virtually impossible. The paragraph begins with a 
master speech act which operates within the framework of the 
act in paragraph 2, it contains its quota of statements and 
opinions, it defines, it exemplifies, and it commends and 
deprecates. The paragraph follows:
A third reason for Emerson's unpopularity is that 
he was a liberal. A liberal, says the Oxford Dictionary, 
is favorable to changes and reforms tending in the direc­
tion of democracy. Emerson favored these changes. How­
ever, liberalism is dead^ It is not merely dead, it was 
mistaken. Mr. Wallace's failure to create a liberal 
party in this country is proof. The latest British elec­
tion, which again buried the liberal party, is proof.
The liberal point of view in economics is wrong. The 
liberal point of view in history, or rather the point of 
view of liberal historians, is wrong. These historians 
denounced Talleyrand,® but Talleyrand was a force for 
stability. They attacked Metternich,7 but Metternich 
was a force for order. I am afraid Emerson was a lib­
eral; that is, he assumed that man might amount to some­
thing by and by if he would but consult his better self, 
and that men, taken individually, might improve them­
selves, so to speak, into a democratic state. This is 
the American dream which, through the Voice of America, 
we are broadcasting round the world, particularly into 
darkest Russia. I am not a politician, merely a literary 
man, and I cannot explain this contradiction.
Wallace's: Henry Agard Wallace (1888-1965; secre­
tary of agriculture, 1933-1940; vice-president, 1941- 
1945; unsuccessful Progressive Party candidate for presi­
dent, 1948).
®Talleyrand: Charles Maurice de Talleyrand-
Perigord, Prince de B€n6vent (1754-1838; French states­
man ).
7Metternich: Prince Klemens Wenzel Nepomuk Lothar
von Metternich (1773-1859; Austrian statesman).
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The sentence following the master speech act which begins 
the act of accounting for defines. Jones feels the neces­
sity to tell what a liberal is, since one reason for Emer­
son's lack of popularity is that he is a liberal. The 
phrase, "says the Oxford Dictionary," shows that this ut­
terance is intended to define. Now, Austin lists "define" 
as an expositive, and like exemplifying, it is a type of 
explaining intended to clarify. The word "define," The 
Random House Dictionary of the English Language says, means 
"to state or set forth the meaning of" and "to explain the 
nature or essential qualities of; describe." The second of 
these definitions seems the one which most exactly corre­
sponds to the act being performed in the utterance of the 
second sentence. Jones is giving the "essential qualities" 
of the liberal, as they are given in the Oxford Dictionary. 
He is also, however, quoting, the original speech act of 
defining having been performed by the editors of the dic­
tionary. Webster's New Dictionary of Synonyms lists "quote" 
with "cite" and "repeat." They share the meaning, "to speak 
or write again something already said or written by an­
other." According to this source, "Quote usually implies 
a use of another's words, commonly with faithful exactness 
or an attempt at it." Here the purpose is to give a gener­
ally accepted definition of the word "liberal." Quoting 
does not commit Jones to accepting this definition. In­
deed, in sentence 11, Jones propounds his own definition.
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It does not contradict the first one, but it turns the term 
"liberal" into an expression of strong commendation, and in 
the next sentence he shows that the liberal is actually 
only a man committed to the American dream. Here, Jones is 
not quoting but attempting to set forth the "essential 
qualities of."
Going back to the intent in the master speech act, 
one needs then to see that the entire paragraph is an act 
of accounting for, but that accounting for proceeds by a 
complex of acts. After defining comes arguing. One finds 
the statement, "It [liberalism] is not merely dead, it was 
mistaken." In the next two sentences, Jones gives "proof." 
Now, the "proof" works to some extent as an indication that 
liberalism may be dead: Wallace's defeat and the defeat of
the liberal party in Britain do indicate that the state of 
the party is not healthy, though they do not necessarily 
indicate that it is dead. If these are supposed to show 
that the party is "mistaken," the problem is even more 
complicated. Does defeat at the polls prove a party's 
platform to be wrong? However, the real thrust of the 
argument comes when Jones says that the liberal historians 
were wrong because they criticized Metternich and Talley­
rand. Few students of history give unqualified approval to 
either of these men, and certainly a person committed like 
Jones to the beliefs of Emerson could not be genuinely 
praising two of the most reactionary figures in nineteenth-
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century Europe. With the definition of "liberal" and its 
association with the American dream, Jones shows that he 
has indeed been arguing, but he has been arguing the oppo­
site side from the literal expression in sentence 4.
Through the entire paragraph, Jones is commending and de­
precating, and the act that begins as a simple explanation 
controlled by a master speech act has been compounded and 
complicated to give it a richness that Austin's and 
Searle's one-sentence utterances do not even approach.
Arguing, one of the acts discovered in paragraph 4, 
is another expositive, already mentioned as an act requir­
ing more than a one-sentence utterance. "Argue" is grouped 
with "discuss," "debate," "dispute," "agitate" in Webster1s 
New Dictionary of Synonyms, and it shares with them the 
meaning "to discourse about something in order to arrive at 
the truth or to convince others." The very word "dis­
course" suggests a longer than one-sentence utterance. 
"Argue," in this source, "usually implies conviction and 
the adducing of evidence or reasons in support of one's 
cause or position." The abridged Merriam-Webster adds to 
the meaning "often heated adducing of reasons and evidence 
in support of one's position." In arguing, then, the 
speaker commits himself to a conviction of the truth of the 
side which he argues for, and he must be prepared to offer 
evidence or reasons for this conviction. In paragraph 4, 
Jones is convinced that liberalism expresses the American
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dream, and he argues for this conviction by attempting to 
make the other side look absurd by giving reasons why the 
idea that liberalism is dead and mistaken are foolish. In 
paragraph 8, he argues the idea expressed in this state­
ment: "No such issue [Tory vs. Socialist] divides the
Republican state from the Democratic state." He uses per­
formatives like "I cite"— paragraph 10, saying, "I cite 
these familiar facts only that you measure from what Massa­
chusetts permitted in 1850 what California demands in 1950." 
"Cite," listed with "quote," according to Webster *s "is 
likely to stress the idea of mentioning for a particular 
reason (as proof of a thesis or substantiation of a posi­
tion taken)." In paragraph 10, then, devoted by the first 
sentence to exemplifying, one has also the stated intent to 
give reasons to back up a thesis.
Arguing proceeds from a variety of other speech acts, 
acts which, by the way, become part of the act of arguing. 
For example, Jones begins paragraph 12 with an evaluation:
"I suppose the greatest president Harvard had in the nine­
teenth century was Charles W. Eliot." In the paragraph he 
then proceeds to argue for his evaluation of Eliot. He 
also argues to show that he is right in condemning the 
political and educational systems of the country: in them,
he detects "a failure of nerve." He argues for the thing 
which he advocates when he quotes Mrs. Roosevelt in para­
graph 27. Arguing, then, winds through the essay, but,
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because of the obvious intent to persuade, it is subtly 
intertwined with other acts.
Before discussing advocating and evaluating and 
analyzing one of the later paragraphs in the essay, it 
seems important here to mention an act which forms part of 
exemplifying and arguing in many instances. The act is 
comparing. Webster*s New Encyclopedia of Synonyms places 
"comparing'1 with "contrasting" and "collating" and defines 
the three verbs as "to set two or more things side by side 
in order to show likenesses and differences." Of "com­
pare," it says, "Compare implies as an aim the showing of 
relative values or excellences or a bringing out of char­
acteristic qualities, whether they are similar or divergent; 
contrast implies as the aim an attempt to emphasize their 
differences; thus, one may compare the movement of the 
Odyssey with that of the Aeneid to arrive at their distinc­
tive qualities; one may thereupon contrast the buoyancy and 
rapidity of the one with the stateliness and dignity of the 
other." Now, comparing is an act that can occur without 
speech, but in the essay it involves the "relating" of 
"characteristic qualities, whether they are similar or di­
vergent." It takes place, like other expositives, "in acts 
of exposition involving the expounding of views, the con­
ducting of arguments, and the clarifying of usages and of 
references." For comparing to take place there must be the 
intent on the part of the speaker to place relative values
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or characteristics side by side and show their likenesses 
or differences. This action would seldom be performed as 
an end in itself, however, in an essay. It would be per­
formed in arguing or in some kind of explaining or in ad­
vocating, or at least this is the case in "The Iron 
String." For example, paragraph 8 is controlled by the 
master speech act which ends paragraph 7: "Let me briefly
discuss four examples of the drive for conformity— two from 
politics, two from education." The first two sentences 
seem to indicate that simple exemplifying will take place:
The British election shows what a genuine two-party 
system is— a system in which there is a fundamental 
philosophic difference. In Great Britain that issue 
lies between the Socialist state and the Tory state.
However, the next sentence begins a comparison of the 
British system with the American system which still seems 
to have as its primary aim to exemplify but with the added 
aim to argue. The intent to compare appears in this one 
sentence: "No such issue divides the Republican state from
the Democratic state." Here Jones is comparing the Ameri­
can system to the British system, but he is also heading 
for a comparison of the two parties in America. He con­
cludes his comparison, "Almost nothing could be more comic, 
if it were not so tragic, than to watch the Republicans 
hunting for somebody who will tell them what to do— a party 
in search of a platform. The only thing just as comic and 
just as tragic is the Democrats hunting for somebody who
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will tell them what they have done— a platform in search of 
a party." Here, comparing has been used in exemplifying 
and in arguing. In paragraph 9 Jones compares the politi­
cal fates of Wallace and McMahon in order to advance his 
argument and to exemplify. In paragraphs 12 and 13 he com­
pares President Eliot of Harvard with President Hutchins of 
Chicago in order to show that his evaluation will lead to 
advocacy of a certain educational system. In paragraph 9, 
he "cites" "familiar facts" from the life of Thoreau as 
part of his argument against the loyalty oath demanded of 
California professors. Obviously, comparing has been per­
formed in order to satisfy the conditions for felicity of 
other acts— in order to provide reasons for, examples of, 
or assessments of. In the essay, it is then a peculiarly 
semi-dependent act.
In this essay, advocating or urging— to use the term 
which Austin uses in his list of expositives— seems closely 
tied to evaluating. Jones urges a course of action which 
he has evaluated and concluded to be worthwhile. The re­
lationship between the two is supported by Austin’s classi­
fication of the two acts. As a "verdictive," evaluating is
"the giving of a verdict, as the name implies, by a jury,
23
arbitrator, or umpire." Urging, on the other hand, as an 
exercitive is "the giving of a decision in favour of or
24
against a certain course of action, or advocacy of it."
For the verdictive, according to Austin, the decisions
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"need not be final; they may be, for example, an estimate,
25
a reckoning, or appraisal." The verdictive "is essen­
tially giving a finding as to something— fact, or value—
26
which is for different reasons hard to be certain about."
In uttering the exercitive, the speaker is taking the ver­
dictive and acting on it: "Its [the exercitive's] conse­
quences may be that others are ’compelled' or 'allowed' or
27
'not allowed' to do certain acts.” The acts which the 
speaker is compelling others to perform in uttering an 
exercitive is an act appraised as good and expressed in a 
verdictive. Now, it is not necessary to the act of urging 
or to any exercitive that the speaker choose to back it 
because he evaluates it as superior to other acts. He may 
advocate an act purely out of self-interest. The act which 
he advocates or urges may be chosen through his appraisal 
of the worth of the action, however, and this is the rela­
tionship which one finds in "The Iron String."
Evaluating is an act performed in a number of places 
in the essay. Webster's New Dictionary of Synonyms places 
"evaluate" with "estimate," "appraise," "value," "rate," 
and "assess," and it defines them as "to judge a thing with 
respect to its worth." It continues, "Evaluate. . .sug­
gests an intent to arrive at a mathematically correct 
judgment" but seldom one given in monetary terms. In 
other words, when he evaluates, a speaker commits himself 
to a verdict concerning the worth of something. His
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utterance "counts as" his assessment of its worth. He is 
not committed to a demonstration of the reasons for his 
evaluation: he must merely show "intent to determine" its
worth. Evaluating and opining have then a certain simi­
larity. Neither is verifiable in the sense that a state­
ment is verifiable. Evaluating is not verifiable, however, 
because it is practiced in an area where certainty is never 
more than what value judgments are capable of. Opining is 
performed in areas where truth and falsity are theoreti­
cally possible: the speaker is willing to rely on his
personal decision concerning truth or falsity, either be­
cause verifiable statements are difficult to arrive at or 
because he feels that they are unnecessary. In addition, 
evaluating has similarities to deprecating and commending. 
Austin recognizes that the behabitive can come close to 
giving a verdict. I have defined deprecating and commend­
ing by limiting them to "expressing" approval or disapprov­
al. In evaluating, on the other hand, the speaker is 
"judging." One finds in this essay, then, utterances with 
some evaluative force like this one in paragraph 5: "That
somewhat frightened conservative, Matthew Arnold, came here 
in the eighties to lecture us about culture." The primary 
force of this utterance is stating, but the phrase "some­
what frightened conservative" gives a value judgment of 
Arnold. In paragraph 9, Jones says, "I wonder what Emerson 
would tell us here about a foolish consistency, that
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hobgoblin of little minds." Here, by quoting Emerson,
Jones gives his evaluation of the conformity in government 
policies in his own day. In paragraphs 12 and 13, he 
evaluates Eliot and Hutchins. In paragraph 14, he eval­
uates the Great Books Program. Paragraph 17 is largely 
evaluative, the argument showing how the judgment is 
weighed and arrived at. The paragraph begins, "In each 
case, of course, there is something to be said for conform­
ity." Evaluating conformity, Jones gives his verdict: the
conformity necessary for a coalition government to survive 
is good, but the conformity that makes the government a 
"Papa knows best" institution is not good.
Paragraph 18 is an interesting example of defining 
and evaluating, both of these secondary acts to stating, 
The paragraph follows:
Honor is not manufactured by printed forms to
be taken before a notary public; it is a function of
manly self-respect— and it is a mark of the time that 
I feel almost apologetic for using so old-fashioned a 
phrase. The notion of standardized wisdom--so many 
parts of Plato, T s o  many parts of Newton,28 so many 
parts of Milton,® do not shake before taking— is a 
product of this same loss of nerve. It reveals hurry 
and distrust— hurry, because when you have invented 
the formula, you can push the product through to its 
shaping, faster; distrust, because when you substitute 
uniformity of pattern for equality of individuals, you 
transfer your belief from the individuals to the pat­
tern. A belated Emersonian, I am still, in things of 
the spirit, for the individual. Robert Frost^O re­
minds us that a one-man revolution is the only revolu­
tion that is coming.
27Plato: (c. 427-347 B.C.; Greek philosopher). 
28jjewton: Sir Isaac Newton (1642-1727; English
physicist and mathematician).
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^Milton: John Milton (1608-1674; English poet).
30Robert Frost: (1874-1963; American poet).
The first sentence is used to state and to define. The 
first part of the sentence tells what honor is not and the 
second part gives one attribute. The third part of the 
sentence deprecates a prevailing attitude in which an apol­
ogy for holding this definition is necessary. The third 
sentence is used partly to define "standardized wisdom."
It is also an evaluation: "Standardized wisdom" itself
must be bad since it results from "loss of nerve." The 
next sentence is used to argue for the idea that the trust 
in "standardized wisdom" reveals loss of nerve. Finally, 
Jones gives his verdict: he is not for "standardized wis­
dom," but for the individual. In the last sentence, when 
he quotes Robert Frost, he is evaluating any movement based 
on standardization and finding it wanting.
As I indicated earlier, evaluating and urging go 
together in this essay. In paragraph 7, Jones shows this 
relationship, and finally in paragraph 27, he clinches it. 
He quotes Mrs. Roosevelt: "Have we really reached the
point where we must fear to join any group because at some 
time or other a person of Communist leanings, or supposed 
Communist leanings, might also join it? That is a terrible 
thing and we should be ashamed of it." Jones shares this 
evaluation, and he adds, "I do not think it is too late in 
the history of the republic, whether in education or in
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politics, to believe that Emerson is still the most excel­
lent spiritual catalyst we have in a democracy." Now, a 
catalyst is an agent effecting change of which it is not 
itself a part. Jones is then not only evaluating and 
deprecating. He is attempting to "revalidate an old Har­
vard custom— the custom of dissent." In doing that he is 
urging or advocating.
Webster1s New Dictionary of Synonyms defines "urge" 
along with "egg, exhort, goad, spur, prod, prick, sic" to 
mean "to press or impel to action, effort, or speed." 
"Urge," it says, "implies the exertion of influence or 
pressure either from something or someone external or from 
something within (as the conscience or the heart); specif­
ically it suggests an inciting or stimulating to or toward 
a definite end (as greater speed or a prescribed course or 
objective) often against the inclinations or habits of the 
one urged." Urging seems to come close to Searle's use of 
"advise." There is no necessity, however, for the thing 
advocated to be in the best interest of the person who is 
urged. The speaker must merely favor the desired change 
or action, and his utterance must count as the exertion of 
influence to cause the hearer to change or act. The 
speaker's statement of intent need be no more explicit 
than Jones's in paragraph 7: he is attempting to "revali­
date" an idea and a custom which have all but disappeared. 
Probably, in the essay written for the type of audience
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which Jones was interested in addressing, the urging would 
usually be this subtle.
Up to this point in this essay, I have, then, dis­
covered a complex of illocutionary forces conveyed in a 
variety of ways. Jones, I have concluded, has stated, 
opined, argued, accounted for, exemplified, defined, com­
pared, and defined, thus performing acts classed as expos­
itives; deprecated and commended, performing acts classi­
fied as behabitives; evaluated, performing an act classed 
as a verdictive; and urged, performing an exercitive. Fur­
ther analysis might disclose more acts, as some utterances 
yield not one or two but as many as three or four acts 
piled on each other. Such analysis seems unnecessary to 
demonstrate that this essay is indeed a complex utterance 
of a series of compound illocutionary acts. Certainly, in 
teaching the essay, the analysis would have to stop at this 
point or even sooner if the freshman student is not to be­
come hopelessly lost in the maze of interrelated acts. The 
question which remains, before I proceed to further enum­
eration of force indicators, is not, then, how many more 
acts can be discovered but whether these acts are felici­
tously performed.
In Chapter III I concluded that the conditions for 
the felicitous performance of an act must specify the 
speaker's intentions, his assessment of the hearer's know­
ledge and desires, the position of the speaker as the
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proper person to perform the act, and the extent to which 
the speaker obligates himself. The conditions summarized 
in Appendix II specify these elements, all of which must 
be satisfied if these acts are to be felicitous. Now, the 
first real test is the extent to which the audience accords 
"uptake" to the speaker. By the fact that I have been able 
to isolate these acts, one can conclude tentatively that 
they are felicitously performed. If I have recognized the 
speaker's intent, the extent to which he has obligated him­
self in each act, and his position as the proper person to 
perform the act, then the acts appear to be felicitous.
For example, I have distinguished between the commitment 
of the author when he states and when he opines, when he 
evaluates and when he commends, when he argues and when he 
accounts for. However, I may have read his signals wrong, 
and his intent in some cases may have been different. One 
conclusion is definite: Jones stands In the proper posi­
tion to perform the acts which he is performing. Again, 
one assumes that a man of his reputation would only per­
form these acts sincerely, that Austin's dictum that a 
man's word is his bond would apply. Certainly, we rarely 
read a serious nonfiction work unless we have some reason 
to trust the author as a person capable of committing him­
self in the proper way in the acts which he performs. 
Further testing of the extent to which I have interpreted 
the acts correctly or given the proper "uptake" will come
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in the next section, when I turn again to force indicators.
IV
Having tentatively identified the illocutionary acts 
performed in the essay by using the explicit formula and my 
intuitive grasp of the nature of these acts, I next tried 
to study in more detail the other indicators. This part of 
the study, I felt, would reenforce or correct my assumption 
concerning the acts performed and, at the same time, ex­
plore the nature of these indicators. The indicators which 
were not discussed in Part III are verb forms besides the 
explicit performative formula, connecting particles, ad­
verbs, word order, and punctuation. In addition, rhetori­
cal devices function in conventional ways, and occasionally 
the author simply states his intention to perform a certain 
act.
The verb in the independent clause is the one which 
must be examined for illocutionary force, since it comes 
directly from the speaker and carries his full intent.
Verbs in dependent clauses may carry the force of an utter­
ance which the speaker is quoting, but the verb in the main 
clause, or, in transformational terminology, in the matrix, 
is the key to the speaker's primary intent. In Part III 
the verbs occurring in the explicit performative form have 
already been used as the first indication of the basic 
force of the essay. The mood of the verbs supplies another
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indication. The use of indicative mood supports the idea 
that stating and asserting are basic acts, but since almost 
any force can be expressed with the indicative mood, this 
indicator alone is ambiguous and uncertain. In three 
places the mood becomes imperative with the form "let me." 
Again, in paragraph 19, the following sentence contains the 
imperative mood: "If all you want to do is to train the
young, establish your pattern— Great Books, General Educa­
tion, call it what you will— and the training may be admir­
able." In the following paragraph, the imperative occurs 
twice: "Ask any Harvard graduate" and "ask him who taught
him." When one examines these three instances of the use 
of the imperative, one sees that this mood by itself as an 
indicator is little more help than the indicative mood.
As force indicators, the "let me" constructions have no 
real request intent. Here, the best explanation for the 
utterances in which they occur is that they are master 
speech acts in the sense in which Fotion uses the term.
In paragraph 7, one finds "Let us briefly discuss. . in
paragraph 11, "Let us turn. . ." (meaning "let us discuss"); 
and "let me briefly contrast. . ." According to Fotion, 
the "let me/us" would become the formula governing the 
speech act in the single-sentence utterance and the rest of 
the sentence the content governing the sentences which fol­
low. An explanation by Chungmin Lee in a recent article, 
"Embedded Performatives," contains a similar explanation,
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one which perhaps accounts better for the "let us" portion 
of the utterance. Lee shows that in a construction using 
"let" and a performative verb, as in "Let me briefly dis­
cuss. . ." the "let me," may function as a "sign of defer- 
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ence." The "let me," according to Lee, has no illocu­
tionary force. With either explanation, the act functions 
as a detached indicator. Considering the sentence in para­
graph 19 out of context, one would conclude that the force 
is advising: the "if" clause suggests that one try the
performative formula, "I advise that. . ." and it works. In 
context, the sentence becomes merely a summing up of the 
basic difference which Jones wants to show between training 
and educating, and it secures the "uptake" of an opinion.
In the "ask" constructions, the requesting force disappears 
as one sees that the use is merely another way of express­
ing condition: "if you ask any Harvard graduate" is actu­
ally what Jones is saying. The whole sentence becomes 
again an expression of an opinion, and the mood of the verb 
is seen as an indicator which needs help from others if it 
is to function clearly.
Certain verbs in themselves carry considerable force 
even when they are not used in the explicit formula or 
would not fit in the formula. An example is the verb seem. 
In paragraph 3, the following sentence occurs: "It seems
that Herman Melville had a vision of evil in Moby Dick, 
that Nathaniel Hawthorne had a vision of evil in The
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Scarlet Letter, and that Henry James had a vision of evil 
in The Turn of the Screw." The sentence is used to state 
and to account for. By the very word seem itself, however, 
Jones is indicating that he is not stating a belief that he 
is committed to but one that others hold. By using the im­
personal "it" as subject, he reenforces this idea and sug­
gests that those who hold the belief may not be willing to 
support their opinions with their names. The attempt to 
interpret the verb seem shows again that one must constant­
ly remember that vagueness and uncertainty inflict all in­
dicators unless they are used in a context where the con­
text and other indicators support them.
The connecting particles make an interesting list. 
One might argue that every conjunction has a part in con­
veying the force of the utterance. The words which connect 
independent clauses and provide transitions between sen­
tences are probably the most important because of their 
contribution to the effect of context on each utterance.
In this list, therefore, connecting particles are limited 
to conjunctions connecting independent clauses, subordinate 
conjunctions connecting dependent clauses to independent 
clauses, and transition words between sentences and para­
graphs. Subordinate conjunctions which introduce noun 
clauses and ones which occur in adverb clauses which are 
embedded in peculiar ways in other clauses will not be 
marked because the importance of these as force indicators
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is not clear.
Looking at these as a list of words out of context 
one sees that, alone, each one is ambiguous and uncertain. 
Put into a context, the most neutral of them gains explic­
itness. For example, in paragraph 1, "however" emphasizes 
the change from one level of popularity to another, thus 
contributing to the overall force of the paragraph utter­
ance. The use of "and" in the second sentence of paragraph 
2 is significant. This conjunction is the kind of neutral 
term which stating and most kinds of explaining demand.
Two ideas are combined using "and" with no indication that 
one is more important than the other. Through the entire 
paragraph, there is only one subordinate clause, since "as 
we owlishly say" functions as an interrupter and will be 
listed here as an adverbial phrase. The use of short 
simple sentences and compound sentences with the clauses 
joined by "and" indicates that the author is merely piling 
one detail on another, and it makes the final sentence, 
which at first seems only to add another idea, hit with 
double force when the reader sees that it has more to do 
than to state and account for. The use of the word now in 
paragraph 9 shows the uncertainty which afflicts the word 
indicator with no help from the other indicators. The 
first one— "Now I do not care. . ."— emphasizes the state­
ment force of the utterance. The second— "Now that the 
situation has worsened"— is an indication of time sequence.
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Both are valuable connective words in explanations, but 
they do not function in the same way. On the other hand, 
a cursory reading of the list indicates that the kind of 
words needed to make the relationships between statements 
and utterances in an explanation clear is present. When 
Jones argues in paragraphs 16-20, he begins to use "but" 
and "if" with considerable frequency. Both indicate that 
opposing sides will be given.
Several adverbs are used in an interesting way. One 
of these is "merely." This word occurs six times in the 
essay. When it occurs, Jones is deprecating his own abil­
ity and his own views. Now, deprecating may be an illocu­
tionary act itself, but here it is an act used "for some­
thing." The "for something" is the establishing of the 
persona in order to praise and condemn. This use will be 
discussed below under rhetorical devices. "Only" is used 
nine times, three times as an adjective and six times as 
an adverb. The adjectival use adds emphasis to the force 
of utterances in some contexts: paragraph 8— the "only
thing"; paragraph 14— "only great readers of books"; para­
graph 22— "only opportunity." Austin, one recalls, mentions 
that some indicators do not change the force but merely 
give emphasis to it. When "only" is used as an adverb, it 
means "merely" in this essay, and again Jones is deprecat­
ing his own actions and views. Then "all" is used in the 
second and third paragraphs, not as an adverb but with the
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sense in the context of "only” or "merely." Here again the 
effect is deprecatory.
Unusual word order seems to convey force in several 
ways. In some sentences, the indirect quotation is handled 
with an interrupter such as "he said." This word order 
emphasizes that Jones is quoting Emerson. In paragraph 7, 
one finds a sentence such as "Long may it be so." Para­
phrased this becomes, "I hope that it may be so for a long 
time." The hope is almost a prayer, but the illocutionary 
force is still commending. In paragraph 9, one finds this 
sentence: "Mr. Wallace is on the political left and must
therefore be intrinsically wrong; Senator McMahon is an 
administration Democrat, and must therefore be intrinsi­
cally right." The repetition of the pattern in the two 
clauses makes nonsense of the conclusions, thus adding to 
the praise and blame force of the utterance. Paragraph 14 
is largely composed of rhetorical questions: "But why a
library?" "Why is bookishness a virtue?" "What is a great 
book?" The reader answers for himself as Jones wants him 
to answer. Most important, he realizes that Jones is argu­
ing against the Great Books Program and condemning those 
who would pour in knowledge and expect to turn out an 
educated man.
The use of the rhetorical question leads into the 
whole question of the use of traditional rhetorical devices 
or the linguistic techniques of persuasive discourse as
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illocutionary force indicators. Searle gives as the pre­
paratory condition for a genuine act of questioning that 
the speaker must not know the answer which he is asking 
for. Since, in this essay, Jones obviously knows the an­
swers to the questions which he asks, the questions are 
rhetorical and the sort of utterance that Austin labels 
"for something." Such questions along with similes, under­
statement, antithesis, apostrophe, hyperbole, and (in some 
lists) as many as a hundred and fifty others are tradi­
tional rhetorical devices. Austin would consider all of 
these to be usages "for something" besides the performance 
of the act which each seems to perform. An example of 
understatement or litotes, for example, will appear to 
state but actually perform another act, often an act of 
praising. Now, most rhetorical devices have been consid­
ered as persuasive devices and therefore tied to the per- 
locutionary act, if one tries to fit them into speech-act 
theory. They are, however, conventional in one sense and 
on one level, and they certainly can be used to indicate 
illocutionary force. Turning first to the conventional 
nature of these devices, one sees that they originally are 
used, in most cases, in unique ways, but to the sophisti­
cated user of the language many of them are just as con­
ventional as the customary word order of the language. To 
the less sophisticated, rhetorical devices will remain 
literal expressions. The thesis here is that even the most
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subtle rhetorical device becomes conventional if it is in 
the repertoire of the speaker and the audience.
Certainly, these uses of language "for something" 
in "The Iron String" help to indicate the force of the 
utterances. A critical sentence is this one from paragraph 
1: "In view of this history I take some pleasure in remem­
bering that the title of these lectures was: ’The Natural
History of the Intellect.’" Jones’s pleasure here results 
from his use of this title in an ironical way to describe 
the history of Emerson's reputation. One has the manipula­
tion of utterances to produce irony, or the use of language 
"for something": Jones takes pleasure in order to make an
ironic assessment of the fickleness of people. This under­
standing rests on the ability of the audience to pick up 
certain conventional clues. The clues are the word some 
and the position of the sentence in relation to others in 
the essay. The word some understates in a subtle way which 
directs attention to the title. The position of the sen­
tence demands that the reader think about the reasons why 
the title gives pleasure to the speaker: nothing in the
previous sentence has prepared the reader to anticipate 
that this title will give pleasure to the speaker. In­
stead, the previous sentences have been flat statements of 
fact. Taking the speaker seriously when he says he takes 
pleasure, the reader then must look for his reason. It can 
only lie in an ironical twisting of the meaning of the
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title to apply to the history of Emerson's ideas or to the 
fact that Emerson has greater insight into the intellect 
than his detractors. By using words "for something" in 
this sentence, the speaker has conveyed his praise of Emer­
son, and in so doing he has performed an illocutionary act.
The final sentence of paragraph 2 and sentence 6 in 
paragraph 3 use understatement as a conventional device for 
conveying the author’s approval of Emerson. The final sen­
tence in paragraph 2 can be rephrased as follows: "It has
only imagination and insight." Sentence 6, rephrased, 
reads "He has only a vision of good." Obviously, the read­
er will feel that "imagination and insight" and "a vision 
of good" are not small and unimportant attributes. Under­
stated, they loom larger than ever. Again, it is necessary 
for the audience to understand this use of "all" and the 
reason for understatement. If the audience does have this 
understanding, then the use functions as an illocutionary 
force indicating device to enable the speaker to praise.
In paragraph 3, the repetition of "vision of evil" 
seven times and the apparent paradox signal to the audience 
that Jones is condemning those who praise a writer for hav­
ing a vision of evil to the point where he makes them ri­
diculous. To the reader who is so unsophisticated that he 
sees nothing strange about the use of this phrase in the 
same construction seven times in one paragraph, this repe­
tition will convey no idea except that each of the writers
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mentioned had a "vision of evil." The discovery that Amer­
icans condemn Emerson for holding the view that is suppos­
edly the cornerstone of their system is only an apparent 
paradox. It conveys to the reader the ridiculousness of 
the criticism of Emerson. Here one has, then, conventional 
uses which are conventional only to users of the language 
of a certain sophistication. They seem, however, to be 
fully as conventional as the use of the "assertive link." 
All speakers of the language would be expected to recognize 
the function of "is," but only one large group would recog­
nize the use of repetition as Jones has used it in "The 
Iron String."
Another device which Jones uses in these first para­
graphs is his adoption of a persona. He becomes ingenuous, 
unassuming, modest. He is "merely a literary historian," 
"merely a literary man," and "not a theologian." Again, 
the sophisticated reader is assisted in detecting the force 
which Jones wishes to convey. He is not "merely" anything 
in this essay; he is the authority giving his opinion to 
students. In other words, he is employing the "Plain 
Folks" technique, a technique for performing perlocutionary 
acts, in order to show the real thrust of his support for 
Emerson's ideas.
These uses with their rlJtorical appeal definitely 
have perlocutionary effect. They are all useful in per­
suading. This fact does not seem to destroy them as
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illocutionary devices. The reader who does not understand 
these uses will miss both perlocutionary and illocutionary 
reactions. In other words, a native speaker may grasp con­
ventions on two levels. On the lowest level, he will mere­
ly understand illocutionary acts performed simply with no 
hint of the use of language "for something." On the high­
est level, he will have in his language repertoire a set of 
conventions which convey illocutionary force at the same 
time that they aim to secure a perlocutionary effect, and 
he will see in language used "for something" a complicated 
way of bringing about the "uptake" of the illocution. One 
is reminded of Ohmann's discussion of irony in "Literature 
as Act." In the sentences discussed in paragraphs 1, 2, 
and 3 and in the repetition of "vision of evil" in para­
graph 3, the irony does result from the author’s perform­
ance of an infelicitous illocutionary act. To a reader who 
knows the conventions of the use of the infelicitous act, 
however, the infelicitous act is used to perform a felic­
itous one.
A device which is so simple that it almost escapes 
notice is the author's simple statement of intent, which 
corresponds to Fotion*s master speech acts or "detached" 
indicators. Such a statement occurs in paragraphs 2-5. 
Jones states that he is going to supply reasons for Emer­
son's unpopularity. In so doing, he is committing himself 
to accounting for the act which he is performing. Jones
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has not hesitated to tell his reader what he intends.
Punctuation is important as an indicator in several 
striking instances. The period, comma, and semicolon are 
indicators chiefly in the sense that they do not call at­
tention to any one force but direct the reader to other 
signs. The dash, on the other hand, seems to exist to call 
attention to a force. In eight places, the dash is used 
instead of the comma to set off appositives. These appos- 
itives are in every case ones which add extra dimensions 
to the words they explain, and thus they emphasize. For 
example, in paragraph 19, one finds the following: "If all
you want to do is to train the young, establish your 
pattern— Great Books, General Education, call it what you 
will— and the training may be admirable." Here Jones is 
condemning Great Books, General Education, etc., as "pat­
terns" for training. Placing these in apposition to "pat­
tern" and setting them off in dashes emphasize the pattern 
quality which results in training, not education. In three 
places, the dashes signal interruptors, each of which is a 
significant key to the author's attitude. For example, in 
paragraph 3, Jones sets off in dashes two lines from Emer­
son's poem describing his son. These lines occur in 
Jones's listing of all the bad things which happened to 
Emerson, and they emphasize that the death of his son, at 
least, must have seemed to Emerson an evil. Finally, the 
dashes signal expressions, even clauses, which the author
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wishes to call attention to as being subtly worded ("a 
party in search of a platform" and "a platform in search of 
a party") or as expressing an idea which he feels has been 
ignored in paragraph 18. Exclamation marks are used for 
sentences with the word order and structure of exclamatory 
sentences in paragraph 21. The utterances have the force 
of statements, however.
After looking at these indicators, the reader is 
struck more and more by several points. In the first place, 
an exhaustive list of force indicators in each category is 
not possible. Almost any word can be used to convey force 
in a given context, and few words consistently convey the 
same force. Instead of a list of indicators, one has sug­
gestions concerning the positions and the functions of the 
indicators. The suggestions of Austin and Searle concern­
ing the verb, connecting particles, adverbs, word order, 
and punctuation (useful here only as an indicator of the 
rhetorical question) are consistently helpful. In addi­
tion, conventional rhetorical devices and direct statements 
of intentions, or master speech acts, sometimes direct the 
reader to the intended force. Certainly, the context of 
every utterance provides the first important sign.
In the second place, the relationship between style 
and illocutionary force seems apparent, though nebulous. 
Beardsley, Ohmann, and even I. A. Richards, a critic who 
has not used speech-act terminology, support the idea of
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a relationship between style and illocutionary force. Is 
illocutionary force to propositional content as style is to 
content? Or, in other words, is style merely the manipula­
tion of illocutionary force indicating devices? If one 
sets out to study style apart from content, how does the 
process which he uses differ from the process used in sep­
arating illocutionary force indicating devices from the 
basic indicators of propositional content? It appears now 
that the study of illocutionary force indicating devices 
will not be as comprehensive as a study of style. In addi­
tion, a speaker or writer has considerable choice among 
devices to convey the same force. Until the extent to 
which each word in a particular context conveys force is 
known, or it can be shown that no two arrangements of words 
or phrases can convey the same force, then one cannot 
equate style and the way the author conveys force. One 
can, however, say that the way the author conveys illocu­
tionary force is one aspect of his style. Since he seems, 
at the present time, to have a variety of ways to convey 
the same force, this discovery will not prove a single 
answer to the question of ways to distinguish between 
styles. A study of this relationship therefore is a sub­
ject for further consideration,
V
In this chapter, I set out to describe my analysis
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of "The Iron String" as the performance of a complex series 
of compound illocutionary acts in Beardsley's sense of the 
word complex, assuming that, in this essay, Jones has ex­
ploited "to a high degree the illocutionary act potential 
of its verbal ingredients." Stating, opining, accounting 
for, exemplifying, defining, quoting, arguing, comparing, 
commending, deprecating, evaluating, and urging assume 
various degrees of importance in the essay as the "verbal 
ingredients" from the simplest indicators to sophisticated 
rhetorical devices convey force. On the whole, evaluating 
and advocating seem to control the other acts: Jones is
continually evaluating one view of politics and one view of 
education— in both cases views that discourage dissent— as 
he urges that another view— one which encourages dissent—  
be adopted. Most of the utterances in the essay are com­
pound. If one considers, for example, as simple a sentence 
as "There is a country called Russia" in paragraph 9, he 
finds two acts being performed and the sentence forming 
part of a third act. Part of the speaker's understanding 
comes from the context: Jones is discussing "the drive for
conformity" as it is demonstrated in people's various views 
toward Russia. The sentence is used first to state:
"Russia is a country." The word arrangement of the origi­
nal shows another act— the deprecating of people who hold 
certain views of Russia. In other words, "I deprecate for 
holding these views people who are so simplistic that they
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need to be told that there is a country called Russia."
The views of such people change as the man advocating them 
changes, and the changes are the result of the ignorance 
of the people. The utterance is also part of an "exemp­
lifying" act. These compound acts are signalled by various 
indicators, and each is constituted by rules.
Or, at least, this interpretation seems possible as 
one analyzes "The Iron String" in terms of speech-act the­
ory. Certainly, it is still merely a possible interpreta­
tion. The reader-judge cannot be certain of attaining the 
objectivity which illocutionary act analysis promises. He 
cannot even be certain that the acts which he has isolated 
are the only way to name the acts in the essay. Using 
speech-act theory to discover locutionary and illocutionary 
acts, he hoped for certainty of the kind which should re­
sult from knowing the rules of the language game. This 
certainty has not resulted, and this analysis of "The Iron 
String" is no more than a beginning.
If it has been successful at all, however, the anal­
ysis of "The Iron String" as a series of illocutionary acts 
should make it easier to analyze other essays in the same 
way, and the analysis of these should proceed more expedi­
tiously. In addition, analysis of other essays might show 
a kind of pattern in the illocutionary acts performed in 
the formal essay, if such a pattern exists. In this essay, 
I contend that Jones states, accounts for, opines, exemp­
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lifies, defines, argues, compares, commends, praises, and 
deprecates in order to urge the adoption of a position 
which he has evaluated and found satisfactory. Probably 
Jones hopes to convince and persuade. In addition, he may 
perform other perlocutionary acts such as clarifying. The 
three essays discussed in the next chapter will be ex­
plored, then, as a further test of the usefulness of this 
theory in the study of the formal essay. I will try to 
see the illocutionary acts which are performed, the indi­
cators which signal these acts, and the pattern which the 
complex arrangement of acts forms.
CHAPTER V
THE FORMAL ESSAY AND AUSTIN'S JUDGE
If Austin is correct, a judge, a disinterested third 
person, should be able to observe a speech act being per­
formed by a speaker in the presence of a hearer and con­
clude that certain locutionary and illocutionary acts have 
been performed. Searle, too, says that a sentence can con­
tain all the indicators necessary to reveal the speech acts 
performed by an utterance. Since the writer of the essay 
cannot rely on gestures, intonation, and stress as indica­
tors, he can or should be expected to place in each sen­
tence tangible clues to the force which he intends each 
sentence to carry in the context of the essay. Up to this 
point in the study of the essay as a complex series of com­
pound illocutionary acts, I have begun the analysis of an 
essay with an attempt to grasp intuitively the nature of 
the acts performed, the only really helpful criterion being 
the explicit formula. Now I can use with greater certainty 
the indicators which Searle and Austin discuss because I 
have found them in "The Iron String," and, in addition, I 
have discovered indicators which they do not list. If the 
impartial judge can indeed tell what illocutionary acts are 
being performed by hearing them performed, then I should be
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able to follow the writer's indicators to the same kind of 
conclusion. With each essay analyzed, I should become more 
adept at interpreting indicators, and I should gain new in­
sight into the way the individual illocutionary acts which 
the author has performed relate to each other.
To continue this investigation, I have chosen three 
essays: "We Were Not Skeptical Enough" by Joseph Wood 
Krutch; "It's Pretty, but Is It Art?" by Sylvia Angus; and 
"Pornography and Censorship” by Irving Kristol. I chose 
these, first of all, because they are all found in recent 
anthologies of essays used in freshman English classes; 
thus they should be typical of the essays used in such 
classes to explain expository techniques with the help of 
traditional terminology. Next, I considered the audience 
for which each was first written. By choosing an essay 
treating a philosophical subject for a lay audience, an­
other written for a literary publication like The Saturday 
Review of Literature, and a third written for a newspaper 
magazine like The New York Times Magazine, I felt that I 
could insure that I had essays which employed a variety of 
conventional indicators in order to reach a variety of 
readers. Finally, I considered the extent to which each 
essay remained close to Barbara Smith's "natural utterance" 
such as a personal letter, which I discussed in Chapter IV. 
Krutch's essay is written in the first person almost en­
tirely, employing "I" or "we" as the subject of the main
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clause in all but seven sentences. The other two essays 
use the first person only a few times. I hoped to move in 
easy stages from an essay like "The Iron String," which was 
originally a speech act in the truest sense, to an essay in 
which the explicit performative formula would still be 
found and finally to essays which used the first person 
very seldom. These last, I believe, remain "natural utter­
ances," but their nature is not so obvious as the nature of 
those essays which employ the first person extensively.
My discussion of these three essays, then, repre­
sents further experimentation with the instruments of anal­
ysis that I had applied to "The Iron String." I hoped to 
refine these instruments and develop them further. My re­
port of my experimentation with these essays will, there­
fore, confirm what I had already learned from the analysis 
of "The Iron String"; but I will stress the new things that 
I learned from the application of speech-act analysis to 
essays which, as I worked with them, I realized were in 
certain ways very different from "The Iron String." These 
differences which I had grasped intuitively before I began 
my analysis actually constitute a fourth reason for my 
choice of these essays for my next application of speech- 
act analysis. I was increasingly aware of illocutionary 
acts which are not found in Jones's essay and indicating 
devices that Jones did not have occasion to use. For ex­
ample, in interpreting Krutch's essay, the reader is faced
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with the crucial problem of understanding the illocutionary 
force or forces behind sentences explicitly referring to 
the writer's "beliefs." Similarly, in Angus's essay, even 
the title indicates that a crucial illocutionary act will 
be that of defining, an act which I touched on only very 
briefly in my treatment of "The Iron String." Kristol's 
essay has been published in two versions. A comparison of 
the two versions provided me with an opportunity to study 
how some of the changes that Kristol made influence the 
ease with which the reader is able to make out the illocu­
tionary forces operating in the essay. Also, Angus's and 
Kristol's essays are interesting because of their rich use 
of verbs, adverbs, and punctuation as indicating devices. 
Finally, in examining these essays, I raised with more 
seriousness a question which I only touched on in examining 
"The Iron String": How well can Austin's impartial judge
see not only what illocutionary acts are being performed 
but also whether they are being performed felicitously? In 
talking about these three essays, I will attempt a brief 
answer to this question.
The process of analysis to be tested in this chapter 
is basically the attempt to answer three questions: (1)
What illocutionary acts are performed in each essay? (2) 
Are these acts successfully or felicitously performed? (3) 
What is the relationship of these acts to each other? Be­
cause the writers of these particular essays are successful
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professional writers, the assumption will be that the acts 
are, in the main, felicitously performed. Thus, the empha­
sis in answering the second question will not be on finding 
them unsuccessful for some obscure reason but on discover­
ing the ways each satisfies the most important conditions 
for success. The first question will be answered by the 
search for illocutionary force indicating devices in each 
essay. The ordinary reader of such an essay, if his read­
ing completes a successful illocutionary act, will rely on 
these indicators usually in a mechanical, unself-conscious 
way as he interprets the sentences in the essay. Here I 
will consciously study the essay for the devices which 
signal certain acts. From a study of the indicators, I 
should know what acts are performed and then be prepared to 
test their felicity by the rules which constitute each as a 
certain type of speech act.
The following devices, discussed in my preceding 
chapter, will also be useful in the study of the three es­
says analyzed here:
1. The context, including the circumstances of publica­
tion, the relationship of each sentence to the oth­
ers, and the relationship between paragraphs.
2. Master speech acts including detached indicating 
devices such as titles.
3. Verbs— mood, tense, performatives.
4. Vocabulary— connecting particles, adverbs.
5. Punctuation.
6. Word order.
7. Rhetorical devices such as irony and understatement. 
In the reading of each essay, any other indicators which 
appear can be added to this list.
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In the short essay, ”We Were Not Skeptical Enough,"
Joseph Wood Krutch addresses an audience as wide as the
intended circulation of the anthology, This I Believe, in
which his essay first appeared. The anthology, which is no
longer readily available, is described by the editors of
Patterns of Exposition, the college text in which Krutch's
essay is reprinted, as "a collection of philosophic obser-
1
vations from famous people." (The essay from Patterns of 
Exposition is reproduced in Appendix IV.) In the essay,
"We Were Not Skeptical Enough," Krutch states that, though 
young people of his generation thought that they were ex­
tremely skeptical, in reality they "believed very firmly in 
a number of things which are not really so." Basically, 
their mistake, according to Krutch, was that they accepted 
the idea that man is merely an animal, that man and his 
society can be studied in the same manner in which one 
studies the animal world, and that man has no power to in­
fluence the direction of his individual life or his soci­
ety. Krutch, on the other hand, has concluded that man 
"can will, and choose and prefer," that he can make society 
what he wishes it to be, and that the belief that man is an 
autonomous creature is important in building a free soci­
ety.
The title of this anthology and the title of the
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the essay are the first indicators of force and content and 
are perfect examples of Fotion's ”detached" indicators. 
Examining the title of the collection, I was immediately 
struck by the presence of a construction which Austin 
classifies as a doubtful expositive, "I believe." The 
Merriam-Webster Pocket Dictionary of Synonyms places "be­
lieve" with "know" and "think" and defines them as "to hold 
something in one's mind as true or as being what it pur­
ports to be." For "believe," Merriam-Webster adds that it 
"stresses assurance but implies trust and faith (as in a 
higher power) rather than evidence as its basis." Obvious­
ly, then, "believe," as here defined, is not the name of a 
speech act in the fullest sense, yet as Austin indicates, 
its use shows something about the nature of the act being 
performed.
What does a speaker seem to be doing when he says,
"I believe"? Mats Furberg in Saying and Meaning distin­
guishes two senses in which "I believe" is used, and this 
distinction seems more helpful in working with the title,
This I Believe, than the definition given above. The first
2
Furberg terms the "degree-showing employment." In this
sense the expression indicates that the speaker is not
certain; or, as Furberg says, "'I believe’ is, roughly
3
speaking, replaceable by 'probably.'" The second or the
"psychological" employment Furberg explains using as an
4
example the "delusional employment." The mental patient
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tells the psychiatrist, "I believe that pink elephants are
5
running after me." Here the term "I believe" expresses
the fact that the utterance is "a piece of information
6
about the speaker's state of mind." The psychological use 
by the normal person is similarly a report on the speaker's 
state of mind, though the "state of mind" may be the result 
of rational processes and bring about rational actions by 
the person holding the belief. Furberg sums up the differ­
ence between the two uses of "I believe": "Whilst the
degree-showing employment simply serves to warn the listen­
er that the utterance has less than its normal [assertive] 
strength, the psychological one serves to tell us something 
about the subject's state of mind— viz. that he is ready to
claim certain things and/or prepared to act in certain 
7
ways."
Now, the use of "I believe" in the title of this 
anthology indicates that the essays in the anthology are to 
be taken primarily as reports on the psychological state of 
the writer of each piece. The quotation from Patterns of 
Exposition shows that the volume is intended to deal not 
with the degree of credence with which the writers hold 
certain beliefs or necessarily with their reasons for 
holding these beliefs but with their beliefs as states of 
mind or "philosophical observations." Now, considering the 
title and the description of the essays, I concluded that 
the use of "I believe," though certainly intended to signal
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a report of a psychological state, also signals an act 
which is different in some respects from the simple report 
of a psychological state. The title of the book seems to 
use "believe" in one sense of "affirm," thus taking it out 
of the group of doubtful expositives and making it a legit­
imate speech act. Now, in his summary of rules, Searle 
equates stating, asserting, and affirming. The title of 
this book uses "believe" in a way that seems synonymous 
with a meaning of "affirm," which is not an exact equiva­
lent of stating and asserting. It uses "I believe" in the 
sense in which one uses it in saying a creed in church, in 
an organization, or at a patriotic program. The person 
saying the creed, "I believe in. . .," is reporting a psy­
chological state, and, as such a report, his utterance can­
not be challenged as an assertion of his belief. In addi­
tion, however, he is affirming in the sense in which Web­
ster 1s New Dictionary of Synonyms defines "affirm" as 
synonymous with such words as "assert" and "declare" and 
differentiates it in the following way: "Affirm implies
conviction of truth and willingness to stand by one's 
statement because it is supported by evidence or one's ex­
perience or faith." Supposedly, the men writing for this 
anthology have formed certain beliefs on the basis of ex­
perience or faith. The utterance of "I believe" in this 
sense is close to Austin's original performative: in say­
ing "I believe" the author is affirming, performing the
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act of confirming his belief. The utterance of "I be­
lieve. . also has its constative element, however, and 
it is this element which the hearer can challenge for truth 
or falsity. Though I think that it is possible to consider 
"I believe" here as merely the report of a psychological 
state, I shall consider "believe" as a true speech act 
meaning "affirm." As such I shall find the act felici­
tously performed if the hearer understands that the speaker 
is uttering a proposition which he obligates himself to 
support with evidence from his own experience or with a 
statement that his faith supports the statement.
When one substitutes the title of Krutch's essay for 
"this" in the title of the book of essays, one has the as­
sertion, "I believe that we were not skeptical enough."
The author has made a value judgment at some time in the 
past. This judgment constitutes his state of mind, and he 
is affirming that his state of mind is such. He does not 
appear to be merely reporting personal psychological 
states: he seems to want to be taken seriously as a critic
of the "we" of which he was a part. Again, one can ques­
tion the truth of the belief which he reports or any evi­
dence which he offers, but one cannot question his asser­
tion that he believes. The titles of the two works, the 
book of essays and the individual essay, prepare the reader 
for the speaker to report his beliefs, first of all. In 
addition, one expects the speaker to affirm beliefs which
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he can support with evidence or faith. Finally, the title 
of the essay indicates that deprecating will take place: 
the author is regretting that in the past a group (we) to 
which he belonged was not skeptical enough. One expects in 
this essay, then, to find asserting or opining, believing 
defined as affirming, evaluating, and, perhaps, some form 
of explaining and justifying.
Each paragraph from the first sentence to the last 
provides a further context for every other paragraph and 
for every sentence. Following the title, the reader ex­
pects the author to report beliefs and to deprecate certain 
beliefs. He expects the beliefs which he deprecates to be 
ones held in the past, since the verb in the title is in 
the past tense. Paragraphs 1-6 obviously deal with beliefs 
from the author's past. Paragraphs 1-2 state: the author
was born in "An Age of Unbelief" and he came to realize 
that this title was not accurate. Paragraphs 3-4 primarily 
exemplify with statements. Krutch probably wants to clari­
fy his assertions in paragraph 2. The last sentence in 
paragraph 4 evaluates: "The trouble was not that we were
not skeptical but that we were not skeptical enough." In 
the context, because of the expectations aroused by the 
four statements used to exemplify, the reader would know 
that one of the possibilities for this sentence in para­
graph 4 is a statement of a conclusion based on the pre­
ceding sentences. The sentence does conclude or sum up the
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author's belief exemplified in the preceding sentences that 
his generation was not really skeptical, but, in addition, 
it evaluates this condition: "We were not skeptic enough."
A certain degree of skepticism is, then, desirable, and 
Krutch's generation, he believes, did not attain this de­
gree. Paragraphs 5-6 exemplify the last utterance in para­
graph 4. In these paragraphs, the use of the past tense 
indicates that the beliefs asserted were those held in the 
past. The evaluation in paragraph 4 shows that Krutch is 
also deprecating in paragraphs 5-6: his generation be­
lieved that man was "not a cause but an effect,1' a belief 
which shows that its members "were not skeptical enough." 
Paragraph 7 turns to beliefs which Krutch holds as he 
writes the essay: the world is in a "parlous" state and
man has lost faith in himself as an agent capable of im­
proving it as well as in a God who can save him. Para­
graphs 8-9 report the author's beliefs at the present time, 
exemplify these, and, by implication, advocate them. The 
reporting of beliefs in chronological order as they change 
strengthens the force of deprecating and commending and 
adds this implied advocating. Man, Krutch now believes, is 
a free agent with power to shape his world, and a demo­
cratic society demands that its members operate on the 
basis of this belief. The final paragraph asserts: "we
cannot set the world free until we believe that the indi­
vidual himself is free." Again, an idea is commended
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and, by implication, advocated.
In paragraphs 8 and 9, Krutch introduces what ap­
pears to be an act not encountered before in this essay or 
in "The Iron String." The act is the one indicated by his 
use of the verb mean. He begins paragraph 8, "What I be­
lieve in most firmly is man himself." He continues, "And 
by that I mean something quite specific." I shall call 
the act performed here "interpreting." By interpreting, I 
shall not mean the act described by Abraham Kaplan and 
discussed in Chapter IV of this study. Kaplan views inter­
pretation as an explanation having both semantic and scien­
tific components. I shall use instead the definition in 
Webster1s New Dictionary of Synonyms, which lists "inter­
pret" with "explain" but differentiates it in the following 
way: "Interpret implies the making clear to oneself or to
another the meaning of something (as a poem, a dream, an 
abstraction, or a work in a foreign language) which pre­
sents more than intellectual difficulties and requires 
special knowledge, imagination, or sympathy in the person 
who would understand it or make it understood." One finds 
in this definition the same perlocutionary intent, clarifi­
cation, that one finds in exemplifying, but the act is 
different from exemplifying in that it does not involve the 
giving of examples. When he interprets, the speaker be­
lieves that he has imaginative or sympathetic insight or 
special knowledge, and he obligates himself to provide that
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insight or special knowledge to explain a concept "that 
presents more than purely logical difficulty" for his aud­
ience. His interpretation need not be a formulation which 
he can defend with facts or logic. About interpretations, 
there can be considerable difference of opinion, yet each 
interpretation can be felicitous because the speaker is 
relying on private knowledge, his possession of which can­
not be disputed, and he indicates to his reader that he is 
relying on this kind of knowledge. Here, Krutch is inter­
preting a belief and the logical consequences of one's 
holding that belief. When he says that he believes in man, 
he means "that he descended from the animals but that he 
has powers which animals share but little, if at all." He 
means "that he is something in himself," "that he can will, 
and choose and prefer." Krutch is using imaginative in­
sight based on his experiences to formulate his belief in 
man. Next, he extends this interpretation to society, and 
he interprets the society of men understood as he under­
stands men as one in which men can be free to think and 
choose and live in a truly democratic society. Perhaps 
the attempt to separate interpreting in this way is a 
futile attempt to distinguish too finely between acts, but 
the desire to set up an act called "interpreting" rests on 
the premise that there is an act of explaining similar to 
defining but going past defining because the meaning to be 
elucidated cannot be supplied without special insight,
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knowledge, or sympathy.
In the process of understanding these acts, the 
reader has repeatedly used a set of indicators which seem 
inextricably tangled with everything which he learns from 
the context. These are the connecting particles and cer­
tain adverbs which function as connecting particles. In 
the first paragraph, ’’then" and "and" indicate an order 
according to time sequence and the absence of contrasting 
ideas. In paragraph 2, the reader finds the adverbial con­
necting particle, "Only very slowly," signaling an orderly 
progression of time and the contrast between "really" and 
"not really" preparing for the examples to be used to ex­
emplify— all of these showing what was "really character­
istic" of the age or "not really so." In paragraph 3, "for 
example" indicates that exemplifying will be undertaken.
In paragraph 4, "as I still do" shows that the author is 
reporting what he, like his contemporaries, believed and 
still believes. "And then" in paragraph 5 shows a time 
connection between ideas in the two sentences: the speaker
is still reporting beliefs, this time a belief he holds as 
a consequence of the ones he has just discussed. In para­
graph 6, "to take the most familiar example" signals that 
the author is exemplifying; "What is even more important" 
indicates an evaluation of the relative importance of the 
ideas; and "we tended to believe" reenforces the idea that 
he is asserting a belief. "Seldom before" and "not often
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before" in sentence 1, paragraph 7, indicate the assertive 
nature of the utterance. "Yet," sentence 2, shows that the 
ideas will conflict, but the utterance still expresses the 
author's belief. The second sentence in paragraph 8 begins 
"And by that," thus tying the exemplifying in sentences 3-5 
to the first sentence in the paragraph. Then, in paragraph 
9, one has "for example" to indicate exemplifying, "not" 
and "not merely" to tie these ideas to the evaluation of 
earlier mistaken beliefs, and "therefore" to signal present 
beliefs. These particles, by indicating the relationship 
between sentences and paragraphs and sometimes by naming 
the nature of the speech act, show either that a certain 
force is to continue from one sentence to the next, that 
the force is to change, or that the force is to be of a 
certain kind. They make explicit the effect of context on 
the utterances in the essay.
A peculiar use of quotation marks is also a clue to 
the author’s beliefs and his attitude toward his beliefs. 
These phrases are placed in quotation marks: "An Age of
Unbelief," "that science proves," "science proved," and 
"nothing but." Not one of these groups of words is so 
definitely a quotation from another waiter's work that it 
would have to be placed in quotation, marks. The marks, 
therefore, call attention to the fact that the author is 
questioning the ideas expressed by the portions of the 
utterances enclosed as quotations: he wants his reader to
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know that these Ideas are not his but someone else's. By- 
showing that he questions these beliefs, the author is 
showing at least a mild condemnation of them. The use of 
quotation marks plus the change in tense of the verb as the 
author's ideas change with time point clearly to such an 
attitude.
The verbs in the essay become, then, the most impor­
tant single indicator, since they convey the force of as­
serting and interpreting as well as deprecating and com­
mending. Through paragraph 6, the verbs in the individual 
sentences are past tense indicative mood. In paragraph 2 
"did come" signals the point toward which the author's be­
liefs were moving in the past. The past tense in para­
graphs 3-6 shows beliefs, most of which the author has dis­
carded. This use is made clear in paragraph 4 by the al­
ready mentioned "as I still do." The sentence in which 
this clause occurs is used to report a belief which the 
author still holds, and because it is an exception, it must 
be pointed out. The change in paragraph 7 to present per­
fect and present brings the reader to the beliefs which the 
author holds at the present time. In paragraph 8, the 
verbs with their subjects are the following: "What I be­
lieve in most firmly is," "I mean," "I believe," "I be­
lieve," and "I believe." In paragraph 9, they are "This 
means," "It means," "I believe," and "The difference is."
In the final one-sentence paragraph, the verb with its
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subject is "I believe.” The author is reporting his be­
liefs, and with "I mean,” he is signaling that he is inter­
preting his beliefs. By the change in tense which occurs 
in paragraph 7, the author clearly signals a change from 
deprecating to commending in addition to asserting, exem­
plifying, and interpreting. For this essay, then, it is 
possible to make an outline of speech acts simply by using 
the verbs in the main clauses.
In this essay, the reader concludes, the indicators 
show that Krutch asserts, exemplifies, deprecates, com­
mends, evaluates, and interprets. One feels that he also 
advocates, since he so obviously believes that his ideas 
are good that he presumably wants his reader to adopt them. 
However, unlike Jones's "The Iron String," this essay seems 
to secure adequate "uptake" if the reader merely accepts it 
as an assertion of Krutch's beliefs. In "The Iron String," 
Jones argues for his beliefs, and the overall thrust is his 
urging the acceptance of a view of education and government 
which he does not believe that people in America hold at 
the time when he makes the speech. Krutch, on the other 
hand, is exploring a psychological state, and the nearest 
he comes to urging that others adopt this state is his 
equating of his view with a democratic society and the op­
posite view with totalitarianism. Believing defined as the 
affirming of something more than a psychological state is 
supported through the essay as the author shows his
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experience with beliefs through the years. As with a re­
port of a psychological state, believing as affirming can 
be felicitous without the reader accepting the belief him­
self: he needs merely to know that the author intends to
affirm his belief.
The next question is then whether or not these acts 
are felicitous. It is in the process of reading the essay 
that the sentences on the page again become utterances and 
speech acts, so the first consideration in testing the 
felicity of this essay as the performance of a complex 
series of compound illocutionary acts is a study of the 
reader for whom it can be felicitous. The reader must be 
capable of reading the language, and he must know something 
about modern scientific thought in order to grasp the prop- 
ositional content as well as the force of the utterances in 
the essay. The first requirement obviously follows from 
the conditions of Austin and Searle. The second becomes 
obvious as one considers the allusions to evolution and 
various behavioral sciences which the reader must under­
stand if Krutch's examples "illustrate" anything to him.
The whole notion of "normal input and output conditions" 
(see pp. 83-84 above) must be expanded to include the 
writer's assessment of the body of knowledge which he can 
expect his audience to have. A successful speech act can 
be performed only when the hearer knows the language which 
the speaker is using. If the speaker alludes to a body of
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knowledge which the hearer does not have, he will fail to 
secure ’’uptake" as surely as he will if he speaks in a 
language the hearer does not know. When Krutch wrote the 
essay, he intended it for the sort of people who would be 
attracted to "a collection of philosophical observations 
from famous people." In Patterns of Exposition, the essay 
is intended for college undergraduates. Neither audience 
is completely homogeneous and neither shares the same body 
of knowledge. In either audience, only the reader with the 
necessary background knowledge will understand the content 
or the force of the essay. The writer will, however, stand 
in a perfect position to perform the intended acts for the 
readers who can comprehend them. A professor of literature 
at Columbia University for many years, Krutch could be ex­
pected to speak as an authority on some subjects to some 
audiences. Here, however, he is not speaking as an author­
ity in a field, though his position earned him the invita­
tion to write for the anthology. Rather, he is asserting 
his beliefs as a young man and his present ones. He stands 
in a perfect position to make these assertions, since the 
propositional content of the acts which he performs is his 
own beliefs and the beliefs of people whom he knows. When 
he evaluates, because he shows his wide range of experi­
ence, the reader may be able to listen, but again his 
evaluations, also his beliefs, do not have to be in any way 
convincing to stand as assertions of his beliefs.
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The question of the speaker's sincerity, certainly a 
big factor when one examines assertions of beliefs, is a 
more difficult one to deal with. As Furberg points out, 
the question of sincerity when a person says, "I believe” 
is always a big one. How does one evaluate the sincerity 
of an author affirming beliefs? Probably, the best test 
again is the reputation of the author. The reader who 
chooses to read this essay must be convinced that the 
writer is a man who would not affirm beliefs which he does 
not hold. He will be willing to accept the author's sin­
cerity, too, if he does not see the author to be further­
ing his own self-interest as he asserts his beliefs. This 
essay by Krutch, a man of integrity in the academic world 
with no selfish interest to further by expressing these 
beliefs, seems felicitous as judged by the sincerity condi­
tion to the extent to which one can judge its sincerity.
Again the question of the perlocutionary effect of 
the essay which is a series of illocutionary acts must be 
considered. The intent to clarify seems present wherever 
an author exemplifies and interprets. An older man showing 
the way his ideas changed as he matured can be expected to 
desire to persuade his audience to adopt his later views. 
The way in which Krutch aligns his view with democracy and 
its opposite with communism certainly seems to show that he 
hopes to persuade, but the judge cannot decide whether or 
not the reader is persuaded without his direct testimony.
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Certainly, a description of a change in ideas from youth to 
maturity would sway some to adopt the ideas of the older 
person. On the other hand, there are those who arbitrarily 
decide with youth. In other words, the perlocutionary act 
remains hidden in the minds of writer and reader, inacces­
sible to Austin's judge.
Examining this essay, then, I have discovered a com­
plex series of compound illocutionary acts performed in a 
very different manner with a different intent from those 
performed in "The Iron String." Both seem "natural utter­
ances," to use Barbara Smith's term again, but one is an 
oration to a stage full of people and the other is a solil­
oquy, a man's musings on his personal beliefs. The ora­
tion, "The Iron String," employs elaborate devices and a 
tremendous complexity of texture. "We Were Not Skeptical 
Enough," the soliloquy, is simple and straightforward.
II
The essay "It's Pretty, but Is It Art?" by Sylvia 
Angus is a far more complicated series of illocutionary 
acts than Krutch's essay, even though the audience for it 
is more clearly defined and restricted. This essay was 
originally printed in The Saturday Review of Literature, 
the readers of which are not only literate users of the 
language but also usually people who are interested in and 
knowledgeable about art, literature, and current affairs.
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The content can be summarized in the following way: Art
lovers have become unwilling to criticize experiments in 
the arts to the extent that they accept whatever is experi­
mental, even the "random," as art. This attitude conflicts 
with the "critical faculty," which demands the willingness 
to criticize the product of the artist and is dependent on 
this idea: "Art is not what we experience; it is the con­
trolled product of the artist's experience." Angus finally 
defines art as "the controlled structuring of a medium or a 
material to communicate as vividly and movingly as possible 
the artist's personal vision of experience," thus providing 
a basis to criticize "random" art.
The reader of "It's Pretty, but Is It Art?" finds 
the context and the title as helpful in indicating the il­
locutionary force of the essay as did the reader of "We 
Were Not Skeptical Enough." The article did not appear in 
the art section of the Saturday Review but in the first 
section which is devoted to articles of general interest.
In Design, it is printed in a section called "The Arts." 
(The essay from Design is reproduced here in Appendix V.) 
The title, a "detached" indicator of content and force, is 
more important as an indicator than either position in 
which the article was printed. The title gives an eval­
uation and asks a question: "It's pretty, but is it art?"
This title indicates that the utterances in the essay will 
be concerned with defining art, since the question poses
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the problem of whether "it" fits the definition of art. As 
an illocutionary act, questioning is not indicated so much 
as arguing in order to define. The title is not asking a 
question to be answered so much as it is proposing an argu­
ment about a definition. It leads the reader, moreover, 
to expect statements and explanations. To what does "it" 
refer, the reader wants to know.
The first two sentences are acts of opining. They 
read: "In art, this is not the age of anxiety, the pill,
or the bomb. It is the age of ’willingness.'" In the next 
paragraph, Angus begins to argue. Art lovers are supposed 
to find experiments in art "interesting," but, unfortunate­
ly, many of them are "not interesting." Angus devotes 
paragraphs 3-5 to arguing for her conclusions or her eval­
uation of this art as "not interesting.” In these para­
graphs she exemplifies in order to argue her point. She 
uses as her example a touring group called "Contemporary 
Voices in the Arts." She points out that the performances 
of this group, which espouses "random" art, are boring and 
confusing. On the other hand, the talks defending their 
performances are lucid and persuasive. In other words, the 
members of the group define art with the clarity and pre­
cision which they condemn in the art itself. With her ex­
ample, Angus has demonstrated that the logical and ordered 
are more interesting than the "random."
In paragraph 6, Angus proposes a possible relation-
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ship between modern science and "random" art. She asks, 
supposedly for the proponents of "random" art, "If random­
ness is a fundamental truth of science, why is it not also 
applicable to art?" Then, in paragraph 7, she presents 
five problems with "random" art which make a telling argu­
ment against it. In paragraph 8, she evaluates and opines 
concerning "random" art, preparing for paragraphs 9-15 in 
which she argues against the "random" in art. In paragraph 
12, she attacks those who would relate scientific relativ­
ity to art: "The atomic particle may be indeterminate, but
man is not. The random, the formless, is basically impos­
sible and uninteresting to man, who is, willy-nilly, a 
pattern-making animal." Paragraph 16 opines as Angus sums 
up what is needed at the time in art. The last two para­
graphs, the point toward which the argument in the essay 
has moved, offer a definition of art, a definition which 
Angus believes to be needed as a result of the argument 
through which she has led her readers to this point.
Now, in "The Iron String," I discovered an inci­
dental act of defining. This essay, unlike "The Iron 
String," indicates by its title and the master speech act 
in the last two paragraphs that its main purpose is the act 
of defining. Monroe Beardsley in Thinking Straight calls
8
definition "the most important kind of verbal elucidation." 
He points out that a definition "consists of two parts, 
the term whose meaning is in question or in doubt and is to
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elucidated (this is the term to be defined), and the term
that is offered as synonymous with the first term and is
assumed to be more familiar or more explicit (this is the
9
defining term).11 In this essay, "art" is the "term to be 
defined," and the "defining term" is "the controlled struc­
turing of a medium or a material to communicate as vividly 
and movingly as possible the artist's personal vision of 
experience." According to Beardsley, there are two types 
of "defining terms": "definition reports" and "definition
proposals." Both of these are found in paragraph 4 of "The 
Iron String" in which Jones first reports the Oxford Dic­
tionary 's definition of a "liberal," a definition which to 
the lexicographer seems to be sanctioned by common usage, 
and then proposes his own definition which deepens and en­
larges the dictionary definition though it does not contra­
dict it.
In the last two paragraphs of "It's Pretty, but Is
It Art?", Angus presents a "definition proposal." She does
not merely quote a definition of art. Instead, what she
gives is what Beardsley calls "a decision to use a word
one way rather than another for certain purposes in certain 
10
contexts." Angus uses a master speech act to signal that 
she is making a proposal: "With more bravery than good
sense, I will climb well out on a limb and define it [art] 
as follows." It is the act which results in the "defini­
tion proposal" which I shall arbitrarily call "defining" in
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this study. When the speaker merely quotes a definition 
from a dictionary, he is not actually performing the act 
of defining, but the act of stating or reporting. The 
editors of dictionaries who report definitions discovered 
in common usage and phrase these definitions for their 
publications are performing an act of defining, but for 
convenience's sake I shall use the term only when the 
speaker obligates himself to provide a "defining term" 
which involves a "decision to use a word one way rather 
than another for certain purposes in certain contexts." 
Probably, this is the only act of defining usually found in 
the essay, the chief source of "definition reports" being 
the dictionary. As Beardsley points out, the speaker per­
forming this act does not obligate himself to verify a 
statement: not being a statement, Beardsley says, a "defi­
nition proposal" "can't be refuted, and it can't be
11
proved," though it is not "immune to criticism." To be 
successful, the definition must, moreover, "be more famil­
iar or explicit" than the "term to be defined." On the 
other hand, it need not clarify. The "uptake" desired is 
the reader's understanding that defining is intended. The 
defining of "art" is, then, the point toward which the 
argument in this essay leads. Angus argues and exempli­
fies, opines and states, deprecates and commends, and 
finally arrives at her definition of art.
Now, the question is, "What role does defining
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actually play in Angus's essay?" The title has indicated 
that a definition is to be tested or that a product is to 
be measured by a definition. Throughout the essay, Angus 
is deprecating and arguing against "random" art. By her 
definition, she excludes the "random" from the class of 
things defined as art, answering her question, "Is it art?", 
and completing her argument against it as art. The perlo­
cutionary intent— to convince the reader that this is not 
art by defining art to exclude the "random"— seems obvious. 
The use of the definition as part of her whole argument 
against "random" art seems equally obvious. The reader is 
impressed again, at this point, by the complexity of the 
series of illocutionary acts which a writer like Sylvia 
Angus is able to perform in order to convey the overall 
force which she hopes to convey. By the end of this es­
say, the reader may not be convinced, but he certainly 
should realize that the author is arguing against the "ran­
dom" in art.
Again, connecting particles play a tremendous role 
in making the context a clear indicator. An especially in­
teresting pattern occurs in paragraphs 12-15. In these 
paragraphs, the author is arguing, and the particles which 
recur are "if" and "but." The way these work is apparent 
in the last sentence of paragraph 12: "Man is a sensing
animal all right, but he is also a thinking reed. . ."
Here the fact that each clause represents one side of the
189
argument is emphasized and made clear by the conjunction.
The fact that basic acts through the essay are 
stating and opining is supported by the use of the verb to 
be in the present tense fifty-six times in the essay's 
eighteen paragraphs. (As in the study of "The Iron String," 
only verbs in the main clauses are considered.) "Is a" is 
called the "assertive link" in Austin's early essays, and 
it often signals the predication of a truth about a sub­
ject. Opining also has the form of the statement. The 
first two sentences of the essay illustrate the use of "is" 
in opining. Since the utterances do not contain a verifi­
able proposition, the act is opining.
The force of the simple present tense "be" works in 
an interesting way with certain conditional verbs to convey 
the force of arguing. The following conditional verbs can 
be found in the main clauses: paragraph 9— "can be," "can
turn," "can stimulate and entertain," "can provoke"; para­
graph 10— "can be had"; paragraph 12— "may be," "may seem"; 
paragraph 13— "may be"; paragraph 14— "may be"; paragraph 
15— "may produce," "can [produce]"; paragraph 16— "can be 
defined"; and paragraph 18— "can go." In a number of cases, 
the conditional verb sets up one side of the argument which 
is then demolished by an utterance containing an assertive 
use of "be." An example of this use is found in the fol­
lowing sentence in paragraph 10: "Experience can be had,
and is had, at any time of the day and night." This
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sentence occurs in a paragraph of assertions, but the two 
verbs stage an argument over possibility and actuality.
Here the "be" verbs are technically auxiliaries, but the 
effect is the same as if they were main verbs. Then in 
paragraph 14, one finds the following sentence: "If we
select the materials, and if we plan and execute the dress, 
the experience may be salutary for us, but do we call the 
merchant a couturier?" Again, "may be" is not positive, 
and the positive "do call" is used to emphasize the asser­
tion, since the question is clearly rhetorical.
Adverbs also play an important part in the felici­
tous performance of the illocutionary acts in this essay.
It seems more profitable to consider the ones which have 
not been included under connecting particles chiefly in the 
context of interesting sentences and phrases, but a few, 
considered alone, point to the author's intent to argue 
against "random" art. Examples are "unfortunately," 
"never," "conversely," "not always." Some such as "equal­
ly" and "clearly" are tied to stating, commending, and de­
precating. In paragraph 16 where the definition of art 
begins with the concluding argument against "random" art, 
"not" occurs six times.
Angus has chosen to use italics and quotation marks 
as force indicators. Beginning in paragraph 4, twenty- 
three words are italicized. They are "say," "show," "af­
ter," "is," "can be," "any," "as art," "poor," "duty,"
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"art,” "we," "we," "not," "not," "includes," "not," "does," 
"is," "we experience," and "controlled." In each case the 
force of the utterance is intensified by the use of ital­
ics. Angus uses quotation marks, on the other hand, for 
the same purpose for which Krutch used them— to show that 
she questions something about the use of the words. Eigh­
teen words and phrases are placed in quotation marks for 
this reason. One example is "a happening." The author 
questions this term concerning its meaning and its suit­
ability as a term to describe art. Her use of quotation 
marks becomes especially clear as she changes her placing 
of quotation marks. In paragraph 4, she speaks of "the 
'random' arts." Here she is bothered by the word random.
In paragraph 7, she talks of "random 'art.'" In this case, 
she is questioning whether or not it is suitable to call 
that which is random, art. Finally, in her definition of 
art in paragraphs 16 and 17, she drops the quotation marks 
around the word art■ Obviously, her use of these marks is 
tied to commending and deprecating. One notes too that in 
the last paragraph Angus uses quotation marks in the most 
conventional way when she encloses "controlled structuring" 
to indicate that she is quoting her own words from the 
preceding paragraph.
Angus also uses exclamation marks in an interesting 
way. She does not use them following utterances with the 
form of an exclamation but following utterances having the
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form of statements. They are used to show surprise at the 
idea and in turn to place weight on one side of the argu­
ment. The first comes at the end of paragraph 5 where the 
long example explaining random art ends. The other one 
comes in paragraph 10, again in the last sentence, where 
again an argument is to be driven home: "If all of these
can also be called 'art,' then clearly what we are doing is 
simply melting our language down into one blob in which 
differentiations can no longer be made— anti-intellectualism 
with a vengeance!"
Angus employs certain words, phrases, and clauses to 
direct the reader to the force of her utterance. These are 
not included in the lists of conventional indicators pre­
pared by Searle and Austin, nor can they be taken out of 
this essay and placed on such a list. These expressions 
will not function the same way in any two situations, but 
their effectiveness still depends on the speaker and the 
hearer sharing a repertoire of conventional meanings and 
usages and they therefore deserve attention as force in­
dicators. For example, in paragraph 1, the author shows 
the ridiculousness of the classicists' embarrassment when 
they are confronted with "random" art when she says that 
"they sneak home for a bit of Haydn on the hi-fi." She 
speaks of the way "willingness has completely overborne" 
the critical ability of the listener. By personifying 
"willingness" she makes it ridiculous. She calls the
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"critical faculty" "that philistine thing.” Now, according 
to The Random House Dictionary of the English Language, 
"philistine" means "lacking in or hostile to culture." No 
educated reader could fail to see in the application of 
"philistine" to "critical faculty" anything but irony. 
Certainly the average reader of The Saturday Review of Lit­
erature does not regard the critical faculty as the enemy 
of culture. In paragraph 2, Angus refers to the "bland, 
slightly nervous acquiescence" of those who favor continued 
interest in the new art. In paragraph 4, Angus contrasts 
the artists' success in saying "(which was not their main 
intention)" with their lack of success in showing "(which 
was)" in order to show that "curiously enough" the arts 
were more successful in the first instance than in the 
second. She uses expressions from time to time like "as it 
may seem to some" and "What I am against." These uses can 
all be interpreted for their rhetorical effect and there­
fore their contribution to the perlocutionary effect of the 
essay, but they also have the more objective function of 
signaling the steps in the argument.
Then, certain complete sentences are interesting as 
indicators of the force intent for whole paragraphs and 
indeed the whole essay. These show the author's case 
against "random" art: more important, in speech-act ter­
minology, they show that the author is deprecating and 
arguing against it. In paragraph 4, one finds the follow-
194
ing sentence: "Films flickered simultaneously on screens,
walls, and ceilings; shrill and unrelated noises attacked 
the eardrums in long, continuous squeals; artists wandered 
about, coyly lighting matches when lights failed; a so 
called panel discussion on the arts resolved itself into 
several people making desultory remarks and joshing each 
other like small boys; artists ambled about the stage like 
actors on the first day of a rehearsal when they do not yet 
know their lines or even their roles." The underlined words 
and phrases show the slant of the author. They are intended 
perhaps to persuade but certainly to hold up one side of 
the argument. One notices the personification of "panel 
discussion," the use of similes, and the very real force of 
the verbs.
In paragraph 5, three sentences which are rhetori­
cally effective argue against "random" art. In each sen­
tence, the terms which especially point to the conflicting 
sides of the argument are underlined. The sentences follow:
Cogently, lucidly, in logical, sequential prose, they 
explained that art should be a total, sensory exper­
ience which should be allowed to flow over and through 
one; that it should not be examined for logic, lucid­
ity , or sequence. Clearly, rationally, they made the 
reasonable point that art has too long concentrated on 
intellectual perceptions, and that this, the age of ex­
ploding mass media and new technology, should be a time 
to seek sense experience in whatever random arrangement 
of sight, smell, or sound might present itself at any 
given moment. With admirable intellectual coherence, 
they made a most persuasive case for the nonintellec­
tual , random art with which the audience had been bored 
the evening before!
195
These three sentences move from a beginning with an adverb- 
adverb-prepositional phrase pattern to an adverb-adverb 
pattern to a prepositional phrase beginning. In each sen­
tence, the opening words and phrases describe the good 
aspects of the lectures. The underlined words which follow 
in each sentence point to the fact that the art does not 
regard these characteristics as good.
In paragraph 6 and paragraph 14, rhetorical ques­
tions are used to suggest the force which Angus intends.
In paragraph 6, she asks, "If randomness is a fundamental 
truth of science, why is it not also applicable to art?"
The question is rhetorical because rather than requiring an 
answer it is merely another way of asserting this relation­
ship between science and art. In fact, in the next sen­
tence its assertive nature is pointed out: "In a seeming
attempt to assert the unity of science and art, we have now 
gone far along the path of asserting that the random is. or 
can be art." In paragraph 14, Angus asks, "If we select 
the materials, and if we plan and execute the dress, the 
experience may be salutary for us, but do we call the mer­
chant a couturier? Is his randomly heaped assortment of 
materials 'art'?" Angus obviously does not expect an an­
swer from her reader. She expects to call attention in a 
persuasive way to her side of the argument.
Paragraph 9 begins with the very peculiar sentence, 
"Which brings me, of course, to the positive, if heretical,
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point I am making: that totally random or accidental art
is not art at all.’* Here the broad reference of the pro­
noun which with which the sentence begins and the fact that 
the group of words defies all attempts to make it a gram­
matically complete sentence at all, that it remains a 
rather elaborate adjective clause, call attention to the 
point that the author is making and to the force of the 
utterances which precede this one. These utterances take 
"random" art out of the definition of art. In paragraph 
10, one finds the succinctly effective, "Experience can be 
had, and is had, at any time of the day or night." In 
paragraph 12, Angus uses the same structures in two sen­
tences in order to emphasize her argument against "random" 
art: "Given a blank wall, man will form its cracks into a
design. Set down in chaos, man will separate the whirling 
from the stationary, for chaos and meaninglessness, as the 
existentialists have discovered, are the hardest of all 
things for man to endure." The past participles "given" 
and "set," each modifying the subject of its sentence "man" 
which, in turn, has in both cases a future tense verb* 
show man's pattern-making propensity. Finally, in the 
second sentence of paragraph 13, one finds this attempt to 
reduce "random" art to absurdity: "Today we are being
asked to watch our artists doodle in public and to cull 
from their doodles whatever appeals to us."
Three paragraphs begin with master speech acts or
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''detached'1 indicators. Paragraph 2 begins, "Unfortunately, 
a great deal of current experiment in the arts is not in­
teresting." This is the kind of claim which an author 
usually intends to argue, and it controls the next sen­
tences. Paragraph 7 begins with this sentence, almost the 
wording of a model master speech act: "If we allow, for
the moment, that the artists in the experiment above have a 
rational theory for asserting that the random can produce 
art, we are faced with a number of criticisms of random 
'art' based on their own demonstrative performances, which 
suffered from at least the following five problems, any one 
of which is capable of destroying any art." Obviously, the 
writer is preparing to argue against random art by giving 
problems which beset it. The third example occurs in para­
graph 17, the sentence already quoted: "With more bravery
than good sense, I will climb well out on a limb and define 
it [art] as follows." This sentence utterance prepares for 
the act of defining.
Sylvia Angus did not speak as an expert to readers 
who would accept her authority if she merely praised and 
condemned. Her points could only be made by leading her 
readers through a reasoning process to her definition. A 
definition, as Beardsley points out, is not a verifiable 
statement, and the person proposing one would probably have 
a perlocutionary intent— to convince— that could best be 
furthered by arguing for the definition. Hoping to
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persuade, Angus could not speak ex cathedra. Instead, she 
must speak to equals and argue in a reasonable way. Again, 
however, one does not need to worry about the perlocutions 
performed. The choice of illocutionary acts can be justi­
fied by the simple desire of the writer to argue the ques­
tion of the proper role of art and finally to define art. 
She need not care at all whether anyone is persuaded by 
her acts. She need only know that the proper "uptake" will 
be secured if the reader knows that she intends to present 
rational arguments defending her definition and if her def­
inition is understood, in turn, as part of her argument.
Ill
Irving Kristol in "Pornography and Censorship" is 
again performing a complex series of compound illocutionary 
acts. Again the context is the first clue to the nature of 
these acts. Then Kristol's use of the wide range of indi­
cators studied in the other essays confirms the original 
impression resulting from the context.
Kristol originally wrote the essay for The New York
Times Magazine , March 28, 1971. The title of the essay in
this publication was "Pornography, Obscenity and the Case
12
for Censorship." This title clearly indicates that Kris­
tol planned to argue for censorship. The title which Kris­
tol has given to the essay in Design, which he rewrote for 
this anthology, is not so clear an indicator of the
199
illocutionary act intent of the author. (The essay from 
Design, is reproduced in Appendix VI.) It does, however, 
provide some guidance to the author's attitude. If the 
author intended to argue against censorship, he would prob­
ably not have paired censorship with pornography in the 
title. Almost no one ever argues for that which he calls 
"pornography." Defined in The Random House Dictionary, 
pornography is "obscene literature, art, or photography, 
esp. that having little or no artistic merit." One might 
argue for freedom as opposed to censorship, the freedom of 
art or literature, but the material that one argues should 
be allowed in circulation will not be called "pornography," 
since this word never carries a good meaning. The reader 
knows, then, that Kristol’s attitude is probably favorable 
to censorship of pornography, but whether he is presenting 
the case for censorship or merely explaining relationships 
between censorship and pornography, the reader does not 
know simply on the evidence of the title.
The reader soon learns, however, that the article is 
a defense of censorship. Kristol points out that those who 
through the years have opposed all censorship are at the 
present time almost completely victorious but that they are 
finding that the relaxation of censorship has resulted not 
only in a world in which the reading and viewing of works 
of better quality can take place but also, as he expresses 
it, in "a world in which homosexual rape takes place on the
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stage, in which the public flocks during lunch hour to wit­
ness varieties of professional fornication." According to 
Kristol if one believes that books can improve a person, 
one must also believe that they can corrupt him. If ciga­
rette advertising can be banned because cigarettes are be­
lieved to harm the body, then it is logical to censor the 
books which will harm the mind. Censorship will, on occa­
sion, Kristol believes, cause a book of real value to be 
restricted in its distribution. It is necessary, however, 
if the minds of the public are not to be swamped with 
pornography.
The first paragraph should leave the reader with the 
understanding that the essay is making a case against por­
nography. The first sentence opines: "Being frustrated is
disagreeable, but the real disasters in life begin when you 
get what you want." The next sentences exemplify in order 
to clarify: someone got what he wanted— a relaxation of
censorship laws which the first sentence has already label­
ed a "disaster." Paragraphs 3-4 exemplify in statements 
and opinions the reasons why the advocates of complete 
freedom of the media are unhappy. Then paragraph 5 asks 
questions which Kristol answers in paragraphs 6-8. In 
paragraphs 9-10, Kristol picks up terms used in paragraph 
8, and by exemplifying his use of these he argues against 
the relaxing of all censorship, showing that, in addition, 
he is advocating censorship. Paragraphs 11-13 continue the
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argument by explaining the harm to society that may result 
from pornography. Kristol defines the terms pornography 
and censorship in paragraphs 14-16.
Then in paragraphs 17-18, Kristol breaks the thought 
of the previous paragraphs to speculate on the changes to 
be expected in the mores of Western society and make pre­
dictions, or opine about the future. Paragraphs 19-24 
argue the importance of the question of wide use of pornog­
raphy to the future of civilization. Paragraphs 25-28 
state Kristol's beliefs concerning the relationship between 
the defense against pornography and the defense of the 
civilization. In paragraph 29, Kristol opines that the 
question is one which involves the future of this country's 
democratic government. Paragraphs 30-33 exemplify his 
opinion. In paragraphs 34-40, Kristol states, opines, and 
argues for his own view of censorship. Finally in the last 
four paragraphs, Kristol states his view, which he clearly 
advocates.
The original paragraph divisions of the essay are 
probably better indicators of illocutionary force than the 
present ones. In fact, it is difficult to see why the 
paragraphing was changed when the essay was printed in this 
collection. The fact that it was changed, however, gives 
an opportunity for the reader to see the importance of 
paragraph organization as an indicator of illocutionary 
intent. In every well-organized work, the organization of
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the individual paragraphs will show one or both of two 
things: the subject, including the author's intent in
handling the subject, and the continuation of the same act 
or complementary acts for the course of the paragraph.
When the original paragraphs in this essay are chopped into 
pieces, they lose the power to show either thing. In the 
appendix, the original paragraphs are marked as are the 
places where sentences, phrases, and paragraphs are de­
leted. The deletions are obviously justified by the space 
requirements of the anthology, but the paragraph changes 
actually make the essay longer because of the additional 
space needed for paragraphing.
A study of paragraphs 3-4 in Design or paragraph 2 
in The New York Times Magazine illustrates this importance 
of paragraph divisions. The paragraphs follow, divided as 
they are in Design:
Is there a sense of triumphant exhilaration in the 
land? Hardly. There is, on the contrary, a rapidly 
growing unease and disquiet. Somehow, things have not 
worked out as they were supposed to, and many notable 
civil libertarians have gone on record as saying this 
was not what they meant at all.
They wanted a world in which "Desire Under the Elms" 
could be produced, or "Ulysses" published, without in­
terference by philistine busybodies holding public of­
fice. They have got that, of course; but they have 
also got a world in which homosexual rape takes place 
on the stage, in which the public flocks during lunch 
hours to witness varieties of professional fornication.
In the last sentence of the second paragraph, this clause
was omitted from the essay in Design: "in which Times
Square has become little more than a hideous market for the
203
sale and distribution of printed filth that panders to all
13
known (and some fanciful) sexual perversions." This de­
letion makes the reading of the essay by a person not 
familiar with New York more meaningful in addition to 
shortening the essay, but no such justification exists for 
the paragraph division. The first four sentences (includ­
ing "Hardly.") report the author's opinion of the present 
mood of those who have favored the removal of all censor­
ship restrictions. The rhetorical question followed by 
"hardly" becomes a master speech act indicating that the 
author intends to give his opinion on this mood of the 
winning side. The next two sentences exemplify this mood. 
Since exemplifying requires the showing of relationships, 
when the examples are placed in a paragraph apart from the 
master speech act and the statement of the concept to be 
exemplified, a heavy burden is placed on the other indica­
tors to show this relationship. Again, because Kristol is 
exemplifying opinions which are part of an argument, making 
these paragraphs also part of the act of arguing, relation­
ships between sentences are extremely important, and the 
connecting particles must function with no help from the 
paragraph divisions. It is interesting to note that five 
of these particles which were originally used to connect 
sentences within paragraphs now must connect paragraphs 
which have been divided.
Adverbs and adverbial phrases support the idea of
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the illocutionary force of arguing. They are "on the con­
trary" (3); "oddly enough," "incredibly enough" and "in all 
sincerity" (6); "nevertheless," "merely" (8); "in this 
crazy world of ours" (10); "to put it bluntly" (21); "mere­
ly" (27); "rarely" (30); "as bluntly as possible" (34); and 
"obviously" (41). Even out of context, these words suggest 
the giving of reasons and opposite reasons.
The verbs convey force in very much the same way 
that they do in the other essays. Thirty-four main verbs 
are present-tense forms of the verb be and suggest stating 
and opining. Seven are conditional: "Might (not) be,"
"might have added," "might find," "can be," "may be," "can 
see," "might point out," "can be," and "may be." In the 
last three paragraphs, the subject-verb arrangement sug­
gests the explicit formula: "I subscribe" (43); "I think,"
"I believe," "I think" (44). All of these support the 
opinion force of the last three paragraphs. Adding "I 
opine that" to any one of these, the reader has a meaning­
ful utterance and has identified the act which he is per­
forming.
Punctuation is more interesting than it is in the 
other essays. Dashes are used to separate clauses and set 
off phrases twenty-four times. The first use is illus­
trated in paragraph 22: "In other words, infantile sex­
uality is not only a permanent temptation for the adoles­
cent or even the adult— it can quite easily become a
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permanent, self-reinforcing neurosis." By using the dash 
Kristol calls attention to the second clause which is the 
stronger of the two points in supporting his argument. The 
dash is, then, a tool in arguing as it is used here. In 
paragraph 1, the reader finds the second use: "For almost
a century now, a great many intelligent, well-meaning and 
articulate people— of a kind generally called liberal or 
intellectual, or both— have argued eloquently against any 
kind of censorship of art and/or entertainment." Or, in 
paragraph 19, he reads, "But when sex is public, the viewer 
does not see— cannot see— the sentiments and the ideals."
In the first of these two sentences, the author with the 
use of dashes calls attention to the type of people whom he 
is discussing and, in a subtle way, suggests that people 
bearing the labels "liberal" and "intellectual" are somehow 
suspect. In the second sentence, Kristol makes his reader 
take notice of the "cannot see" verb, thus emphasizing this 
portion of his argument.
Colons and parentheses point to advocating, stating, 
and exemplifying. A typical use is found in paragraph 34: 
"And lest there be any misunderstanding as to what I am 
saying, I'll put it as bluntly as possible: If you care
for the quality of life in our American democracy, then 
you have to be for censorship." For "I'll put it," one can 
substitute "I advocate that." The second part of the sen­
tence is then used for advocating. Parentheses are used
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to enclose short explanatory phrases. For example, in 
paragraph 18, one finds, "It is, however, highly improbable 
(to put it mildly) that. . ." and, in paragraph 36, one 
finds, "We have no problem in contrasting repressive laws 
governing alcohol and drugs and tobacco with laws regula­
ting (i.e., discouraging the sale of) alcohol and drugs and 
tobacco." These short phrases add to the meaning of the 
phrases which they follow, and they, also, emphasize points 
in the argument.
The use of the question mark seven times in this 
essay raises the problem of the rhetorical question.
Searle gives as the preparatory condition for a genuine act 
of questioning that the speaker must not know the answer 
which he is asking for. In this essay, the speaker ob­
viously knows the answer which the question demands, and 
the reader is conscious that here is a use of the form of 
a speech act "for something," a use which bothers Austin 
tremendously. The use here is "for" the purpose of calling 
attention to the speaker's statements and opinions, espe­
cially the opinions which he advocates. As such a signal 
it becomes another rhetorical device used as a conventional 
indicator of the illocutionary act. No reader of the so­
phistication demanded by this essay will mistake these 
questions for sincere requests for information. He will 
immediately know that they signal statements and opinions 
which are to be advocated and argued for.
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This point leads to an assessment of the overall 
effect of these four punctuation usages. What they do is 
secure for the author the kind of immediacy which the 
spoken act has. They do more to supply the stress and in­
tonation patterns of stating and asserting than any other 
device. In addition, they seem to work almost like the 
explicit formula: they make clear the force which the
other indicators suggest.
As the Henry Luce Professor of Urban Values at New 
York University and a coeditor of Public Interest, Irving 
Kristol stands in relation to his audience in such a way 
that he can opine, state, explain, and argue concerning the 
effects of pornography on the public in order to advocate 
censorship. Because of his position, he can be expected to 
have thought more deeply on the subject than the average 
reader of The New York Times Magazine or of the undergrad­
uate anthology Design. Because he is speaking on a subject 
which most people feel to some extent qualified to speak 
on, he must, however, "argue that" in some instances rather 
than stating dogmatically. From the beginning of the essay, 
Kristol acknowledges that many people in his position will 
not agree with him, at least before they read the essay.
For them, he must "argue that" in order to advocate. His 
essay then is a successful performance of a complex series 
of compound illocutionary acts because Kristol understands 
the controversial nature of the subject of his article,
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possesses the authority to speak on this subject, and em­
ploys the illocutionary forces which will secure the only 
effective "uptake" which he can expect— the "uptake" from 
opining and arguing in order to advocate. Kristol also 
states, deprecates, and commends successfully, but the 
chief acts are these others which the nature of the subject—  
one on which agreement is difficult to reach— demands. The 
perlocutionary effect of persuasion which Kristol obviously 
intends also seems furthered by these uses.
IV
At this stage in the study, I have completed the 
attempt to analyze four essays by professional writers as 
the performance of a complex series of usually compound 
illocutionary acts. In these essays, the authors appear 
to perform successfully a variety of acts. In all the 
essays, the authors attempt to perform perlocutionary acts: 
they all attempt to clarify and in three cases they ob­
viously want to persuade. The interesting results from 
this analysis are to be found, however, not in the area of 
perlocutionary acts, but in the area of illocutionary acts.
The illocutionary acts show certain characteristics 
of such acts in successful essays. First, the reputation 
of the author determines the type of act which he can per­
form successfully, and, at the same time, he will only be 
successful when he performs the acts which he can clearly
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obligate himself to perform successfully. For example, he 
must not appear to state when he could not have the inform­
ation to verify his statement, he must not ask his audience 
to believe him to be sincere in a statement of beliefs if 
he is a known liar, and he must not assert dogmatically 
points which are susceptible to argument. Second, the acts 
in the successful essay will be complex in most cases. The 
simplest utterances in these essays occur in Krutch's essay. 
Their simplicity fits the tone of his essay which is 
thoughtful, meditative, not designed to be dramatically 
persuasive. In an essay like the last one, however, each 
section contains more than one act intertwined with each 
other. For example, in the paragraph already quoted, 
Kristol opines, exemplifies, and argues, at the same time 
that he is deprecating and commending.
In the next chapter, I shall report on the attempt 
to analyze student essays as attempts to perform a complex 
series of illocutionary acts.
CHAPTER VI
THE STUDENT ESSAY AND AUSTIN'S JUDGE
When an essay is regarded as the performance of a 
complex series of compound illocutionary acts, the twin 
problems for Austin's judge are to determine what acts are 
performed in the essay and to evaluate them as successful 
or unsuccessful. In handling these problems, the procedure 
of the judge is to ask how well each discernible act satis­
fies the rules which constitute it. As we have seen, these 
rules, as formulated in general terms by Austin and Searle, 
specify (1) the speaker's illocutionary intention, (2) his 
assessment of the hearer's knowledge and desires, (3) the 
position of the speaker as the proper person to perform the 
act, and (4) the extent to which the speaker obligates him­
self .
In the two preceding chapters I have studied the 
work of four professional writers. I have assumed that 
these authors deserve their reputation as skillful writers 
of expository prose and that an important aspect of this 
skill is their ability to perform illocutionary acts felic­
itously. Thus my investigation was guided by the Austin- 
Searle rules and served as a test of their validity. On 
the assumption that the illocutionary intentions of the
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effective writer of the professional essay can be ascer­
tained with considerable precision, I devoted most of my 
analysis to a search for the linguistic indicators of illo­
cutionary force by means of which these intentions are made 
evident to the reader. In addition, I assumed that the 
other components of the felicitous performance of illocu­
tionary acts— the authority with which the writer speaks on 
the subject of his essay, his understanding of the limits 
of his knowledge, and his reluctance to obligate himself in 
areas in which he does not feel that he can fulfill his 
obligation— should also be evident in the work of the 
skillful professional. Thus, a secondary purpose of my 
analysis was to raise the question of the means by which 
the authors of these essays hoped to insure that their 
illocutionary acts would be felicitous. This part of my 
analysis was necessarily much more sketchy and tentative 
than the first part, though it did result in a greater 
particularization of the Austin-Searle general rules for 
each of the illocutionary acts discovered. The results of 
this latter part of my investigation are summarized in the 
charts in Appendix III.
Thus, my examination of the professional essays gave 
me some confidence in the validity of the speech-act theory 
as a guide in the analysis of the essay and aided me in the 
development of a set of admittedly very rough instruments 
to be used in further investigation. I felt that these
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instruments were sufficiently refined to use in evaluating 
a group of student papers as the successful or unsuccessful 
use of language for the performance of certain assigned 
illocutionary acts. My assumption was that good student 
writing, like good professional writing, will reflect the 
principles found in speech-act theory for the performance 
of the successful speech act and that a piece of student 
writing can be shown to be "poor” because it departs from 
these principles.
It was easier to make a full evaluation of the 
felicity of student writing because, for the student essays, 
I made the assignment which specified the major intent 
which the student was to pursue and I could examine each 
essay to see to what extent that intent was carried out. 
Then, I knew the audience of the essay, I knew on what sub­
jects the students were able to obligate themselves to acts 
such as stating, and I knew the acts which they could 
felicitously perform in a way which I could not possibly 
know for the professional writer. Thus, knowing what acts 
were supposed to be performed, I sought to determine why 
some acts succeeded and others failed.
I concluded that the student essays examined here 
fail when the writers do not fulfill the requirements for 
the performance of successful illocutionary acts which pro­
fessional writers have satisfied. The student writers do 
not always employ appropriate devices or any devices to
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signal the act to be performed. The reader may speculate 
that the writer intended to perform a certain act asked for 
in the assignment, but unless the writer signals his inten­
tions, the reader cannot be sure that he is performing the 
act. The failure to indicate the act in an appropriate 
manner is, however, only the surface problem. In addition 
to a scanty use of indicating devices, the writers of these 
essays fail, it seems to me, for three other reasons:
1. The writer does not perform the act required in the 
assignment.
2. The writer slips back and forth between acts without 
preparing his reader for changes or perhaps without 
being aware of the changes himself.
3. The writer performs acts which he cannot properly 
perform because of his relationship to the audience 
for which he writes.
In other words, the acts are "unhappy" or "infelicitous"
because they are not performed according to the rules which
constitute successful speech acts.
The student essays to be studied were written at 
Louisiana State University to satisfy the first two re­
quirements in English 1002 in the spring semester of 1975. 
Each was an assignment to be completed by the end of the 
fifty-minute class period. They contain grammatical and 
mechanical errors which I have retained in my transcrip­
tion, some of them even those once designated "gross" er- 
ros by the freshman English committee at the University.
My contention is that the main reason the first papers are 
poor, indeed practically meaningless, is the failure in
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communication which is a consequence of the authors' fail­
ure to perform illocutionary acts successfully. The suc­
cessful paper is successful, on the other hand, primarily 
because the act which the writer was asked to perform is 
clearly signaled and adhered to throughout the paper.
I
The first essay analyzed here was written on the 
second day of class and is therefore Theme 1 or the diag­
nostic theme for the second semester of the 1974-75 school 
term. The writer has some problems with grammar and me­
chanics, but the paper fails because the writer does not 
explain, as he is asked to do, but instead chooses to in­
struct and exhort.
On this particular day, the students were given two 
theme topics, each based upon a quotation from an essay of 
the type studied in English 1001, a course which most of 
them had completed the semester before. I did not assume 
that the students had read the essays, so I chose quota­
tions which I believed they could understand out of context 
with only a few remarks from me before they began to write. 
On the second day of the semester, however, it is almost 
impossible to know what assignments will make sense to stu­
dents, and the teacher is testing the breath of background 
knowledge of the class as much as the writing ability of 
each member. The two assignments, typed copies of which
215
were given to each student, follow:
1. In the essay, "Farewell, My Lovely," E. B. White 
summed up his generation's affection for the Model 
T Ford in the following way: "My own generation
identifies it with youth, with its gaudy, irre­
trievable excitements." What does your generation 
identify with youth? Explain your answer in your 
essay.
2. Harold Taylor in the essay, "The Development of an 
Identity," says, "The particular purpose of a college 
education is to enable the young to establish a per­
sonal identity from the materials of experience and 
knowledge which lie at hand." Explain the ways in 
which your first semester at college has helped you 
"to establish a personal identity."
After handing out the assignment sheets, I briefly discuss­
ed the possible problem spots of the assignment: the mean­
ing of "personal identity," "identifies," and the "Model T 
Ford." I asked for questions from any student who did not 
understand the assignment, and I talked to several individ­
ually as they began to write. I reminded the students that 
adequate development is one criterion for the good paper in 
freshman English classes and that usually their papers 
should be three hundred to five hundred words in length, 
but I did not emphasize length because I did not want to 
encourage random padding.
The first assignment, the subject of the essay ana­
lyzed in this section, specifies the propositional content 
for the essay and the chief illocutionary acts which the 
student is expected to perform. He is to opine when he 
tells what his generation identifies with youth. If he 
were given this assignment by an advertising firm, for
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example, which desired statistically correct assessments 
of those activities and products with which today's young 
people identify, he would be expected to assert or state. 
Since he will not be able to verify in any conceivable way 
during the fifty-minute writing period that a majority of 
his generation will agree with his choice, he cannot be 
expected to state his answer to this question. He is asked, 
moreover, to spend most of his writing time performing the 
act of explaining. Now, in Chapter IV, I have shown that 
"explaining" is an ambiguous term which encompasses several 
different acts and that each of these acts is usually per­
formed in a multiple-sentence speech act. Explaining may 
be accounting for, and it may be exemplifying or even de­
fining, according to the definitions in this study. The 
assignment does not specify which act of explaining the 
student is to perform; so he might be expected to give 
reasons for his choice or to exemplify his choice with the 
intent to clarify. The writer will have a perlocutionary 
intent in most cases: he will want to convince his reader
that his choice is valid or reasonable. He may, in addi­
tion, perform other acts, but they must stay subordinate 
to the intent to opine and explain. My reason for wording 
the assignment so that I asked only for these acts is the 
result of my experience with student papers. This experi­
ence indicates that students are more inclined to argue and 
attempt to persuade than they are to provide good exempli­
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fication or good reasons. I wanted them to focus complete­
ly on explaining before they were asked to perform acts 
which may require rexplaining as a "sub-act." In explain­
ing here, the student’s authority must rest on firsthand 
knowledge of youth which he has as an eighteen-year-old at 
the present time or in years past, if he should happen to 
be very much older than the usual college freshman. He 
must supply his information in order to explain his opinion.
The essay follows:
I would say that my generation identifies smoking 
cigarettes with today's youth. It seems as though every 
year I see a younger child with a cigarette in his hand. 
Lately, I have seen children as young as twelve years 
old smoking cigarettes. They think it makes them look 
older and grown-up.
The fact that so many youngsters are smoking at this 
early age is a bad situation. They are going to get in­
to habits of smoking and not be able to quit later on. 
This can cause problems with their lungs at an earlier 
age than the previous lung diseases of smokers since 
they are starting at least seven or eight years earlier 
than the adult smokers.
This generation should do something to show these 
children that this can cause difficulties or even death 
of them later on in their life. Programs should be 
started in grammar schools showing these youngsters how 
much cigarette smoking can harm them. This would dis­
courage a lot of this early beginning of smokers. Show 
films of what smoking has done to previous smoker's 
lungs and tell of the bad effects that smoking can give 
a person. Stress the fact that starting to smoke so 
young will become a habit and that they will be smoking 
two or three packs a day later in their life. The 
coughing and agony that cigarette smoking causes after 
several years will be a good point to bring up.
You can look outside and see this problem face to 
face with the youngsters because nothing is being done 
about it. No one is saying anything to them about why 
it is wrong. There should be an effort put forth to
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show these children the mistake they are making by 
starting to smoke so young, but the city officials 
and school board members are not doing much about it.
We know that it is wrong; we know that they are doing 
it; but nothing is being done to prevent it. When a 
child sees his parents smoking, he must figure it
cannot be too bad for himself. Mom and Dad do it.
This is what the children are faced with, and they 
cannot very likely be told that it is wrong when the 
person speaking is smoking.
This is a big problem with today's youth, but noth­
ing seems to be getting done about it. If programs 
were started to prevent this, a lot of lives might be 
saved. With a little effort from this generation they 
might be helped; but without it what do they have to 
look forward to?
It is apparent in paragraph 1 that the writer prob­
ably will not be content merely to opine and explain. The
first sentence opines in order to answer the question— to 
convey the basic propositional content of the essay. When 
the student tells his reader that his generation identifies 
with smoking, his reader must decide how he will explain: 
will he account for or exemplify? Accounting for seems 
the most obvious act, though he might exemplify with the 
telling of experiences with the people of his generation in 
which cigarettes are the single constant element, thus "ex­
plaining" his opinion and probably trying to prove that it 
is more than an opinion— in fact, a fairly accurate assess­
ment of the habits of his friends and acquaintances. The 
next three sentences do indeed exemplify and account for 
the author's opinion that cigarette smoking is character­
istic of today's youth, but the writer also manages to 
raise himself out of the class of youth to a vantage point
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from which he is observing "smoking youth." This process 
begins in sentence 2, and it is completed in sentence 4 
where the writer says, "They think," not "we think."
Subtly, perhaps unconsciously, the writer shows that he is 
preparing to condemn others rather than illustrate or ac­
count for something of which he is a part. Now, condemning 
can legitimately occur as an author explains: any or all
of his acts may be compound, and he has not been instructed 
to praise the thing which he associates with youth. Con­
demning or deprecating is not, however, to be the chief 
emphasis of the paper. Since two sentences in the first 
paragraph exemplify and the last sentence accounts for, the 
writer still has a chance to keep explaining as his major 
act until he launches a full-scale attack on smoking in 
paragraph 2. At this point he gives up all pretense of ex­
plaining in favor of a discussion of the horrors of smoking 
and ways to discourage it.
In paragraph 2, the writer shows in his first sen­
tence that he is prepared to deprecate or condemn. Then, 
in paragraph 3, he signals with his verbs that he will ad­
vise and exhort. The repetition of the modal "should" in­
dicates the nature of the act being performed. Then the 
change to imperative mood reenforces the idea that the 
writer is giving instructions. In paragraph 4, the writer 
might be said to be accounting for the widespread practice 
of cigarette-smoking among children, but then in his con-
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elusion one sees that his real interest is still in advis­
ing and exhorting, even warning.
The writer, failing to perform the act that the as­
signment requires, has instead unsuccessfully performed 
acts which he lacks the authority to perform successfully, 
cannot perform in a three-hundred-word paper written in 
fifty minutes, and would need reference material to sub­
stantiate. In paragraph 2, one questions his authority to 
state in sentences 2 and 3. In paragraph 3, one wonders 
how the writer can know that these measures will help. The 
problem runs through paragraph 4. How much does the writer 
know about campaigns to stop children from smoking, the 
reader asks himself. He would accept statements based on 
the writer's own experience as a child or the experience of 
his friends. In the last paragraph, however, the writer is 
omniscient in his pronouncements. His reader will, there­
fore, accord him the muddled "uptake" which his muddled 
performance deserves.
Now, this paper was one of the poorer papers written 
in response to the assignment, but the problem of directing 
attention to the appropriate illocutionary act was apparent 
in enough papers to tell me something about the assignment 
and the class. The quotations seemed clear enough to most 
of the students, but the acts which they were asked to per­
form did not seem clear. The term explain, I assumed, 
caused them as much trouble as it has caused really serious
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students of expository writing. If I were to continue to 
use the term, I knew that I had to limit its meaning for 
the class.
II
The second assignment of the semester elicited a 
paper from a student with far more potential as a writer 
but with the same inability to perform the two acts request­
ed in the assignment. Because the student, after a confer­
ence with the instructor, rewrote the paper, this paper 
provides an interesting example, not only of the ways the 
writer goes wrong in performing the required acts, but also 
of the ways a writer can succeed. The errors of various 
kinds are, again, distracting, but not so distracting as 
the fact that the reader is never completely sure that he 
knows which illocutionary act the writer is performing at 
a given moment.
In the class meetings before the second assignment,
I worked on the senses in which I would use the term
explain in their assignments. We looked at examples of
accounting for, of exemplifying, and even of defining as we
discussed A1 Capp's "Young Van Schuyler's Greatest Ro- 
1 2 
mance" and Erik Erikson's "Adolescence," both found in
the anthology Design, a supplementary text in the class.
In Erikson's essay, actually a section from his book,
Identity: Youth and Crisis, defining, accounting for, and
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exemplifying take place as Erikson discusses adolescence in 
modern society, A1 Capp's story defines terms such as 
"Normies" and "Others," and we used it as a fictional exam­
ple of the "out-grouper," Erikson’s term which we discuss­
ed in class extensively. I emphasized the necessity for 
the student to read the assignment carefully and to show in 
the first paragraph which acts he intended to perform in 
his own essay. I used traditional terminology reminding 
the students as they had been taught in English 1001 to use 
an introduction with a thesis statement and reviewing the 
writing of introductions.
The assignment question which the girl who wrote the
next two papers as well as the students who wrote the last
two chose to write on follows:
Erik Erikson says, "Young people can become remarkably 
clannish, intolerant, and cruel in their exclusion of 
others who are 'different,' in skin color or cultural 
background, in tastes and gifts, and often in entirely 
petty aspects of dress and gesture arbitrarily selected 
as the signs of an in-grouper or out-grouper." To 
what extent is Erikson accurate in calling young people 
in an "in-group" "clannish," "intolerant," and "cruel"? 
Explain your answer using your own experience as an 
"in-grouper," an "out-grouper,” or an observer of both 
to illustrate your ideas.
In this assignment the writer is explicitly told to illus­
trate or exemplify his opinion. Thus, he is, first, to 
give his opinion of the accuracy of Erikson's view. The 
writer is not asked to argue that another group is more 
clannish or intolerant than adolescents, though he could 
use comparison with another group to illustrate his view of
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adolescents, and arguing may figure in the complex series 
of acts if it is not allowed to take over as the chief act. 
Moreover, the writer may have a perlocutionary intent— in 
this case, probably to convince or persuade. However, he 
has been guided to his best authority for his acts— his own 
experience, and he has been instructed that his chief re­
sponsibility is to opine and explain with illustrations.
The essay to be analyzed, this time the work of a 
girl, follows:
The time in one's life roughly between twelve and 
twenty is a very different time. Very important things 
happen, patterns are set up to affect the rest of your 
life, a career is set up for launch, and a majority of 
the most important lessons are learned. This time in 
your life is different mostly in that it is so much 
more intense. Even the smallest of matters can be up­
setting and take on terrible importance. Erikson 
brought out that the opinions of one's peers is one of 
the terribly important factors that affect decisions.
He is right.
It is rather obvious that youth is "clannish." I 
felt Erikson was being very condemning in his article 
concerning the way youth form cliques. That is the
way he came across to me. In the fact that youth are
often cruel to and intolerant of those who are not in
the "group," I guess he has a right to condemn. How­
ever, I should like to disagree with attributing this 
to being young. This trait is not a trait of adoles­
cents, but one of humanity. Most of the things he 
brought out about that period of life are more readily 
recognized only because they are more intense. It is 
apparent in circles of older people all over the world.
It is true that the young strive to please their 
peers, and it often becomes an obsession. We pick cer­
tain friends who are like us and surround ourselves 
with them. I can't speak for the youths that Erikson 
observed to make these statements but the extent of 
cruelty and intolerance of cliques is not as great as 
he has made it out to be. . . .
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Since the assignment requires that the student opine and 
illustrate, she is in trouble when she makes "disagreeing" 
the major act in paragraph 2, but her trouble began in 
paragraph 1, and by the end of paragraph 3, her paper has 
become incoherent to such a degree that analysis of the 
next paragraph seems pointless.
In the first paragraph, the writer shows that the 
complex series of compound illocutionary acts which she has 
been asked to perform are not likely to be performed in a 
clear way. The writer who intends to opine and illustrate 
in this essay needs to begin by showing the extent to which 
he accepts Erikson's view of the adolescent as "clannish, 
intolerant, and cruel." In the first paragraph he must 
indicate his own belief and show the direction his essay 
will take in an attempt to clarify it. In this essay, the 
statement of the student's belief comes in the final sen­
tence of the paragraph. She begins the paragraph by 
asserting, a proper act with which to lead up to the act 
of opining or giving her belief. The problem with her as­
sertion is its propositional content. Her assertion is 
little more than a truism: this different time of one's
life is a very different time. The reader expects the next 
sentence to rescue the sentence in some miraculous way from 
the state of uselessness which the truism in most situa­
tions succumbs to, and, for a time, it appears that it has 
succeeded by illustrating the ways it is different.
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Sentence 2 states, however, in a way that shows that the 
second sentence does not illustrate the first. Sentence 3 
defines "different" in sentence 1 in such a way as to make 
the illustrations in sentence 2 irrelevant. Sentence 4 
does illustrate sentence 3, but then sentence 5 is dropped 
into the reader's lap. Various relationships between the 
intensity of one's experiences and the effect of peers on 
one's decisions may be obvious to the reader because of his 
own experience, but what relationship the writer intends to 
show, the reader has no way of knowing. Then comes the 
utterance of the writer's belief: "He is right." The
reader will probably assume that the writer means that "he 
is right" in calling the young people of an "in-group" 
"clannish, intolerant, and cruel," but actually the reader 
only assumes that this is the point because he has the 
question before him. In this first paragraph, the writer 
has made a series of assertions and opinings, some of them 
seemingly intended to clarify others, and the reader has no 
way of deciding how the writer intends them to relate to 
each other. The author has used no master speech acts. 
Therefore, the reader is confused concerning what illocu­
tionary acts are to be performed and what the propositional 
content will be of an essay introduced in this inadequate 
way.
Now, sentence 1, paragraph 2, seems to be a master 
speech act indicating that the writer is prepared to
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illustrate the last sentence of paragraph 1. However, 
sentence 2, paragraph 2, shows that the writer does not 
really agree with Erikson at all, since "condemning" seems 
to function as a value word denoting an attitude which the 
author does not like. Sentence 3 adds to the idea that 
"condemning" is used in this way, though the sentence adds 
too little else to justify its inclusion in the essay. In 
the fourth sentence, the writer moves into an act which has 
nothing to do with the assignment but a lot to do with the 
use of "condemning." The writer disagrees and argues with 
Erikson's attributing clannishness, intolerance, and cruelty 
to adolescents and not to adults. She is only asked to de­
cide on the extent to which adolescents are "clannish, in­
tolerant, and cruel" and illustrate her position from her 
observations of "in-groupers" and "out-groupers" among her 
own acquaintances. Then, in sentence 5, the writer makes 
an assertion to support a point which she was not asked to 
make with assertions which she cannot make successfully. A 
college freshman will always trouble his reader when he 
makes assertions about people "all over the world." In 
addition, the word intense in sentence 6 becomes more ap­
parently a problem than it was in the first paragraph 
where the reader worried about a "time in your life" which 
is intense. The word means "existing or occurring in a high 
degree" or "acute, strong, or vehement, as sensations, 
feelings, or emotions," according to The Random House
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Dictionary of the English Language, If this word is used 
accurately at all in the second paragraph, it confuses fur­
ther the point the writer is making about the extent to 
which she feels that "in-groupers” are "clannish" or 
"cruel." Acting intensely, young people in "in-groups" 
would be tremendously crueler than people at other ages.
In the third paragraph, the writer proceeds to make 
one assertion after another until the paper fades off into 
an incoherent jumble. By this time, the reader knows that 
the paper does not opine and illustrate but makes assertions 
that are not successful as components in an act of illus­
trating because they are not tied together in a meaningful 
way. Many of them are not successful assertions if they 
appear as single-sentence acts since they contradict each 
other and express views which the reader will not be will­
ing to accept from an eighteen-year-old student.
When the student rewrote the paper following a con­
ference in my office, she indulged her love of jargon and 
big words, but she controlled to a remarkable degree her 
tendency to make infelicitous assertions and her desire to 
perform a variety of acts instead of the ones called for 
in the assignment. In our conference, I discussed the as­
signment with her, and then I read over her paper with her 
sentence by sentence in order to point out inconsistencies 
and contradictions as well as the ways in which she had 
failed to satisfy the assignment. I did not use speech-act
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terminology such as illocutionary act because we had not 
used it in the class. Instead, I asked her in rewriting 
the paper to answer the question as directly as she could 
with her opinion of Erikson's view and then to illustrate 
her view with examples from her own experience.
The essay follows:
To the young person the fixation of an accepted 
identity and the clarification of one's ideas, ideals, 
and behavior is very important. Clarification is sought 
in surrounding oneself with peers who either accept your 
initial identity or allow you to copy theirs. According 
to Erikson, clarification can also be sought by destruc­
tive means. He states that young people can become re­
markably cruel and clannish in the exclusion of others 
selected as "out-groupers." I feel the measure of their 
cruelty is only to the extent that the out-grouper al­
lows it to disturb him.
One of the problems of identity formation is that 
when a young person enters high school, which I shall 
use as an influential adolescent environment, she has 
the choice of accepting one of the already stamped out 
identities or forming her own and taking the chance of 
it being accepted by those whom she wishes to accept 
her. The mistake of far too many youths is that they 
feel the first choice is their only one. Rather than 
molding their own identity by experience or carefully 
weighing advice from trustworthy sources, the student 
sees as practically her only choice the acceptance of 
the preformed identity of a prominent clique.
A young person's second choice is what Erikson pre­
fers to call the Democratic doctrine— to play one's own 
role. To be able to form an identity acceptable to me 
was far more important than whether it was accepted by 
others. I would not always have a group of peers to 
stand on or behind me. If I were the one that tested 
my ideas, ideals, and behavior and they passed as ac­
ceptable, I would find that knowledge more comforting 
than knowing I had the identity of someone else and had 
to depend on their acceptance. If I approached those 
who were cruelly intolerant of my own role, I would 
pass them off and not be bothered. If I had let their 
exclusion bother me, then the extent of their cruelty 
would be greater. I measure the intolerance and cruelty
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by the way it affects the student.
I had enough faith in humanity to believe that some­
where a group of people would accept me and were the 
type meant to be my friends. Cliques who believed they 
did not want me or need me or would shut me out because 
they considered me "out" were blown off. I found a 
minority of people who accepted whether they approved 
personally of the role I had chosen or not. I did not 
find the intolerance of other cliques very cruel, and 
their approval was no longer important. I was happy 
that I myself was satisfied with my adolescent identity.
In conclusion, not only do I find young people less 
cruel and intolerant than Erikson portrays, but also I 
still believe they are inclined to be more open-minded 
than in post-adolescence.
Only in the last paragraph does the writer give in to the 
desire to argue against Erikson’s thesis by stating her be­
lief that adults are more cruel than adolescents. In this 
last sentence, the change in act is bothersome, but in the 
preceding paragraphs the acts introduced in the first para­
graph have been at least partly performed.
The first paragraph of the essay still shows some 
problems which the writer is having in refining the perform­
ance of the assigned speech act. Grammatical and diction 
problems are obvious difficulties, but the still-present 
difficulty in executing certain illocutionary acts is the 
most serious one. The first sentence asserts, as signalled 
by the assertive link "is," as well as by the nature of the 
content. The second sentence asserts and illustrates the 
method of "clarification." One problem at this point is 
the authority for the writer's assertions. The third sen­
tence introduces another problem. The word also signals
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that this sentence is used to assert another means of
clarification besides the one described in sentence 2.
However, it is actually only an aspect of the first method
as the writer could show by a clearer use of indicators to
signal the relationship between sentences in a multiple-
sentence utterance. Sentences 3, 4, and 5 could be changed
to read in this way:
According to Erikson, however, the search for clarifica­
tion which aids some adolescents in fixing an identity 
results in harm to others. In their association with 
peers who share or accept the same identity traits, 
adolescents form "in-groups" which often become remark­
ably cruel and intolerant toward others. I feel, never­
theless, that these groups are only cruel to the extent 
that the "out-grouper" allows them to disturb him.
In the revised paragraph, in illustrating "clarification," 
the writer prepares for the point which she wishes to make: 
"out-groupers" are harmed only to the extent to which they 
allow themselves to be, so they determine the extent to 
which "in-groups" are "clannish, intolerant, and cruel."
If the reader accepts the signal given by the use of the 
word also as a true indication of meaning, this revision 
will not work; but the revision spares the reader the dif­
ficulty of reconciling "surrounding oneself with peers who 
either accept your initial identity or allow you to copy 
theirs" and considering this practice as completely outside 
the "in-group" system.
The next paragraphs fail in that they do not contain 
illustrations which show the author's experiences but assert
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generalities, but the paragraphs do try to illustrate the 
author's view of the cruelty of "in-groups." The use of 
the pronoun she in paragraph 2 confuses the reader concern­
ing the identity of the speaker and "her" relationship to 
the assertions which she is making. If the reader knows 
that the writer is a girl, he does not know it because of 
any assistance from the writer. In addition, the reader 
misses the assistance from transition words which success­
ful exemplifying requires. The reader must discover for 
himself the relationship between the "out-grouper1s" suf­
fering and the choices. The third paragraph is tied in by 
the allusion to the paragraph before it. By the end of 
paragraph 4, however, the reader has difficulty remembering 
the point of the paper. The writer is asserting and opin­
ing, but the content is now her own strong character, not 
the extent to which adolescents can be called "clannish, 
intolerant, and cruel."
This paper I consider to be a definite improvement 
over the other paper. It has problems such as those dis­
covered in the first paragraph. On the other hand, the
writer does give her opinion of the extent to which adoles­
cents are cruel in their treatment of "out-groupers" in the 
first paragraph, and in paragraphs 3 and 4 she gives as ex­
amples of her opinion her own experiences as an "out- 
grouper" by choice. I would prefer her examples to be more
concrete than they are, but, after this revision, I could
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see that the young woman would probably finally display the 
intelligence and background which had earned her ACT scores 
that allowed her to skip most first-semester freshman sub­
jects.
Ill
The second writer of a paper on the assignment des­
cribed above shows a different type of confusion of acts. 
The writer seems to know what he is expected to do but to 
be incapable of performing the acts in a straightforward 
manner that will secure the proper "uptake" from his reader. 
Finally, the writer changes from one act to another for no 
apparent reason, and the reader is left with a decision 
concerning the nature of the proper "uptake."
The essay begins with the title, "The Adolescent 
Journey," which is provocative but not a clear indicator of 
the act to be performed. One expects from the title some 
allusion in the essay to the journey mentioned in the title, 
perhaps an extended metaphor which will be used in explain­
ing the writer's view of Erikson's assessment of the ado­
lescent's "in-group" behavior. Actually, the expectations 
set up in the title are never satisfied as one sees in the 
essay which follows:
The Adolescent Journey
People experiencing adolescence should prepare them­
selves for some good fortune and some disappointments 
based on what groups they are classified in. Being
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classified in groups is an adjustment that is premedi­
tated by the group and is not decided by the person 
involved. The fact is, the person who is being put in 
a group must accept what he is until he reaches a stage 
that will allow him to change or be independent.
Members of groups have characteristics that warn of 
their disapproval of letting outsiders into their group. 
One example is the "clannish’' effect they can give to 
the outsider. The group does this by classifying the 
outsider with another group and telling him that he 
should "get lost." This frequently occurs when a young­
er boy wants to associate with an older group of boys.
I experienced this in my early group. I wanted to give 
my friends my own age the impression that I was at a 
higher level of maturity than they could ever reach and 
that they had to look up to me. This was a cruel thing 
to do to my friends when I look back on it, even though 
it seemed very appropriate at the time. In this case 
people who were "different" were excluded from the 
group.
Some of these groups were formed for the accomplish­
ment of a common purpose. The common purpose usually 
was to eliminate people from our association who were 
unable to fulfill the characteristic we wanted a member 
to have. These groups are called cliques. I have been 
in a clique in my adolescence. For example, I have been 
in cliques in which the outsider was excluded just for 
the sake of argument. This type of nonsense is typical 
of the adolescent stages, especially in the early and 
middle stages of adolescence.
The exclusion of others is not always an easy task. 
If an outsider is persistent enough, he can adjust him­
self so that he fits in with the image of the group.
For example, if I was ambitious enough to want to fight 
in any way possible to join a group, I would concentrate 
on perfecting ways to fit into it. With a great desire, 
I may eventually become an "in-grouper."
Being an "in-grouper" or "out-grouper" is based on 
what type of person one is. I mean whether you are a 
"normie, a "poor kid," or an "other."
A normie is a normal kid. Being normal is one step 
toward being an "in-grouper." Normality may be based 
on race, culture, or belief. Race is the most difficult 
obstacle to overcome because there is no way to overcome 
it. Culture can sometimes be an obstacle because of 
differences in languages and educational background.
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Belief is probably the easiest obstacle for one to over­
come. A "poor kid" has distinguishing features that 
cannot be overcome. For example, a racial difference.
In my case this is true and I am distinguishable. These 
distinguishing features are not always reasons for ex­
clusions. Sadly enough, in many cases they are. Other 
features are handicaps such as wooden legs or short arms.
"Others" are the most unfortunate group. They are 
unwelcome outcasts. In a sense, they have no way to 
redeem themselves or truthfully prove that they are 
worthy of respect and acceptance.
The "Out-grouper" should be optimistic and realize 
that he is in a group himself, that group being the out­
siders.
In paragraphs 1-4, the writer, with no help from the title, 
attempts to illustrate his answer, the propositional con­
tent of which is not clear. Then, in paragraph 5, he be­
gins to classify and define. In paragraph 7, he concludes 
his essay by advising.
The reader senses in paragraph 1 that the writer is 
agreeing with Erikson that adolescent "in-groups" can be 
cruel. The writer confuses his reader, however, by his in­
direct way of expressing his belief. "People experiencing 
adolescence" might be parents, teachers, policemen, or any 
other group working with young adults, though the reader, 
partly because he knows the assignment, assumes that the 
phrase refers to adolescents themselves. In the first sen­
tence, the writer leads his reader to expect that he is 
going to discuss good and bad aspects of the "in-group" 
relationship. The reader is led to a blank wall, however, 
in the next sentence by the assertion that "being classi­
fied" equals "an adjustment" and that the "adjustment" is
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"premeditated" by the "in-group." The last sentence where 
the reader is expecting the writer's stand on Erikson's 
ideas is again frustrating. Obviously, the writer has not 
enjoyed the effect of "in-groups," but he cannot bring him­
self to execute a clear expression of this opinion that 
they are bad. One speculates that he does not understand 
how to signal his acts directly and that a large portion of 
this student's problem is his ignorance of the significance 
of illocutionary force indicators.
Paragraphs 2-4 attempt to illustrate the writer’s 
experiences as an "in-grouper" in order to show that "in­
groupers" can be cruel. The broad reference in paragraph 
2 makes the propositional content unclear: is the writer
a younger boy wanting membership in an older boys' "in­
group" or is he a younger boy who made it into an older 
boys' "in-group"? Finally, the reader concludes that he is 
the younger boy who was accepted by the older boys, but the 
writer has not signaled that this is the direction which he 
is taking. The act of illustrating in these paragraphs 
would be more effective if the writer had used statements 
of specific happenings rather than general statements. For 
example, in paragraph 4, the reader, by describing one way 
in which he fought, could make his illustration far clearer 
to his reader. Illustrating, to be successful, requires 
that the writer supply relationships between the illustra­
tion and the thing to be illustrated, and, for a reader who
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is not familiar with the way this young man has fought to 
secure his place, these relationships must be made very 
clear. They would be far clearer if the writer described 
specific happenings.
In paragraph 8, the writer abruptly changes acts. 
Paragraphs 8-10 are devoted to classifying and defining 
"normie," "poor kid," and "other." These terms were intro­
duced in the Capp story mentioned above, and they could be 
used effectively in this assignment as the writer explains 
"out-groups" and "in-groups." In the context of the as­
signment, the writer would not even have to define the 
terms, since his reader already knows the way in which he 
is using them. Here, they are stuck in without master 
speech acts to show their relationship to the chief illocu­
tionary intent of the paper. The propositional acts of 
these paragraphs are confused, but the reader can hardly
worry about that point when he sees no reason for the act
of defining at all or the use of these terms unless they 
are introduced earlier and used more effectively. The 
final paragraph of advice is equally confusing but welcome 
as the end to a paper which ran out of material several 
paragraphs earlier. In fact, one wonders whether the
writer did not worry excessively about length and add these
paragraphs to stretch his work.
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IV
The successful essay or complex series of compound 
illocutionary acts performed by a third student demonstrates 
the extent to which these other essays did fail. The 
writer, a young woman, tells her reader immediately in the 
first paragraph that she agrees with Erikson and that she 
can illustrate her understanding of Erikson's ideas with 
her own experiences. For me, at least, her illustrations 
succeed in clarifying.
The reader notices immediately that the writer is 
not prone to make statements and assertions which she can­
not be responsible for. The essay follows:
Adolescence is a wonderful and difficult period in 
growing up, and that period of development between the 
beginning of puberty and maturity holds cherished as 
well as harrowing experiences for almost everyone who 
has been through it. For, as Erik Erikson stated in 
his essay on adolescence, "Young people can become re­
markably clannish, intolerant, and cruel." This cruel­
ty is common in the world of the young adult, and cop­
ing with situations like prejudice and ridicule some­
times strengthens and sometimes weakens the tormented 
individual. I have experienced the anguish of being an 
"out-grouper" as well as the "pleasure" of being an 
"in-grouper," and it is because of this direct partici­
pation in both events that I can comment on the absurd­
ity of the two. For I was the same person before I 
encountered wealth, and here is where the absurdity 
lies. With the same face and ideals and a few green­
backs in my wallet, I experienced a sudden transforma­
tion that, at first, I was not aware of.
Being an "out-grouper," as I remember it, was a 
trying and awkward experience. I was one of those kids 
who still wore white socks and loafers when all the 
other girls had flamboyant, colorful fishnet stockings 
and tiny-heeled pumps that none of them could walk in.
I also had a mop of auburn hair, that embarrassing
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color between red and brown that looks so awkward in the 
midst of girls with blond hair. But, worst of all, I 
was poor. That was the great burden in my life that 
would surely make me eligible for sainthood after death. 
It was poverty, I felt, that kept me from achieving the 
fame that was rightfully mine. My classmates would 
laugh at my ancient clothes and medieval loafers, and, 
at parties, new teenagers would mistake me for the maid 
and throw their fur-collared coats at me for safekeep­
ing. It was humiliating, and I waited for the day when 
I would be famous and plastered on billboards through­
out the country. And then my dream was fulfilled!
My widowed mother met and married a brilliant and 
charming widower who just happened to have a small for­
tune and an older daughter with a flair for fashion. 
Slowly I became chic and fashionable. Lime-green fish­
net stockings made me the center of attraction. My 
built-in swimming pool also helped. New friends flocked 
around me, encircling me in the very groups that had 
once cast me out. At first, it was exciting and fun. 
Then the hypocrisy of these "friends" finally shouted at 
me. These "in-groupers" wanted me to ridicule and shun 
the members of the "out-group" that I was once a member 
of. I had that same, funny auburn hair and still wore 
loafers when nobody was around. (They were comfortable.) 
So why was I different suddenly? The whole thing was 
absurd, and I will never forget how unrealistic and 
foolish it was of me to be an "in-grouper." I had been 
an "in-grouper" all along with the "out-groupers" who 
were like me.
Adolescence is a wonderful and difficult period of 
growing up, and this stage of growth can be painful as 
well as joyful. Young people can be prejudiced and 
harsh in their encounters with others, and this harsh­
ness can sometimes weaken or strengthen an individual. 
But it is a period of growth that everyone experiences, 
and, luckily, most survive. And this survival brings 
new insights to us about human behavior and life.
The reader soon notices phrases such as "almost everyone,"
"common," and "sometimes strengthens and sometimes weakens"
all of which show that the writer will not overgeneralize
or, in speech-act terminology, make assertions which she
cannot sincerely obligate herself to provide evidence to
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support. The content of the last two statements in para­
graph 3 is not completely clear though the reader suspects 
that he knows the point that is being made, but at the end 
of the essay, as the reader, I definitely knew the writer's 
opinion of Erikson's view of adolescence and understood, 
not only that the writer had intended to illustrate, but 
also what the writer "means" by her answer, to the extent 
to which that is possible. In addition, the writer has 
performed acts which were not required by the assignment 
without destroying the focus of her paper.
In the first paragraph, the writer begins with an 
assertion on adolescence that is also an evaluation of it. 
In the second sentence, she quotes in order to opine. The 
connecting particle "for" in sentence 2 shows that the 
writer is more concerned with the "difficult" and "harrow­
ing" aspects of adolescence than with the "wonderful" and 
"cherished" side: in other words, the writer believes with
Erikson that adolescents can be "clannish, intolerant, and 
cruel." The next sentence opines further concerning the 
view expressed in sentence 2 and adds dimension to the 
paper's position on adolescent cruelty by opining concern­
ing its effect on the adolescent. In the next sentence, 
the writer shows her source of information— her own exper­
ience. The sentence which begins "I have experienced" 
functions as a master speech act to indicate exemplifying. 
Throughout the paragraph, the writer is deprecating and
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commending. By the end of the complex series of compound 
illocutionary acts which is the first paragraph of this 
essay, the writer has answered the question in the assign­
ment, showed her understanding of the effect of the "in­
group" on the individual, and suggested the direction the 
essay will take as she illustrates the statement, "This 
cruelty is common in the world of the young adult, and 
coping with situations like prejudice and ridicule some­
times strengthens and sometimes weakens the tormented in­
dividual." The phrase "situations like prejudice and rid­
icule" is inaccurately formulated, but the reader knows the 
young woman's opinion and also knows that she intends to 
add the idea of the good effect of the "in-group/out-group" 
situation to the total idea in the paper.
This essay can be analyzed for its use of illocu­
tionary force indicators just as the professional essay can 
be. The expectations in the mind of the reader who knows 
the assignment provide the first context indicators. In 
paragraph 2, "as I remember it" and "I felt" function like 
the explicit formula by signaling that the writer is ex­
emplifying in terms of her own experience and that she is 
opining. Connecting particles such as "also," "worst of 
all," and "and" assist in the performance of the illustrat­
ing acts. The third paragraph could be divided in order to 
show the changes from the statements and opinions about her 
mother's marriage and her new life to the opinions
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and statements that explain her reaction to the new life.
In paragraph 3, quotation marks, "friends," signal depre­
cating.
This essay exhibits the complexity of the profes­
sional essay, to the extent that the author can handle com­
plex acts successfully. She deprecates her own attempt to 
be stylish in order to deprecate the "in-group" mystique. 
She fulfills the assignment, agreeing with Erikson that 
"in-groups" can be cruel, but she shows throughout the pa­
per that the effect of the cruelty has been to strengthen 
at least one adolescent— herself. In other words, this 
student essay is judged successful because it displays the 
same characteristics displayed by the professional essays. 
It, like them, is a complex series of compound illocution­
ary acts, each of these acts signalled by indicators known 
to the writer and to any reader who finds the essay fully 
intelligible.
V
The student essay viewed by Austin's judge is, then, 
successful for the same reasons that a professional 
writer's essay will be successful. The writer in composing 
the essay performs a complex series of compound illocution­
ary acts, and he performs them in the manner specified by 
the rules which constitute the individual acts, correctly 
using the force indicators in his repertoire. One realizes
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very soon that the acts which are successfully performed in 
the student essays are never as complex as those found in 
the professional essays. One is reminded of Beardsley's 
conclusion, "What makes a discourse a literary work (roughly 
speaking) is its exploitation to a high degree of the
3
illocutionary-act potential of its verbal ingredients."
The successful student essay contains more compound acts 
and manages to work in more acts with opining and exempli­
fying without destroying the unity of intent in the paper, 
but even this paper lacks the "richness and complexity of 
meaning" which Beardsley finds in the great work. The 
second essay studied fails at least partly because the 
writer tries for complexity and loses unity because she 
cannot handle compound acts well.
The importance of the assignment becomes increasing­
ly apparent. The student writer uses as his first indica­
tor the assignment for which he writes the essay, this 
assignment functioning as the context of his utterance as 
the collection of essays or a periodical functions for the 
professional writer. The terms used in the assignment must 
be ones which the writer knows, and he must be asked to 
perform acts which are possible. The term explain will 
probably always give difficulty. It seems necessary, how­
ever, when the instructor is trying to limit the acts which 
the student performs to accounting for or exemplifying in 
order to make sure that the student can perform these acts
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which are an integral part of more complicated acts such 
as arguing.
It seems logical to conclude, therefore, that a 
study of the essay as a complex series of compound illocu- 
tionary acts should give a student insight into the nature 
of the composing process which results in an essay, the 
restrictions on him when he intends to perform a certain 
act, and the signals which he must use if he wants his 
reader to understand his intent.
If the study of the formal essay as the performance 
of a complex series of compound illocutiionary acts has the 
possibilities for teaching composition which I believe it 
to have, then one should be able to outline a program for 
teaching the essay based on the conclusions to be drawn 
from this study. In the concluding chapter of this dis­
sertation, after summarizing my conclusions, I shall pro­
pose such an outline.
CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSION
I began this study to test the hypothesis that a 
formal essay can be analyzed as the performance of a com­
plex series of compound illocutionary acts and that the 
insights gained from such an analysis can be applied to 
the teaching of the reading and the writing of the formal 
essay. My study proceeded from a study of the works of 
J. L. Austin and John Searle to an analysis of professional 
and student essays using speech-act theory. From this 
study I have concluded that such an approach may provide a 
valuable fresh approach to teaching composition as well as 
the careful reading of expository prose.
In the second and third chapters of this study, I 
discussed the parts of the speech-act theory of Austin and 
Searle which are relevant in the study of the essay. The 
relevant ideas from their theories are the following: (1)
virtually every utterance in a meaningful speech situation 
consists of a locutionary or a propositional act, an illo­
cutionary act, and sometimes a perlocutionary act; (2) the 
propositional and illocutionary acts are rule-governed and 
conventional; (3) conventional force indicators convey the 
illocutionary intent of the speaker; and (4) the rules,
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conventions, and indicating devices are accessible to the 
native speaker of the language as a result of his knowledge 
as a native speaker.
In Chapter IV, I analyzed 'The Iron String" by How­
ard Mumford Jones as the performance of a complex series of 
compound illocutionary acts. In the process I discovered 
that the author performed acts of stating, opining, arguing, 
exemplifying, accounting for, comparing, quoting, evaluat­
ing, urging, deprecating, and commending, and I formulated 
the rules for these, which I have listed in Appendix II. I 
concluded that some of these— exemplifying, arguing, and 
accounting for— are seldom performed using a one-sentence 
utterance and that they usually consist of a statement or 
opinion to be argued for or exemplified plus the evidence 
to be used in arguing or exemplifying. I discovered indi­
cating devices which Austin and Searle did not discuss, and 
I concluded that in certain contexts almost any word may 
function to indicate force and that the author's use of 
indicating devices may finally be tied to his style, thus 
providing a new approach to the study of the relationship 
of form and content.
In Chapter V, I studied three additional essays—  
Joseph Wood Krutch's "We Were Not Skeptical Enough," Sylvia 
Angus's "It’s Pretty, but Is It Art?", and Irving Kristol's 
"Censorship and Pornography." In analyzing these I found 
it necessary to discuss three additional acts— believing,
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defining, and interpreting— and to formulate the rules for 
these, which are also listed in Appendix II. I found more 
and more evidence to support the idea that the illocution­
ary acts in most essays by professional writers are dis­
tinguished by their complexity and that the ways to indi­
cate force are as numerous as the verbal resources of the 
writer and his audience. I concluded, too, that these 
essays were felicitous performances of illocutionary acts 
because the authors possessed the necessary authority to 
perform the acts in them and understood the obligations 
which they undertook in performing them. Finally, in 
Chapter VI, I analyzed five student essays, four unsuccess­
ful ones and one successful one, for their felicity as 
illocutionary acts. I must now consider to what extent I 
have proved the hypothesis with which the study began to be 
a correct one. Is it valid, in other words, to regard the 
formal essay as a performance of a complex series of usual­
ly compound illocutionary acts? Can this theory be used in 
the composition class?
The first question elicits a somewhat hesitant af­
firmation of the first part of the hypothesis. Given the 
theory of the illocutionary act and given certain profes­
sional essays, I have been able to manipulate the elements 
in the essays to fit the elements of the theory. And, I 
might add, they fit rather neatly. On the other hand, I 
suspect that '’manipulate" may be a more apt term to
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describe the process which I have used than I had hoped it 
would be— that, in other words, I have merely superimposed 
one more pattern on the structure of the essay instead of 
discovering relationships inherent in its structure in a 
good ordinary language philosopher way. Rather than new 
insights which will make the intrinsic structure of the 
essay clearer, I may have simply put old wine into new 
bottles which add nothing to the flavor of the wine though 
they embellish its appearance on the shelves. For example, 
does an examination of connecting particles as force indi­
cators make their use clearer than the examination of the 
same words as transition devices? Is it more helpful to 
consider organization in terms of the focus on the desired 
illocutionary acts and the importance of their relationship 
to each other? I believe that speech-act theory does offer 
a constructive new approach to the analysis of the formal 
essay because I believe that the theory is an accurate 
description of speech acts. I do not believe that it has 
passed the theory stage, however; and the final study, if 
such a study is possible, is probably some years away.
One direction for study at this time is an examina­
tion of the second part of the hypothesis, which I have 
explored only in evaluating the five student essays. Actu­
al use of the theory in composition classes should show 
more about the intrinsic value of the theory as a descrip­
tion of the essay as well as its value as a teaching aid.
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Basing my ideas on the analysis in Chapters IV, V, and VI,
I believe that the following procedures will work.
In the first place, the student must be introduced 
to spoken English as the performance of speech acts. In 
this introduction, the age of the student and his maturity 
in the use of English should dictate the instructor's use 
of terminology to explain speech acts. The term illocution­
ary , for example, has no intrinsic value, but it is a con­
venient term once the student has mastered his language to 
the extent that the word will not hide the concept. The 
rules which constitute each act are far more important in 
the study than the ability to use the word illocutionary in 
an appropriate slot. These rules should not be taught but 
discovered. Until a student can consider a certain speech 
act which he can perform with ease and formulate the rules 
for it, he is unlikely to use the act successfully in an 
essay. As his knowledge of speech acts grows, then the 
acts for which he can verbalize rules should grow. Indica­
tors, on the other hand, can be taught more directly.
The writing of the professional can be used in three 
ways as the student moves from the spoken to the written 
act. In the first place, the student should be able to see 
in the essay a series of illocutionary acts constituted by 
the same rules which constitute these acts in a conversa­
tion. Especially important is that he sees the commitments 
which the writer makes to his audience— the sort of know­
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ledge he claims to have, the future actions which he expects 
to perform, and the beliefs which he is expressing. In 
order to make these commitments, he must know his audience 
or, at least, know that his audience is too vague to know 
well. In the second place, the student studying the pro­
fessional essay should increase his ability to perform 
additional illocutionary acts by seeing them performed in 
the writing of the professional. Assuming that this abili­
ty to perform speech acts can be taught, the instructor can 
hope to increase the student's ability to perform these 
acts by showing him the acts as they are performed in the 
essay. In the third place, the student can see the way 
professional writers use indicators. Memorizing a list of 
Indicators is of dubious value, partly because one must 
learn them in context. Discovering them in the sentences 
of an essay should be far more helpful.
Next the student should be taught that, before he 
writes, he must analyze the illocutionary acts which he 
intends to perform. He must know his audience, and he must 
know what acts are required by the assignment. And he must 
know the importance of truly intending to perform a certain 
act, the act demanded by the assignment. One suspects, 
especially after seeing the ending which she wrote on the 
assignment, that the writer of the second and third essays 
analyzed in Chapter VI did not intend to explain, that she 
still intended to argue and finally prove Erikson wrong
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about adolescents but right if he applied his theory to 
adults.
Finally, the student can be taught to criticize his 
completed paper as a complex series of compound illocution­
ary acts. Conscious of the rules which govern his acts and 
of the importance of his use of indicators, he should be 
able to check his writing in two ways. First, he should be 
able to decide whether he has felicitously performed the 
acts which he intended to perform by judging whether the 
acts which he has performed were duly constituted by the 
rules. He should discover statements which he cannot suc­
cessfully make to his particular audience, attempted acts 
of explaining which fail to show relationships, violations 
of his commitment in the act. Second, he should discover 
indicators which signal the wrong act and sentences which 
need indicators if they are to signal any act. Once the 
essay has been completed, it becomes a speech act as sep­
arate from the writer as the spoken act is from Austin's 
judge and as accessible to his methods of analysis. A 
student should be able to analyze his own essay from a 
position near that of Austin's judge.
In other words, studying the essay as the perform­
ance of a complex series of usually compound illocutionary 
acts may replace steps in teaching composition which are 
time-honored but dubiously successful. The teaching of 
organization may be swallowed up in the emphasis on the
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focus on the appropriate illocutionary acts. Problems with 
clarity may be absorbed in the separation of the problem 
into problems of content and problems of force, and the 
last kind of problem may disappear as the student considers 
his acts as rule-governed. Force indicators may become far 
more meaningful terms to students than the traditional 
terms. Finally, as I suggested earlier, the old problem of 
style may be partially solved or even completely solved as 
the illocutionary force potential of each word and word 
arrangement becomes clearer. In other words, ancient rhet­
oric's arrangement, invention, and style may be well on 
their way to expression in a new vocabulary and support by 
a new rationale.
As a result of my study, I believe that this theory 
has this kind of practical application.
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APPENDIX I
AUSTIN'S CLASSIFICATION OF THE ILLOCUTIONARY FORCES 
OF UTTERANCES WITH HIS EXAMPLES OF EACH OF THE MAIN TYPES
1. Verdictives
Austin says that verdictives "are typified by the giving of a verdict. . . by a jury, arbitrator, or umpire. But they need not be final; they may be, for example, an estimate, reckoning, or appraisal. It is essentially a finding as to something--fact, or value— which is for different reasons hard to be certain about" (How to Do Things with Words, p. 150).
acquithold (as a matter of law)read it asreckonplaceput it atgradeassess
characterize
convict interpret as ruleestimatedate
make itrankvaluediagnose
find (as a matter of fact)understandcalculatelocatemeasuretake itratedescribeanalyse
2. Exercitives
Austin defines an exercitive as "the giving of a decision in favour of or against a certain course of action, or advocacy of it. It is a decision that something is to be so, as distinct from a judgement that it is so: it is advocacy that it should be so, as opposed to anestimate that it is so; it is an award as opposed to an assessment" (How 
to Do Things with Words, p. 154).








Austin says of commissives that they "are typified by promis­ing or otherwise undertaking; they commit you to doing something, but 
include also declarations or announcements of intention, which are not promises, and also rather vague things which we may call espousals, as for example, siding with" (How to Do Things with Words, pp. 150-151).
promise undertake am determined to mean to propose to envisage guarantee vowdedicate myself toadoptespouse
covenantbind myselfintendplanshallengagepledge myself agreedeclare forchampionoppose
contractgive my worddeclare my intentionpurposecontemplateswear
betconsent side with embrace favour
4. Behabitives
Austin says of this group, "behabitives include the notion of reaction to other people's behaviour and fortunes and of attitudes and expressions of attitudes to someone else's past conduct or imminent conduct. There are obvious connexions with both stating or describing what our feelings are and expressing, in the sense of venting our feel­ings, though behabitives are distinct from both of these" (How to Do Things with Words, p. 159).
1. For apologies we have 'apologize'.2. For thanks we have 'thank'.3. For sympathy we have ’deplore’, 'commiserate', 'compliment', 'condole', 'congratulate1, 'felicitate', 'sympathize'.4. For attitudes we have 'resent', 'don't mind', 'pay tribute', 'criticize', 'grumble about', 'complain of ', 'applaud', 'over­look', 'commend', 'deprecate', and the non-exercitive uses of 'blame', 'approve', and 'favour'.5. For greetings we have 'welcome', 'bid you farewell'.6. For wishes we have 'bless', 'curse', 'toast', 'drink to', and'wish' (in its strict performative use).7. For challenges we have 'dare', 'defy', 'protest', 'challenge'.
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5, Expositives
About this class, Austin says, "Expositives are used in acts of exposition involving the expounding of views, the conducting of arguments, and the classifying of usages and of references" (How to Do Things with Words, p. 160). Austin presents expositives groupetT TrTto the following subclasses:
1. affirm deny state describe class identify
2. remark mention ?interpose
3. inform apprise tell answer rejoin
3a. ask
5. accept concede wi thdraw agree demur to object to adhere to recognize repudiate 5a. correct revise
6. postulatededuceargueneglect?emphasize
4. testi fyreportswearconjecture?doubt?know?believe
7. begin by turn to 
conclude by 7a. interpret 
distinguish analyse define 7b. illustrate explain formulate 7c. mean refer cal 1understand regard as
APPENDIX II
THE CONSTITUTIVE RULES FOR SPEECH ACTS
This appendix is divided into two parts. The first part is 
simply a reproduction of the constitutive rules that Searle provides 
for the illocutionary acts of requesting, stating, questioning, thank­
ing, advising, warning, greeting, and congratulating. These are re­
produced as they are found on pp. 66-67 of Speech Acts. The second 
part of the appendix provides my own formulation of the rules for 
thirteen additional acts discovered in the four professional essays. 
Stating is a basic act in the four essays, but, since the rules for it 
are included in Searle's summary, I will not include any discussion of 
it in my summary except as a reminder that it is closely related to 
several other acts but differs in important respects from them.
To understand Searle's summary, one must understand the abbre­
viations which he uses. These abbreviations are used in the summary: 
"A"— act; "H"— hearer; "S"— Speaker; "jp"— proposition; and "E"— an 
event, state, etc. I have used the same abbreviations in my rule sum­
maries.
The thirteen acts whose constitutive rules are presented in the 
second part are arranged in accordance with Austin's classification of 
illocutionary acts. The definition of each of these major types is 
found in Appendix I. In the essays, no examples were found of the type 
of act which Austin calls the "commissive," so the numbering of these
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groups of rules will skip the number "3" in order to retain the number­
ing of Austin's classifications. My formulation of the rules for each 
of these acts follows the pattern used by Searle in Speech Acts.
My formulations are usually preceded by citations from the 
synonymies found in Merriam-Webster dictionaries. These citations 
provide only a preliminary characterization of each act, which is then 
amplified by the rules themselves. The citation chosen is the one 
which fits the act as it is performed in these essays. The choice of 
meaning will seem arbitrary in some cases where the term has a number 
of other meanings. For example, "interpret" and "define" are names 
for two or more acts which are not clearly distinguished in the 
Merriam-Webster synonymies. "Explain," as shown in Chapter IV, is 
discussed here as several acts— accounting for, exemplifying, and de­
fining. These rules with the discussion in the appropriate sections 
of Chapters IV and V should make clear the sense in which each term 
is being used to describe an act.
Part I











Future set A  c f  H .
Tjpts of illocutionary act
A tttr t, ils tt ifbai), ctftrm 
A ny p ropctition  p.
i .  H  i t  able to  do A . S  believes H  
is able to do A .
i .  I t  i t  not obvious to  both S  and H  
that H  w ill do A  in the normal 
course o f  events o f  h it  ow n accord.
S  wants H  :o  dp A .
Counts at, an attempt to  set H  to 
do A .
Order and eemmatid Sure the addi­
tional preparatoryrulc that S  must 
be in a position o f authority over H. 
Command probably docs not have 
rhe ‘ pragmatic’ condition requiring 
non-obviousness. Furthermore in 
both, the authority relationship 
infects the essential condition 
because the utterance counts as aa 
attempt to  get H  to  do A  in tirtu t 
e j tin authority oJS over H .
i .  S  has evidence (reasons, etc.) fo r 
the tru th  o f p.
a. I t  is not obvious to both S and H  
that H  knows (does not need '.o be 
reminded of, etc.) p .
Jbc lieve* p .
Counts at an undertaking to  the 
effect that p  represents an actual 
suce o f  affairs.
Unlike arput these do no t seem to  be 
essentially tied to attempting tc 
convince. Thus “ I x n  simply 
stating that p  and not attempting to 
convince y o u " is acceptable, but 
"1  am arguing that p  and not 
attempting to  convince you”  sounds 
inconsistent.
Omttia.i1
A ny proposition o r  propositions! 
function.
1. S  does not know ‘ the answer’, i.e., 
does not know i f  the propovitioi. i t  
true, or, in the case o t the pro posi­
tional function,docs not know t i«  
infotmatiun needed to complete theProposition tru ly (but see c o w c n i  slow).
2. I t  is not obvious to both S  and H  
that H  s till provide the information 
at that time w ithout being asked.
5  wants this in fcrm rtien.
Counts as an attempt to el*cit tb it  
irifonnation from  H .
There are tw o kinds o! questions,
(u) real questions, (fr) exam ques­
tions. In  real questions S wantr to  
know (find out) the m tw er; in exam 











Thank ( ft t)
Past act A  done by K
A  benefits S  and 5  believe* A  
benefit* S .
S  feels grateful o r  appreciative fo r  s i.
Count* as an expression o f  gratitude 
o r appreciation.
Sincerity and essential rule* overlap. 
Thanking is just expressing grati­
tude in  a way that, e.g., promising 
it  no t just expressing an intention.
A dritt
Future a a  A  o f  IL
i .  S  ha* some reason to  believe A  
w ill benefit H.
a. I t  is not obvious to  both S  ar.d H  
' that H  w ill do A  in  the normal 
course o f  events.
S  believe* A  w ill benefit H .
Counts as an undertaking to  the effect 
that A  is in  H ’s best interest.
Contrary to  what one m ight suppose 
advice is not a species o f requesting. 
I t  is interesting to  compare "advise”  
w ith  “ u rge", advocate" and 
"recom m end".
Advis ing you is not try ing  to get you 
to  do something in the sense mat 
requesting is. Advising is more like 
te lling you what is best fo r  you.
IFan
Future ev *nt o r  state, etc., TL
i .  H  has reason to  believe E  w ill 
occur ar.d is not in  H 'i interest, 
a. I t  is not obvious to  both S  and H  
that £  w iil occur.
S  believes E is not in  FT* brat interest.
Counts as an undertaking to  the effect
that £  is not in  H ’s best interest.
W arning is like advising, rather t r * n  
requesting. I t  is not, I  th ink, 
necessarily an attempt to get you to 
take evasive action. Notice ih r t  the 
above account is o f  categorical not 
hypothetical warnings. M o tt warning* 
are probably hypothetical; " I f  you 









E n e n tk l
Com m ent:
None.
S  has just encountered (or 
been introduced to , etc.) H .
None.
Count* a* courteous recog­
n ition  o f  H  by J .
Cengraftilalt 
Some event, aa , etc., £  related to  H .
£  is in H ’s im-rest and S  believe* E  i*  
in  H ’s im e ie it.
S  is pleased a: E.
Counts as an expression o f  pleasure at £ .
’ ‘ Congratulate”  is sim ilar to " th a n k "  in  th a t i t  L  ' 
an expression o f its sincerity condition.




Webster's New Dictionary of Synonyms lists "evaluate" with "estimate," "appraise," "value," "rate," "assess," and "assay." Ac­cording to Webster1s , they "are comparable when meaning to judge a thing with respect to its worth." "Evaluate" differs in that it "suggests an intent to arrive at a mathematically correct judgment; it seldom suggests, however, an attempt to determine a thing's mone­tary worth, but rather to find its equivalent in other and more familiar terms."






Any thing, event, idea, etc.
S has a view of the relative or in­trinsic worth of a thing, event, idea, etc., based on his judgment and capable of translation into terms that are not monetary.
H does not know S's view.
S believes his view of the thing to be justified.
The utterance counts as an under­











Future act A of H.
S wishes A to be carried out and 
knows that it is possible for H to do A.
It is not obvious that H will do A or that H wants to do A,
S desires H to do A.
The utterance counts as an under­taking to cause H to do A.










Some action, person, thing, etc.
A sees the merits of the action, person, thing, etc.
S does not have reason to believe that H already admires the person, place, or thing, admires it in the same way S does, or knows that S admires it.
S believes that the person, place, thing, etc. has certain merits.
The utterance counts as an undertaking to the effect that S admires the action, person, thing, etc.
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b. Deprecate
Webster's New Dictionary of Synonyms says that "disapprove" and "deprecate" mean *'to feel or to express an objection to or con­demnation of a person or thing. . . . Deprecate stresses the implica­tion of regret, frequently profound, occasionally diffident or apolo-
n A f 4 .  i t
Rules:
Propositional content Some event, action, thing, etc., E.
Preparatory S objects to E and regrets its occur­rence, existence, or condition.
It is not obvious that H holds the same view, holds it as strongly, or knows that S holds this view.
Sincerity S believes the event, action, thing etc., to deserve condemnation.




According to Webster's New Dictionary of Synonyms, "Opinion, view, belief, conviction, persuasion, sentiment are comparable when they mean a more or less clearly formulated idea or judgment which one holds as true or valid." Speaking of "opinion," Webster's adds that "the term more consistently suggests a personal element in the judgment, the possibility of its being in error, and the strong probability that it will be disputed."
Rules:
Propositional content Any proposition £
Preparatory S does not have hard evidence for the
truth of £, recognizes that his form­ulation of £  is based on a personal judgment, and realizes that its truth may be disputed.
It is not obvious to S that H believes £  or knows that S believes £.
Sincerity S believes £.
Essential The utterance of £  counts as the un­dertaking to the effect that S be­lieves that £  represents an actual state of affairs, but S does not and cannot provide hard facts to support
£•
(Opining differs from stating and asserting in the degree of verifi­ability of the proposition. When the speaker opines, he does not expect his hearer to require evidence for the truth of his opinion but to accept it as his personal judgment.)
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b. Argue
Webster's New Dictionary of Synonyms lists "argue" with "dis­cuss," "debate," "dispute," and " a g i t a t e a n d  gives their shared mean­ing as "to discourse about something in order to arrive at the truth or to convince others." Webster's adds, "Argue usually Implies con­viction and the adducing of evidence or reasons in support of one's cause or position."
Rules:
Propositional content Any proposition (or series of propo­sitions) £
S can supply £  or any series of prop­ositions as part of a reasoning process which will support an idea held up in discussion in opposition to another idea.
It is not obvious either that H ac­cepts the idea or that H knows the reasoning process being used to support it,
S believes in the idea and the valid­ity of his argument.
The utterance counts as an undertak­ing by S to demonstrate to H the superiority of the view which S holds.






This term is not defined in Webster's New Dictionary of Syn- onyms. I am using it as a term to name Kaplan's "scientific explana­tion" discussed in Chapter IV.
Rules:
Propositional content: Any proposition (or series of propo­
sitions) £
S knows for what reasons a phenomenon exists or occurred.
It is not obvious that H knows the same reasons.
5 believes that he can supply the reasons for the phenomenon.
The utterance of £  counts as the 






Another form of explaining, "exemplify" is placed with "illus­trate" in Webster's New Dictionary of Synonyms, which says they "are comparable when they mean to use in speaking or writing concrete instances or cases to make clear something which is difficult, ab­stract, general, or remote from experience or to serve as an instance, case, or demonstration of a point or matter under examination." Web­ster's adds, "Exemplify implies the use of examples for clarification of a general or abstract statement or as aid in revealing the truth 
of a proposition or assertion."
Rules:
Propositional content An action, instance, case, etc., usually expressed in more than one sentence.
Preparatory S sees a relationship between an 
action, instance, case, etc., and a difficult, abstract, or general statement.
It is not obvious that H sees this relationship.
Sincerity S believes that the relationship which he is proposing exists.
Essential The utterance counts as an undertak­ing to provide examples to illustrate a difficult, abstract, or general statement.
(Note that the very nature of the act calls for a perlocutionary in­tent on the part of the speaker— to clarify.)
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e. Define
Another kind of explaining, defining is analyzed here without the help of Webster's New Dictionary of Synonyms, since the defini­tions which I have used in defining tKTs act come from Monroe Beards­ley's Thinking Straight. I have arbitrarily restricted the term to the kind of^efTnTng which Beardsley says produces the "definition proposal
Rules:
Propositional content A term to be defined and a definingterm
S possesses a defining term which is a more familiar expression for a term which S wishes to be understood in a particular way.
It is not obvious that H already be­lieves or accepts this definition.
S believes that the defining term which he offers is a valid one in the 
context.










Any term and explanation of the term
S has knowledge or insight which he uses to formulate a sentence in­tended to help H to understand the term.
It is not obvious that H understands the term.
Sincerity S believes that he has special know­ledge or insight needed to under­stand the term.
Essential The utterance of the sentence counts as the undertaking to provide S's understanding of the term.
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9* Compare
Webster's New Dictionary of Synonyms groups "compare," "con­trast," and "collate" when they "mean to set two or more things side by side in order to show likenesses and differences." Webster's says of "compare," "Compare implies as an aim the showing of relative values or excellences or a bringing out of characteristic qualities, whether they are similar or divergent."
Rules:
Propositional content Two or more events, objects, people,ideas, etc.
S sees likeness and/or differences between two or more things, often ones which show relative values or excellences.
It is not obvious that H sees these likenesses and/or differences.
S believes that the likenesses and differences exist.






Webster's New Dictionary of Synonyms says that "quote, cite, 
repeat are not close synonyms, though all mean to speak or write again something already said or written by another." Webster's adds, "Quote usually implies a use of another's words, commonly with faithful exactness or an attempt at it, for some special effect like adornment, illustration, close examination."
Rules:
Propositional content Any sentence or series of sentences,any word or phrase
S is capable of reading or recalling the exact words of a portion of spoken or written discourse, usually discourse not composed of his own original utterances, in all cases not uttered for the first time on the occasion of the quoting.
It is not obvious that H is familiar with the quotation or does not need to be reminded of it.
S believes that he is quoting exactly.
The utterance counts as an undertak­













S possesses experience, knowledge, or faith to support the truth of £.
It is not obvious that H believes £, or H needs to be reminded that S believes £.
S believes £.
The utterance of £  counts as the undertaking to affirm the belief of S that £.
APPENDIX III
THE IRON STRING
By Howard Mumford Jones
[1] I have lately been reading a Harvard author who is just now out of favor here. He has been unpopular before. He once made a speech1 at this college, a speech so disliked that he was persona non grata2 in Cambridge for thirty years. However, the alumni and the Faculty final­ly decided he was a solid citizen— this was after the Civil War— and so they made him an Overseer, they gave him an honorary degree, and they asked him to deliver a course of lectures. In view of this history I take some pleasure in remembering that the title of these lectures was: "The Natural History of the Intellect." Another thirty years or so drifted by, and they erected a building in his honor. On any class day in winter you can enter it and see Frank Duveneck's statue of him buried under the coats and hats. Somehow, this symbolizes what has happened to Emerson.
[2] The reasons for Emerson's current lack of favor are understandable. He was a transcendentalist, and any beginner in philosophy can tell you what is wrong with transcendentalism.3 As a philosophy it is incon­sistent, illogical, and indefensible. Its epistemology is contrary to fact, its ethical system is unscientific, its language is confused, and its frame of reference is romantic America. It is not, as we owlishly say, for our time. All it has is imagination and insight.
[3] Another reason for Emerson's unpopularity is that he did not havea vision of evil. To count in criticism nowadays you must have a vision of evil. It seems that Herman Melville had a vision of evil in Moby 
Dick, that Nathaniel Hawthorne had a vision of evil in The Scarlet Let­
ter, and that Henry James had a vision of evil in The Turn of the Screw. Precisely what the evil was in each case is in dispute, but it is there, Emerson had no vision of evil. His life was threatened by tuberculosis, he abandoned his pulpit, his first wife died young, his brothers were sick men, and his son perished—
That hyacinthine boy, for whomMorn well might break and April bloom"
he was ostracized by the conservative, he took the unpopular side in 
politics, he was accused of advocating atheism, he was said to be a radical, but he had no vision of evil. All he had was a vision of good.
Reprinted by permission of Harvard Alumni Bulletin.
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Good, he said, is something so tough, resilient, and timeless, it is in­destructible. Our culture is supposed to have this vision of good as its ideal, yet Emerson is unpopular. I am not a philosopher, but merely a literary historian, and I do not pretend to explain the contradiction.
[4] A third reason for Emerson's unpopularity is that he was a liberal.A liberal, says the Oxford Dictionary, is favorable to changes and re­forms tending in the direction of democracy. Emerson favored these changes. However, liberalism is dead. It is not merely dead, it was mistaken. Mr. Wallace's5 failure to create a liberal party in this country is proof. The latest British election, which again buried the liberal party, is proof. The liberal point of view in economics is wrong. The liberal point of view in history, or rather the point of view of liberal historians, is wrong. These historians denounced Talleyrand,6 but Talleyrand was a force for stability. They attacked Metternich,7 but Metternich was a force for order. I am afraid Emerson was a liberal; that is, he assumed that man might amount to something by and by if he would but consult his better self, and that men, taken in­dividually, might improve themselves, so to speak, into a democratic state. This is the American dream which, through the Voice of America,we are broadcasting round the world, particularly into darkest Russia.I am not a politician, merely a literary man, and I cannot explain this contradiction.
[5] That somewhat frightened conservative, Matthew Arnold,8 came here 
in the eighties to lecture us about culture. He began the habit of de­preciating Emerson. His lecture brings me to the fourth reason for Emerson's unpopularity. Arnold hinted that Emerson did not quite under­stand human weakness. Ours is the aspirin age, and we understand human weakness. Mr. T. S. Eliot9 has told us a number of times that man is full of sin. Mr. Reinhold Niebuhr10 has told us that man is full of sin. Monsignor Sheen11 has told us that man is fullof sin. The bright faith in man characteristic of the eighteenth cen­tury, the bright trust in spiritual development characteristic of much of the nineteenth century, were fallacies.
[6] Arnold allowed Emerson a single virtue. Emerson, he said, is the friend and aider of those who would live in the spirit. But we are in­formed that our profoundest failure, individual and political, is afailure of the spirit. For example, we are not truly successful indemocratizing Germany because there is lacking a spiritual content toour democracy. Through the Marshall Plan and through military aid toWestern Europe, there must glow, we are told, a radiancy of the spirit, or Communism will rush in. I do not understand how, if all men are weak, if all men are sinful, we can hope to maintain, much less improve, democratic society, I do not see how universal wickedness can be re­strained except by an authoritarian church and state, I do not see how free men can be held together by mere unanimity of evil hearts. Nothing, of course, is more flattering than to think of one's self as a great sinner, irreparably lost. Byron is a case in point. A new Byronism12
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now appears in poetry and theology, but I still suggest that some tinc­ture of virtue is necessary for citizens of a republic. However, I am not a theologian.
[7] By now you have rightly inferred that I find something important in Emerson. I am speaking of Emerson h propoa of our time in order to revalidate an old Harvard custom— the custom of dissent. The protection of dissent is old at Harvard. Emerson's Divinity School Address wae de­livered, whatever happened afterwards— an early example. President Lowell's13 refusal to discharge Mffnsterberg11* and Harold LaskiJ5, when mob feeling demanded it, is a second example. The refusal of the Presi­
dent and Fellows to silence Harlow Shapley16 at the demand of an influ­ential alumnus is a third. If Oxford's proudest products are its rebels, the proudest tradition of Harvard is the protection of dissent. Long may it be so. I sometimes think dissent may have no other placeto go if the drives for conformity continue. For a slow, irresistible drive against dissent does go forward. That is why Emerson is impor­tant. Let me briefly discuss four examples of the drive for conform­ity-two from politics, two from education.
[8] The British election shows what a genuine two-party system is— a system in which there is a fundamental philosophic issue. In Great Britain that issue lies between the Socialist state and the Tory state.No such issue divides the Republican state from the Democratic state. There is with us a set of persons called Democrats, some of them in office, and another set of persons calling themselves Republicans, not so many of whom are in office, but neither you nor I nor more competent observers can define the philosophic difference between these sets of persons in terms that will really make sense. Almost nothing could be more comic, if it were not so tragic, than to watch the Republicans hunting for somebody who will tell them what to do— a party in search of a platform. The only thing just as comic and just as tragic is the Democrats hunting for somebody who will tell them what they have done—  a platform in search of a party. We are afraid of political dissent.We are so afraid of it that we use every means we can to prevent the creation or continuation of a dissenting party, Communist, Progressive, or what have you. I wonder what Emerson would say to this spectacle—  he who interested himself in man rather than in mass.
[9] This example of our distrust of dissent is from the national scene. My next example is from the international scene. There is a country 
called Russia. There is something called the cold war. There is some­thing called the atom bomb, and there may be something called the hydro­gen bomb. Now I do not care whether you think Mr. Wallace is politically naive or whether you think Mr. Wallace is an instrument of Satan, but I find nothing more characteristic of the pressure of conformity upon opinion than to compare what happened to Mr. Wallace and what happenedto Senator McMahon. A few years ago Mr. Wallace was roundly smeared for urging that on the whole it would be more sensible patiently to continue to seek some accommodation with the Kremlin than to continue to slide down the terrifying spiral along which we are descending. Now that the
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situation has worsened, Senator McMahon--I mean no disrespect when I say he is safely ensconced in office--was a few weeks ago roundly applauded for saying very much the same thing. Mr. Wallace is on the political left and must therefore be intrinsically wrong; Senator McMahon is an administration Democrat, and must therefore be intrinsically right. We applaud the Christian sentiment of the one and denounce the identical Christian sentiment of the other. It is now, of course, clear that sensible persons were right in saying that no important military weapon and no important scientific discovery can be long kept secret, but as our emotions of conformity are always predictable when this question comes up, the Russians must be very pleased. It makes me think of what General Lee said when he learned that General McClellan had been called back to command the Army of the Potomac. "I am very happy that General McClellan is again opposed to me,'1 he remarked, "because I always know what he is going to do." I wonder what Emerson would tell us here about a foolish consistency, that hobgoblin of little minds.17
[10] I take my third example from the world of learning. I received a 
week or two ago an airmail letter asking me to protest against the action of twelve regents of the University of California who, in the teeth of faculty opinion, of administrative opinion, of gubernatorial opinion, of the opinion of six members of the board, and of the opinion of many outside the university, are determined to require a new oath from a faculty which has already taken an oath, and which has declined to take the new oath by a vote of 900 to O.10 It is apparently supposed not only that some member of the faculty may be a Communist, but that members of the faculty may, or might, or could, or would belong to mys­
terious organizations not named, mysteriously threatening the peace and dignity of California. The exact language of the proposed oath is:"That I am not a member of the Communist party, or under any oath, or a party to any agreement, or under any commitment that is in conflict with my obligation under this oath." No one knows what this language means except that it is insulting. It is not proved that any member of the California faculty has perjured himself or committed treason or acted as a spy. It is provable that the faculty of no university served the country more patriotically during the war. Now a majority of the re­gents has discovered that this same faculty are potential liars. They infer that the faculty might take oaths only to violate the oaths they take. They therefore set up this second oath, although if the oath- taker is not bound by oath number one, he is not going to be any more bound by oath number two. The effect is simply to penalize dissent. On the other hand, a friend of Emerson's preached active disloyalty to this government, an aunt of Emerson's helped that friend to violate the laws, and when this friend eulogized a rebel named John Brown, Emerson applaud­ed him. Now, as we quaintly say, we "teach" Thoreau's Essay on Civil 
Disobedience, even in California. I cite these familiar facts only that you measure from what Massachusetts permitted in 1850 what California 
demands in 1950.
[11] Let me turn to nqy last example. Passing over such obvious dangers to higher education as the military control of research, the extra­
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ordinary oath proposed to be attached to the National Science Founda­
tion, the stool-pigeon clause demanded by the Navy Department of offi­cers in training and happily modified because of student dissent, let me briefly contrast two patterns of collegiate training.
[12] I suppose the greatest president Harvard had in the nineteenth century was Charles W. Eliot. 9 Like Emerson he is now undervalued.He believed in the individual. His great work was to break up the cake of custom which then bound this college. He argued that if a man was old enough to go to college, he was old enough to know what he was go­ing to college for. Mr. Eliot therefore instituted the elective system. He restored dignity both to learning and to the scholar. He knew very well that many men would not profit under his system, and that many men would abuse his system, but he also knew very well that for men worth educating, this was education worthy of men. He had got tired of edu­cating boys. He guessed that the social gains would outweigh thesocial losses, and the brilliant roll call of distinguished Harvard men graduating in Mr. Eliot's time proves that he was right.
[13] I suppose the greatest president of the University of Chicago in the twentieth century is Mr. Hutchins.20 I honor Mr. Hutchins. He speaks his mind. He is a remarkable individual. But I am always puz­zled to know why Mr. Hutchins, who speaks his mind, infers that single- mindedness is therefore the principal virtue in liberal education. Mr. Hutchins has abandoned the pattern of Mr. Eliot and gone back to the pattern of Aquinas.21 I do not fully understand the Chicago system, but the part I do understand is the dogma that a selected list of great books is sufficient for, or synonymous with, a liberal education. These the teacher is to expound. The student is there to be taught. He may argue, he may debate, but he is there to master this library.
[14] But why a library? The people who wrote these books had no suchlibrary, for the most part. As Emerson said, librarians are not wiser than other men. Why is bookishness a virtue? What is a great book?Who determines when it is great enough to get in, or, what is more im­portant, small enough to be left out? Some books in some moments for some people have great beauty, and some books for some people at somemoments have great wisdom, but I submit that one gains as much pleasureand wisdom and instruction from little books as one does from big ones. Are there great books, indeed? May not one truly say there are only great readers of books, and that the great reader seldom confines him­self to any restricted list? Yet it is seriously maintained at Chicago that only by bookish authority can democracy be maintained and culture be enriched.
[15] It is regrettable that Abraham Lincoln's library was meager. He never read Aquinas. He merely wrote the Gettysburg Address, which is shorter than Pericles'22 and just as good. Meek young men, said Emerson,grow up in libraries believing it their duty to accept the views whichCicero,23 which Locke,2<f which Bacon25 have given, forgetful that Cicero, Locke, and Bacon were only young men in libraries when they wrote these
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books. It is true that Mr. Eliot put together the Harvard classics,but he did not do it to end a library; he merely thought it might be aneconomical way to begin one.
[16] I do not remember who first made popular the phrase: "failure ofnerve." But in these several instances of a drive to conformity, I de­tect a failure of nerve, a failure of belief in the individual.
[17] In each case, of course, there is something to be said for con­formity. There is always something to be said for conformity. I think, for example, something is to be said for the theory that whether the party in power is Democratic or Republican, we have in fact a coalition government; but a coalition government so insecure that it treats dis­sent as unpatriotic is not a government which Emerson, at any rate, could approve. The doctrine that "Papa knows best" troubles the presi­dency and the office of the secretary of state, but it is not the doc­trine of Emerson. The demand for patriotic oaths contrasts with the sentiment of a president26 in Emerson's time who once said of a rival that he would gladly hold General McClellan's stirrup, if by so doing hecould get the country through its danger.
[18] Honor is not manufactured by printed forms to be taken before a notary public; it is a function of manly self-respect— and it is a mark of the time that I feel almost apologetic for using so old-fashioned a phrase. The notion of standardized wisdom— so many parts of Plato,27 so many parts of Newton,26 so many parts of Milton;29 do not shake before taking— is a product of this same loss of nerve. It reveals hurry and distrust— hurry, because, when you have invented the formula, you can push the product through to its shaping, faster; distrust, because when you substitute uniformity of pattern for equality of individuals, you transfer your belief from the individuals to the pattern. A belatedEmersonian, I am still, in things of the spirit, for the individual.Robert Frost30 reminds us that a one-man revolution is the only revolu­tion that is coming.
[19] By this circuitous route I come back to Emerson and education. We have found out in two wars that if all we want to do is to train theyoung, we can do it cleverly. If all you want to do is to train theyoung, establish your pattern— Great Books, General Education, call it what you will— and the training may be admirable. But it will be only training. We set up these teaching patterns and then look around for somebody to make them operate instead of assuring ourselves that we first have men to teach.
[20] Like everybody else I have tinkered with the curriculum, but be­yond rudimentary common sense and the baser parts of diplomacy, it doesnot matter what the pattern is, provided you have good scholars andstudents who really want to learn. The pattern seems wonderful only fora time. Ask any Harvard graduate ten years out what the catalogue out­lined as proper education when he was a junior, and you will probablydraw a blank; ask him who taught him, and he will instantly recur inmemory to this or that powerful personality.
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[21] Education is a private affair. It is as private as falling in love. There is no such thing as general education, there are only specific individual educations. How often in the biographies of Harvard men do you find the phrase: "He studied with Agassiz, or Kittredge, or Royce, or Shaler!"31 How seldom does the curriculum appear except in a negative and crippling connotation!
[22] Education, I repeat, is a private affair. It is essentially a lonely business, which neither deans nor advisers nor proctors nor tu­tors nor professors can substitute for. Like religion and marriage, it is personal, the result of the impact of character upon character. My objection to some things we are trying to do here is that we havestrayed away from the spirit of Emerson.
[23] When Emerson uttered his famous phrase: "Trust thyself— everyheart vibrates to that iron string,"32 he makes, if I may say so, the whole iron curtain vibrate. He did not speak to the sentimental, the lazy, the superficial men, the men who are content to get by with the aid of a tutor and skilful appeals to the dean's office. What he had in mind is the stark truth that we brought nothing into this world and itis certain we can carry nothing out, and that therefore between thesepoles of time lies our only opportunity to develop character. And when he said that books are for the scholar's idle time, he did not mean that nobody should enter the Lamont Library.
[24] In a democracy we count by ones and not by masses, though there are those who would define democracy by another pattern— the hatred of those who count by masses. Hate, however, is neither salvation nor statesmanship. The great contribution of Emerson is not only that he agreed to count by ones, but he also believed that one— anyone— had in­finity behind him. I cannot defend this belief logically, though it looks suspiciously like Christianity, and is no more absurd than exis­tentialism. But in education, as in the national life, how are we to fortify the individual unless we rally infinity behind him? This will,I know, be incomprehensible to many and impractical to some, and I can only point to the historic truth that this doctrine, incomprehensible and impractical, is the child of Harvard— of the great, traditional Har­vard, the Harvard that I, who am merely Harvard by adoption, think we must not lose. When Lowell33 recited his ode for the Harvard dead in 1865, he did not celebrate the curriculum:
Those love her best who to themselves are true,And what they dare to dream of, dare to do;They followed her and found herWhere all may hope to find,Not in the ashes of the burnt-out mind,But beautiful with danger's sweetness round her.
[25] Perhaps if we looked more often, both faculty and students, upon the face of the statue in Emerson Hall, we might detect a smiling irony about its lips. Perhaps, if we looked at it oftener, a noble doubt, as Emerson would say, might suggest itself about our faith in advice, in pattern, in crutches, in conformity.
294
[26] Emerson's faith was not in machinery but in man thinking, whereas we today are proud of machines that think, and suspicious of any man who tries to. I see no reason for being as apologetic as we are about the protest of protestantism and the dissidence of dissent34 in a col­lege which was founded by dissenters; and difficult though it is to make my point, I for one dissent from current notions in college and country that democracy will survive only after you have imposed a pat­tern and made as many persons as possible conform to it.
[27] The educational problem is not conformity to any pattern, however lofty in intent; it is how to remove obstacles from the lonely path by which education sometimes results in man thinking. As for public life, I quote Mrs. Roosevelt: "Have we really reached the point where we must fear to join any group because at some time or other a person of Communist leanings, or supposed Communist leanings, might also join it? That is a terrible thing and we should be ashamed of it." I, too, am ashamed of this pressure of conformity. I do not think it is too late 
in the history of the republic, whether in education or in politics, to believe that Emerson is still the most excellent spiritual catalyst we have in a democracy. It is in that spirit I have tried to speak.
NOTES
1 speech: Ralph Waldo Emerson (1803-1882; American poet, essayist,and philosopher), "The Divinity School Address," July 15, 1838.
2 persona non grata: unacceptable person.
3 transcendentalism: philosophy that there is a spiritual reality(usually apprehensible by intuition, not reason) that transcends, is superior to, or is a priori to experience, to the material or empirical.
4 That. . .bloom: Emerson, "Threnody," 16-17.
5 Wallace's: Henry Agard Wallace (1888-1965; secretary of agricul­ture, 1933-1940; vice-president, 1941-1945; unsuccessful Progressive Party candidate for president, 1948).
6 Talleyrand: Charles Maurice de Tallerand-Perigord, Prince de B£n£vent (1754-1838; French statesman).
7 Metternich: Prince Klemens Wenzel Nepomuk Lothar von Metternich (1773-1859; Austrian statesman).
8 Matthew Arnold: (1822-1888; English poet and critic).
9 T. S. Eliot: Thomas Stearns Eliot (1888-1965; British, though American-born, poet and critic). See the introduction to Arnold's 
"The Grand Style."
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10 Reinhold Niebuhr: (1892- ; American Protestant theologian).
11 Monsignor Sheen: Monsignor (now Bishop) Fulton John Sheen (1895- ; American Roman Catholic cleric and apologist).
12 Byronism: affected or romantic consciousness of being irrevo­cably given to mysterious or unspeakable sins— after George Gordon, sixth Baron Byron (1788-1824; English poet).
13 President Lowell's: Abbott Lawrence Lowell (1856-1943; president of Harvard, 1909-1933).
^  Miinsterberg: Hugo Miinsterberg (1863-1916; German psychologistwho taught at Harvard).
15 Harold Laski: Harold Joseph Laski (1893-1950; English political scientist of liberal views who taught at Harvard from 1916 to 1920).
16 Harlow Shapley: (1885- ; Paine Professor of Astronomy at Har­
vard, vocal advocate of liberal causes).
17 a foolish. . .minds: "A foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds, adored by little statesmen and philosophers and divines" (Emerson, "Self-Reliance," Essays: First Series3 1841).
18 Subsequent votes on related issues should not be confused with this one as reported in the newspapers. At the time of going to press, the author's summary of the situation was believed to be reasonably 
correct [Jones's note].
19 Charles W. Eliot: Charles William Eliot (1834-1926; president of Harvard, 1869-1909).
20 Hutchins: Robert Maynard Hutchins (1899- ; president of theUniversity of Chicago, 1929-1945).
21 Aquinas: Saint Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274; Italian theologian and philosopher).
22 Pericles': (a. 495-429 B. C.; Athenian statesman).
23 Cicero: Marcus Tullius Cicero (106-43 B. C.; Roman statesman, orator, rhetorician, philosopher, and poet).
21* Locke: John Locke (1632-1704; English philosopher).
25 Bacon: Francis Bacon, first Baron Verulam and Viscount St.Albans (1561-1626; English philosopher, essayist, and jurist).
26 president: Lincoln.
27 Plato: (a. 427-347 B. C.; Greek philosopher).
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28 Newton: Sir Isaac Newton (1642-1727; English physicist and mathematician).
29 Milton: John Milton (1608-1674; English poet).
30 Robert Frost: (1874-1963; American poet).
31 Agassiz. . .Shaler: all teachers at Harvard: Jean Louis Rodolphe Agassiz (1807-1873; Swiss naturalist); George Lyman Kittredge (1860-1941; American philologist); Josiah Royce (1855-1916; American philosopher); Nathaniel Southgate Shaler (1841-1906; American geolo­gist).
32 "Trust. . .iron string": opening sentence of Emerson's "Self-Reliance" (see note 17).
33 Lowell: James Russell Lowell (1819-1891; American poet, essay­ist, and diplomat).
3lf protest. . .dissent: "the Dissidence of Dissent and the Prot­estantism of the Protestant religion" is a famous phrase from Matthew Arnold (see note 8), Culture and Anarchy (1869).
APPENDIX IV
We Were Not Skeptical Enough
"We Were Not Skeptical Enough" was written for This I  
Believe, a collection of philosophic observations from 
famous people. This necessarily short essay is a convenient 
beginning illustration of the use of examples as a basic pat­
tern of exposition.
I  was bom in what was called "An Age of Unbelief." When I  was l
young t took that description seriously, and I  thought that I  was 
an intellectual because of the number of things I  did not believe.
Only very slowly did i  come to realize that what was really s
characteristic of myself and my age was not that we did not believe 
anything but that we believed very firmly in a number of things 
which are not really so.
We believed, for example, in the exclusive importance of the 3
material, the measurable, and tire controllable. We had no doubts 
about "what science proves" and we took it for granted that what­
ever science did not prove was certainly false.
Copyright ©  1954 by Help, Inc. Reprinted by permission of Simon and Schuster.
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When, for example, "science proved" that man had risen from *
the lower animals, we believed, as I  still do. that this is a fact. But 
when science found it difficult to define, or measure, or deal with 
the ways in which a man’s mind, and character and motives differ 
from those of the lower animals, we believed that there was no 
important difference between them. The trouble was not that we 
were skeptical but that we were not skeptical enough.
We studied man by the methods which had proved fruitful for s
the study of animals and machines. We learned a great deal about 
his reflexes, animal drives, the ways in which he could be condi* 
tioned to behave. And then, because our methods did not permit 
us to learn anything else about him, we came to the conclusion 
that there was nothing else to be learned.
We came to believe, to take the most familiar example, that 8 
love was “nothing but" the biological impulses connected with 
sex. What is even more important, we came also to believe that 
his thinking was "nothing but” his power of rationalization and 
that his ideals and values were “nothing but" the results of his 
early conditioning. We began to assume that what he believed to 
be his free choices were not really anything of the sort; that he 
was not the captain of his soul but only what the dialectic of 
society or perhaps his infantile fixations had made him. He was,' 
we tended to believe, not a cause but an effect
Seldom before in the history of civilization has the world been 7 
in so parlous a state and not often before have men seemed to 
believe less in a God who would save them. Yet it is at this mo­
ment that we have lost faith in man himself as a prime mover 
of events.
What I  believe in most firmly is man himself. And by that I  * 
mean something quite specific. I  believe that he descended from 
the animals but that he has powers which animals share but little, 
if at all. I believe that he is something in himself. I  believe that 
he can will, and choose and prefer.
That means, for example, that society is what he makes it, not 9 
that he is what society makes him. It  means that he can be per­
mitted to think, not merely conditioned by good or bad propa­
ganda. I  believe, therefore, that he can be freed, and that means 
a good deal more than given the vote or permitted civil liberties.
The difference between a totalitarian and a democratic society Is 
the difference between those who believe the individual man
v
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capable of being the captain of his soul and those who believe that 
he is merely the creature of the society in which he lives.
I  believe that we cannot set the world free until we believe that 
the individual himself is free.
APPENDIX V
“It's Pretty, but Is It Art?”
Sylvia Angus
CO In  art, this is not the age of anxiety, the pill, or the-bomb.
I t  is the age of "willingness." Even the most conservative classicists feel, 
as they sneali home for a bit of Haydn on the hi-fi, that they should give 
the avant-garde “ a chance.”  To those genuinely interested in the great 
variety of artistic experiment now going on, curiosity has reached a fever 
pitch in which willingness has completely overborne that philistine thing, 
the critical faculty. Everything is grist for the m ill; everything is, at the 
very least, "interesting."
(2 )  Unfortunately, a great deal of current experiment in the
arts is not interesting. A rt has always been experimental, but never before
Frcm Saturday Review’, September 2, 1967. Copyright 1967 Saturday Review, Inc 
Reprinted by permission o f the publisher and the author.
From The Saturday Review, September 2, 1967. Copyright 1967 





has the audience for art been called upon to find all the trials and errors 
"interesting,"  and it does art a disservice to accept everything offered w ith 
the same bland, slightly nervous acquiescence.
(3 )  There is, for example, the recent case o f the touring
group called “ Contemporary Voices in the Arts,”  sponsored by the New 
York Council on the Arts, which visited a number of college campuses 
all over the state. The idea was interesting. The artists were well-known, 
avant-garde people with a significant body of work behind them in  film, 
sculpture, painting, music, poetry, and dance. One could expect that an 
artistic galaxy which included Merce Cunningham, Jack Tworkov, John 
Cage, Len Lye, Robert Creeley, Stanley Vanderbeek, and Billy Kluver 
would have something significant to say and to show about the arts they 
are engaged in.
(4 )  Curiously enough, their largely student and faculty au­
diences found that they had a great deal of value to say (which was not 
their main intention) and very little  to show (which was). Audiences 
were treated to a kind of traveling circus, but a circus manque, a tedious 
circus. Films flickered simultaneously on screens, walls, and ceilings; 
shrill and unrelated noises attacked the eardrums in long, continuous 
squeals; artists wandered about, coyly lighting matches when lights failed; 
a so called panel discussion on the arts resolved itself into several people 
making desultory remarks and joshing each other like small boys; artists 
amblca about the stage like actors on the first day of a rehearsal when 
they do not yet know their lines or even their roles. I t  was a “happen­
ing," and, for most of the audiences, a bore. The point of all this is that 
the performance was not billed as a "happening" but purported to be an 
experience in the new art forms, the “ random” arts.
(5 )  The most curious and significant thing about this per­
formance, and one of the most telling criticisms of current experiments 
in “ the random” as 3n art technique, came on the day after the perform­
ance, when the arusts in small groupings spoke to students about the 
purposes and met >:>ds of their arts. Cogently, lucidly, in logical, sequen-' 
tial prose, they e>: lined that art should be a total, sensory experience 
which should be ail; wed to flow over and through one; that it  should not 
be examined for logic, lucidity, or sequence. Clearly, rationally, they 
made the reasonable point that art has too long concentrated on intellec­
tual perceptions, and that this, the age of exploding mass media and new 
technology, should be a time to seek sense experience in whatever ran­
dom arrangement of sight, smell, or sound might present itself at any 
given moment. W ith  admirable intellectual coherence, they made a most 
persuasive case for the nonintellectual, random art with which the audi­




C6) A rt today, like science, is in the grip c f the uncertainty
principle. Einstein began it w ith relativity, and now Heisenberg has 
shown that the smallest particles of matter are indeterminate in their mo­
tion. The sense of this relativity and indeterminateness has filtered into 
all our consciousnesses. I f  randomness is a fundamental truth of science, 
why is it not also applicable to art? In a seeming attempt to assert the 
unity of science and art, we have now gone far along the path of asserting 
that the random is or can be art.
(7 )  I f  we allow, for the moment, that the artists in the ex­
periment above have a rational theory for asserting that the random can 
produce art, we are faced w ith a number of criticisms of random “art” 
based on their own demonstrative performances, which suffered from at 
least the following five problems, any one of which is capable of destroy­
ing any art:
*
1. Overkill—the expenditure of too much effort or attention for . insufficient 
sensory or emotional reward.
2. Pretentiousness—the declaration of significance when the significance of­
fered is minor or cliche.
3. Inarticulateness—the inadequate communication which comes from lack of 
understanding by the artist of what might happen during his experiments.
4. Lack of Direction—not quite the same as lack of goal. There need not be a 
final goal in sight, hut the lack of any sense of direction produces circular 
art, and circular art ceases to be interesting after two or three revolutions.
5. Tedium—the open-ended tiresomeness of material so shapeless and unstruc­
tured that it  doesn’t know when to stop.
(8 )  The above criticisms are criticisms of random art as art. 
I f  it  is art, then it is too often poor art, and it is the audience's duty 
to point this out and not to generalize feebly that all of it is interesting. 
There is no more justification for uncritical acceptance of any and all 
assaults upon the senses in the name of art than there is justification for 
accepting passively the drilling of experimental dentists. Experiment is 
always valuable, but experiment is only “art”  when it succeeds. Robert 
Frost once remarked that he did not require that a potato be covered w ith 
earth for him to accept it as a potato. It is perhaps equally unnecessary 
that we be w illing ly on deck for an artist’s trials and errors. These trial 
runs are best confined to the artist’s studio until he works the bugs out of 
what he is doing.
'9 )  W hich brings me, of course, to the positive, i f  heretical,
point I  am making: that totally random or accidental art is not art at all. 
It is "a happening,”  and "a happening” is a form of social interaction, a
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kind of group dynamics. Happenings can be great fun; they can turn one 
on; they can stimulate and entertain; they can even provoke spiritual or 
sensory awakenings. That, however, doesn’t make them art any more 
than a motorcycle trip, or a trip to a supermarket, or a fall down a well is 
art, though any one of them may also stimulate, entertain, or awaken us. 
I f  any and all experience can be labeled art and demand our attention as 
art, then clearly the word has lost all meaning and turned into mush.
(10) This is not, as it  may seem to some, a mere semantic 
quibble. I t  is an attempt to gain some perspective in an area where per­
spective itself has become suspect. There is a not-so-underground effort 
being made these days to turn the word "experience" into an all-purpose 
shrine before which we must keep an eternal flame burning. We are 
supposed to seek experience at all costs, and, what is more, we are being 
conned into dignifying all experience w ith the title of "art.” But all ex­
perience is not art, which has always been a rather special area o f experi­
ence, Experience can be had, and is had, at any time of the day or night. 
To ride the New York subway on an August day is an experience. I t  is 
equally an experience to hoe a row of carrots, to swim across a lake, to go , 
to the toilet, to spank one's child, or to be converted to Mohammedanism. 
I f  all of these can also be called “art,” then clearly what we are doing is 
simply melting our language down into one blob in which differentia­
tions can no longer be made—anti-intellectualism with a vengeance!
(11 ) "Experience” is the most important " in ”  word we have 
at the moment; everyone from Timothy Leary to Marshall McLuhan, the 
Fugs, and 3,000,000 students are for it. So am I. W hat I  am against is 
being told to recognize as art any random group of chance and often tire­
some irrelevancies which may give me a reaction, an “experience," no 
matter of what kind of quality. For if there is one thing about which I  
am perfectly clear, it is that art implies control. I t  is the precise opposite 
of randomness.
(12 ) Here, precisely, is where scientific truth and artistic truth 
part company. The atomic particle mav be indeterminate, but man is not. 
The random, the formless, is basically impossible and uninteresting to 
man, who is, w illy-nilly, a pattern-making animal. Given a blank wall, 
man w ill form its cracks into a design. Set down in chaos, man w ill sep­
arate the whirling from the stationary, for chaos and meaninglessness, as 
the existentialists have discovered, are the hardest of all things for man 
to endure. To expect that he can, without drugs, turn off his brain and 
float on a sensory sea is as illogical as to expect, conversely, that he can 
react on a purely intellectual plane, untainted by the perceptions of his 
senses. That the over-intellectualizing of art has caused rms violent pen­
dulum swing in the opposite direction is a reason, but nc: an excuse, for 
the excesses of die present position. The idea of a random “ art”  may
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seem a corrective to rigidified, overformalized art forms, but it  is a funda­
mentally useless correction. Man is a sensing animal all right, but he is 
also a thinking reed, and it is futile to attempt to lim it his art to the 
narrow compass of his senses.
(13 ) In  the long artistic past of humanity an accidental, ran­
dom stroke has often produced significant art, but it took the artist’s eye 
to recognize what the random stroke had done. Today we are being asked 
to watch our artists doodle in public and to cull from their doodles what­
ever appeals to us. This may be fun, but it gives the performers no cachet 
to be known as artists, since we are asked to do our own discriminating 
and make our own selections on purely subjective grounds. The artists 
who do this are rapidly putting themselves out of work, since the end 
point to this method must be "every man his own artist."
(14 ) The artist who tosses a pot of paint at a wall, or hangs 
a wrecked car from the ceiling, or holds the microphone up to record his 
gargling and then tells us to look and to "experience” is doing no more 
than the merchant who displays before us an assortment of textiles, 
thread, buttons, and braid, and suggests we choose what we like and 
make ourselves a dress. I f  we select the materials, and i f  we plan and exe­
cute the dress, the experience may be salutary for us, but do we call the 
merchant a couturier? Is his randomly heaped assortment of materials 
"art'?
(1 5 ) M y criticism of these experiments in the random, then, 
is not that they may not produce interesting, beautiful, or moving things, 
but that they are simply not art. They may produce excitement, gaiety, 
tedium, or a headache, but so can a day on the beach. I f  there is no focus­
ing, organizing intelligence behind it, there is no art in any meaningful 
sense of the word.
(1 6 ) W hat is needed, it  seems, is to redefine yet again, and
for a new generation, what we mean by art—a hazardous but a peren­
nially necessary job. T o  start w ith the easier end, let us clarify what art is 
not. I t  is not, as the current definition would have us believe, the com­
munication of experience, not even of moving or emotional experience— 
though it includes this function. Too many moving and emotionally 
communicated experiences occur every day which are not art—for exam­
ple, a man telling, us how his dog was run over, or a girl describing hex 
hatred of her mother. A rt is not any accidental pattern of color, shape, or 
sound which delights us. Nature is fu ll of such delightful accidents, but 
nature is not art. Art, in  short, cannot be defined by what it does to us, 
because we can be moved, stimulated, angered, made ecstatic by a vast 
number of personal experiences which are not artistic in nature.
(1 7 ) W hat is left, then, i f  we cannot define art by what it
does, is to define it  by what it  is. W ith  more bravery than good sense, I
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w ill climb well out on a lim b and define it  as follows: A n  is the con- 
trolled structuring of a medium or a material to communicate as vividly 
and movingly as possible the artist's personal vision of experience.
(18) This definition, be it noted, allows for weak art or for
great art, depending on the skill or stature of the artist. I t  does not allow 
any place for the random or totally unstructured. The key words are 
"controlled structuring." Experience, emotion, communication are all in ­
gredients, but all are insufficient without the controlling mind, which, 
alone, is capable of producing art. A rt is not what we experience-, it  is the 
controlled product of the artist’s experience. Our reaction to it  is our own 
affair, but art comes from the artist—purposefully. I f  we give back to the 
word art a rational meaning, we can then go happily on to enjoy or to 
abominate random happenings without destroying the intellectual basis 




CO Being frustrated is disagreeable, but the real disasters in
life begin when you get what you want. For almost a century now, a
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great many intelligent, well-meaning and articulate people—of a kind 
generally called liberal or intellectual, or both—have argued eloquently 
against any kind of censorship of art and/or entertainment.
(2 )  And with in tnc past 10 years, the courts and the legisla­
tures of most Western nations have found these arguments persuasive— 
so persuasive that hardly a man is now alive who clearly remembers what 
the answers to these arguments were. Today, in the United States and 
other democracies, censorship has to all intents and purposes ceased to
exist.
(3 )  Is there a sense of triumphant exhilaration in the land? 
Hardly. There is, on the contrary, a rapidly growing unease and disquiet. 
Somehow, things have not worked out as they were supposed to, and 
many notable civil libertarians have gone on record as saying this was not 
what they meant at all.
(4 )  They wanted a world in which “Desire Under the Elms" 
could be produced, or “ Ulysses’' published, without interference by 
philistine busybodies holding public office. They have got that, of course; 
hut they have also got a world in which homosexual rape takes place on 
the stage, in which the public flocks during lunch hours to witness vari­
eties of professional fornication.
(5 )  But disagreeable as this may be, does it  really matter? 
M ight not our unease and disquiet be merely a cultural hangover—a 
"hangup,’' as they say? W hat reason is there, to th ink that anyone was 
ever corrupted by a book?
(6 )  This last question, oddly enough, is asked by the very 
same people who seem convinced that advertisements in magazines or 
displays of violence on television do indeed have the power to corrupt. It 
is also asked, incredibly enough and in all sincerity, by people—e.g., uni­
versity professors and school teachers—whose very lives provide all the 
answers one could want.
(7 )  A fter all, i f  you believe that no one was ever corrupted 
by a book, you have also to believe that no one was ever improved by a 
book (or a play or a movie). You have to believe, in other words, that all 
art is morally trivial and that, consequently, all education is morally 
irrelevant No one, not even a university professor, really believes that.
(8 )  To  be sure, it is extremely difficult, as social scientists tell 
us, to 'race the effects of any single book (or play or movie) on an indi­
vidual reader or any class of readers. But we all know, and social scien­
tists know it too, that the ways in which we use our minds and imagina­
tions shape our characters and help define us 3s persons. That those who 
certainly know this are nevertheless moved to deny it merely indicates 
how a dogmatic resistance to the idea of censorship can—like most dog- 
matism—result in a mindless insistence on the absurd.
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(9 )  I  have used these harsh terms—"dogmatism”  and "mind­
less”—advisedly. I might also have added “hypocritical.”  For the plain 
fact is that none of us is a complete civil libertarian. W e all believe that 
there is some point at which the public authorities ought to step in to 
lim it the "sell expression" of an individual or a group, even where this 
might be seriously intended as a form of artistic expression, and even 
where the artistic transaction is between consenting adults.
(10 ) A playwright or theatrical director might, in dtis crazy 
world of ours, find someone w illing to commit suicide on the stage, as 
called for by the script. We would not allow that—any more than we 
would permit scenes of real physical torture on the stage, even i f  the vic- 
tim  were a w illing masocnist.
(11 ) The basic point that emerges is one that W alter Berns 
has powerfully argued in his superb essay, "Pornography vs. Democracy” :. 
No society can be utterly indifferent to the ways its citizens publicly 
entertain themselves.
(1 2 ) Bcarbaiting and coclcfighting are prohibited only in part 
out o f compassion for the suffering animals; the main reason they were 
abolished was that it was fe lt they debased and brutalized the citizenry 
who flocked to witness such spectacles. And the question we face with 
regard to pornography and obscenity is whether, now that they have such 
strong legal protection from the Supreme Court, they can or w ill brutalize 
and debase our citizenry.
(13 ) W e are, after all, not dealing w ith one passing incident— 
one book, or one play, or one movie. We are dealing w ith a general 
tendency that is suffusing our entire culture.
(14 ) I  say pornography and obscenity because, though they 
have different dictionary definitions and are frequently distinguishable as 
"artistic" genres, they are nevertheless in the end identical in effect. Por­
nography is not objectionable simply because it arouses sexual desire or 
lust or prurience in the mind of the reader or spectator; this is a silly 
Victorian notion.
(1 5 ) A great many nonpornographic words—including some 
parts of the Bible—excite sexual desire very successfully. W hat is distinc­
tive about pornography is that, in the words of D. H . Lawrence, it  at­
tempts "to do dirt on (sex) . . .  ( I t  is an) insult to a vital human rela­
tionship.”
(16 ) In other words, pornography differs from erotic art in  that 
its whole purpose is to treat human beings obscenely, to deprive human 
beings of their specifically human dimension. That is what obscenity is 
all about. I t  is light years removed from any kind of carefree sensuality— 
there is no continuum between Fielding’s "Tom  Jones” and the Marcuis 
de Sade's" j  ustinft.”
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(17 ) It may well he that Western society, in the latter half of
the 20th century, is experiencing a drastic change in sexual mores and 
sexual relationships. We have had many such "sexual revolutions" in the 
past—and the bourgeois family and bourgeois ideas of sexual propriety 
were themselves established in the course of a revolution against 18th 
century "licentiousness”—and we shall doubtless have others in the future.
(18 ) It is, however, highly improbable (to  put it  m ild ly) th a t, 
what wc are witnessing is the final revolution which w ill make sexual 
relations utterly unproblematic, permit us to dispense with any kind of 
ordered relationships between the.sexes, and allow us freely to redefine 
the human condition. And so long as humanity has not reached that 
utopia, obscenity w ill remain a problem.
(19 ) Sex—like death—is an activity that is both animal and 
human. There are human sentiments and human ideals involved in this 
animal activity. But when sex is public, the viewer does not see—cannot 
see—the sentiments and the ideals. He can only see the animal coupling.
(20) And that is why, when men and women make love, as we
say, they prefer to be alone—because it is only when you are alone that 
you can make love, as distinct from merely copulating in an animal and 
casual way. And that, too, is why those who are voyeurs, iE they are not . 
irredeemably sick, also feel ashamed at what they are witnessing. When 
sex is a public spectacle, a human relationship has been debased into a 
mere animal connection. ;
(21 ) The basic psychological fact about pornography and ob­
scenity is that it appeals to and provokes a kind of sexual regression. The 
sexual pleasure one gets from pornography and obscenity is autoerotic and 
infantile; to put it bluntly, it is a masturbatory exercise of the imagina­
tion, when -it is not masturbation pure and simple. Now, people who 
masturbate do not get bored with masturbation, just as sadists don’t get 
bored with sadism, ar.d voyeurs don’t get bored with voyeurism,
(22) In other words, infantile sexuality is not only a perma­
nent temptation for the adolescent or even the adult—it can quite easily 
become a permanent, self-reinforcing neurosis.
(23) What is at stake is civilization and humanity, nothing 
less. The idea that "everything is permitted," as Nietzsche put it, rests on 
the premise of nihilism and his nihilistic implications. I w ill not pretend 
that the case against nihilism and for civilization is an easy one to make. 
W e are here confronting the most fundamental of philosophical ques­
tions, on the deepest levels.
(24 ) But that is precisely my point—that the matter of por­
nography and obscenity is not a trivial one, anu that only superficial 
jjjjgd^ggn^take a bland and untroubled view of it.
(25 ) In  this connection, I might also point out that those who
i
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are primarily against censorship on liberal grounds tell us not to take 
pornography or obscenity seriously, while those who are for pornography 
and obscenity on radical grounds, take it very seriously indeed.
(26 ) I believe the radicals—writers like Susan Sontag, Herbert 
Marcuse, Norman O. Erown, and even Jerry Rubin—are right, and the 
liberals are wrong. I also believe that those young radicals at Berkeley, 
some five years ago, who provoked a major confrontation over the public
. use of obscene words, showed a brilliant political instinct.
(2 7 ) Once the faculty and administration had capitulated on 
this issue saying: "Oh, for God's sake, let's be adult: W hat difference 
does it make anyway?"—once they said that, they were bound to lose on 
every other issue. And once Mark Rudd could publicly ascribe to the 
president of Columbia a notoriously obscene relationship to his mother, 
without provoking any kind of reaction, the SDS had already won the 
day. The occupation of Columbia’s buildings merely ratified their victory.
(2 8 ) Men who show themselves unwilling to defend civiliza­
tion against nihilism are not going to be either resolute or effective in 
defending the university against anything.
(29 ) 1 am already touching upon a political aspect of pornog­
raphy when I  suggest that it is inherently and purposefully subversive 
of civilization and its institutions. But there is another and more specific-' 
ally political aspect, which has to do with the relationship of pornography 
and/or obscenity to democracy, and especially to the quality of public 
life  on which democratic government ultimately rests.
(3 0 ) Though the phrase, "the quality of life," trips easily from
so many lips these days it tends to be one of those cliches w ith many 
trivial meanings and no large, serious one. Rarely does it have anything to 
ido w ith the way the citizen in a democracy views himself—his obliga- 
Itions. his in tentions, his ultimate self-definition.
( 3 iX  There is an old idea of democracy—one which was fairly
common until about the beginning of this century—for which the con­
ception of the quality of public life is absolutely crucial. This idea starts 
from the proposition that democracy is a form of self-government, and 
that i f  you want it to be a meritorious polity, vou have to care about 
what kind of people govern it. Indeed, it puts the matter more strongly 
and declares that, if  you want self-government, you are only entitled to 
it  i f  that "self”  is worthy of governing.
(5 2 ) And because the desirability of seJf-govemment depends
Ion the character of the people who govern, the older idea of democracy 
was very solicitous of the condition of this character. I t  was solicitous of 
jthat collective self which we call public opinion and which, in a democ­
racy. governs us collectively.
(3 3 ) And because it cared, this older idea o f democracy had
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no problem in principle with pornography and/or obscenity. I t  censored 
them—and it did so with a perfect clarity of mind and a perfectly clear 
conscience. It was not about to permit people capriciously to corrupt 
ihcmselves,
(34 ) I  have, it may be noticed, uttered that dreadful word,
"censorship." And I  am not about to back away from it. IF you think 
pornography and/or obscenity is a serious problem, you have to be for 
censorship. I 'l l  go even further and say that if  you want to prevent por­
nography and/or obscenity from becoming a problem, you have to be for 
censorship. And lest there be any misunderstanding as to what I  am say­
ing, I ’ll put it as bluntly as possible: I f  you care for the quality of life in 
our American democracy, then you have to be for censorship.
(35 ) But can a liberal be for censorship? Unless one assumes
that being a liberal must mean being indifferent to the quality of Ameri­
can life, then the answer has to be: yes, a liberal can be for censorship— 
but he ought to favor a liberal fcrrn of censorship.
(36 ) Is that a contradiction in terms? I  don’t think so. We.
have no problem in contrasting repressive laws governing alcohol and 
drugs ana tobacco with laws regulating (i.e., discouraging the sale o f) 
alcohol and drugs and tobacco. Laws encouraging temperance are not the 
same thing as laws that have as their goal prohibition or abolition.
(37 ) We have not made the smoking of cigarets a criminal ’ 
offense. W e have, however, and w ith good liberal conscience, prohibited 
cigaret advertising on television, and may yet, again with good liberal con­
science, prohibit it in newspapers and magazines. The idea of restricting
!individual freedom, in a liberal way, is not at all unfamiliar to us.
(38 ) I  therefore see no reason whv we should not be able to
distinguish repressive censorship from liberal censorship o f the written 
and spoken word.
(39 ) This possibility, of course, occasions much distress among 
artists and academics. It is a fact, one that cannot and should not be 
denied, that any system of censorship is bound, upon occasion, to treat 
unjustly a particular work of art—to find pornography where there is only 
gentle eroticism, to find obscenity where none really exists, or to find both 
where its existence ought to be tolerated because it serves a larger morali purpose.(4 0 ) I t  is such works of art that are likely to suffer at the hands| of the censor. That is the price one has to be prepared to pay for censor- 
I ship—even liberal censorship.
(41 ) But just how high is this price? I f  you believe, as so many
artists seem to believe today, that art is the only sacrosanct activity in our 
profane and vulgar world—that any man who designates himself an artist 
thereby acquires a sacred office—then obviously censorship is an intoler-
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Iable form of sacrilege. But For those of us who do not subscribe to this religion of art, the costs of censorship do not seem so high at all.(42 ) But I must repeat and emphasize: W hat kind of laws we 
pass governing pornography and obscenity, what kind of censorship or 
—since we are still a federal nation—what kinds of censorship we insti­
tute in our various localities may indeed be difficult matters to cope with; 
nevertheless the real issue is one of principle.
(4 3 ) I  myself subscribe to a liberal view of the enforcement 
problem: I think that pornography should be illegal and available to any­
one who wants it so badly as to make a pretty strenuous effort to get i t  
W e have lived w ith under-the-counter pornography for centuries now in 
a fairly comfortable way. But the issue of principle, of whether it should 
be over or under the counter, has to be settled before we can reflect on 
the advantages of alternative modes of censorship.
(44 ) I  think the settlement we are living under now, in which 
obscenity and democracy are regarded as equals, is wrong; I  believe it is 
inherently unstable: I  think it w ill, in the long run, be incompatible w ith 
anv authentic concern for the quality of life in  our democracy.
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